I think the proper authentication system should include bogus key you
may provide if you are forced to; it should work as expected for a while
silently turning all remote alarm systems on; and then suddenly stop anyways.
On Thu, Apr 14, 2005 at 08:25:46AM -0600, Aaron Smith wrote:
> On Fri, 2005-04-01 at 00:02 +0530, Devdas Bhagat wrote:
> > > The implementation doesn't matter if the attacker set believes that they
> > > can breach the system. For instance, if a rumor starts that iris scanners
> > > in ATMs open up if you pop out an eyeball and hold it on the end of a pen,
> > > there will be a bunch of one-eyed victims running around _even if the
> > > premise is untrue_.
> >
> > http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4396831.stm
> >
> > Anyone feel like continuing to use or recommend biometrics?
> >
> > I would *much* rather be safe.
> >
> > Devdas Bhagat
> > _______________________________________________
>
> All I can say is that my life is worth much more than a car. Forget the
> complicated, high-tech protection mechanism--if somebody is willing to
> kill or maim me to steal my car, I'll happily open it and give them the
> keys. I'd rather have a good insurance policy than biometric protection
> on something like that.
>
> _________________________________
>
> @@ron Smith <smitha_at_byui.edu>
> Network Operations
> Brigham Young University Idaho
>
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Received on Apr 15 2005
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