Honeypots: Re: Stealth VM

[Stuart Thomas <stuartpaulthomas () gmail com>]

Michael Owen wrote:
> > Stuart Gilchrist-Thomas dijo:
> >     
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > Does anyone have any pointers to evidence or advice on hiding or
> > > reducing the detection of VM honey pots. I know of temporal issues
> > > e.g. Timing metrics can give away a VM, and that you can manually
> > > alter peripheral identities e.g. virtual network cards etc. 
> > >       
> > I've also
> >     
> > > created a company to purchase ip and hosting space to ensure a form
> > > of identity in depth. But I still lack experience in preventing
> > > detection. Can you help? Are you my only hope? ;)
> > >       
> > Why hide the fact that the honeypot is running on VM? After all, many
> > environments in production (@datacenters) are running over VM. Those
> > intruders that think that VM == honeypot will change their 
> > mindset soon.
> > Regards
> >
> > Javier
> >
> >     
> As Javier says, I'd go the complete other direction. If you're running VMware, install the VMware Tools (as they would be on a normal guest). Don't rename the PCI devices, as you'd be unlikely to ever do that in a real production environment. Assume that there is no way to hide the fact that is in a VM, and make it look like a real VM. Many VMs tend to be specialized in what service they provide, so make sure that your Honey VMs are doing that. You wouldn't have a normal production machine serving up http, smtp and smb, so don't make your Honey VM do that. Make it look just like a real production VM. 
>
> Mike
>   
Good points Mike, thanks. My query was blended towards Malware analysis 
and it's detection of it's environment too. I like your points though, 
so would VM Workstations and GSX server appear the same from any 
"leaked" VM signatures? I only have access to a licenced version of 
VMWare workstation.
Cheers,
Stu