>>>>> "Crist" == Crist J Clark <cristjc_at_comcast.net> writes:
Crist> I have not found much information about the network security of
Crist> factory installations of TiVo (this one is not "customized" in any
Crist> way, yet). What sort of risks am I running if this thing is on the
Crist> WLAN? Are there any listening services someone could break into? (I'd
Crist> just nmap it, but I'd like to know some of these answers before I
Crist> bother getting a USB WiFi unit.) What protocols are used for upload
Crist> and download? If they are not well known (FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, etc.) or
Crist> are proprietary, anyone know how easy passive eavesdropping or active
Crist> insertion or modification attacks may be?
The connections are outbound for fetching program guide and remote
programming requests (it polls every 15 minutes for remote
programming), using HTTP to a non-standard port. The program guide is
an encrypted payload, but otherwise HTTPS is not used.
Home Media Option uses peer to peer HTTP, again with an encrypted
payload on a non-standard port.
The box doesn't have any ports open except when HMO is enabled.
If you're using this only for program guide fetching or remote
programming (no peer-to-peer HMO), you can probably get away with
simply punching a hole to talk to the tivo central on a specific port
from your box. You can enable WEP to prevent casual sniffing: the
TiVo understands WEP with a single fixed 40 or 128 bit key.
Let me know if you have a more specific question. I've been using
mine in wireless mode for longer that most people around. :)
--
Randal L. Schwartz - Stonehenge Consulting Services, Inc. - +1 503 777 0095
<merlyn@stonehenge.com> <URL:http://www.stonehenge.com/merlyn/>
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Received on Jan 03 2004
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