Hehe, nice try...
Bennet wrote:
> Wow. If you leave out all those things, what's left?
Having tracked firewall-wizards for some time I accept the fact that the
"Firewall-Host" in itself is just a tiny piece in your security framework.
However, it might be a crucial piece...
So the question is: Is it smart to take the abilities of a FW-Host for
granted and protect the network / the connected hosts only against stuff
the FW-Host cannot protect against?
Example: I have an NT-Host behind the FW which is vulnerable to POD or
NetBIOS-Attacks. However, the FW-Host is supposed to filter out this kind
of traffic. How far can I trust the _current_ products to do just that?
> Are you sure it belongs on firewall-wizards?
Hope this actually belongs here...
Regards,
Hartmut
Dipl.-Inf. Hartmut Fehling
Hamburg-Mannheimer Versicherungs-AG
Überseering 45
22287 Hamburg
Tel 040 - 6376 - 3599
Fax 040 - 6376 - 4784
E-Mail Hartmut.Fehling_at_Hamburg-Mannheimer.de
Received on Nov 10 1997