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Full Disclosure: Re: [Apparmor-dev] Re: Re: [SC-L] Re: [Owasp-dotnet] RE: 4 Questions:Latest IE vulnerability, Firefox vs IE security, User vs Admin risk profile, and browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code

Re: [Apparmor-dev] Re: Re: [SC-L] Re: [Owasp-dotnet] RE: 4 Questions:Latest IE vulnerability, Firefox vs IE security, User vs Admin risk profile, and browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code

From: Crispin Cowan <crispin_at_novell.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 16:28:23 -0700

Brian Eaton wrote:
> Does cap_setuid give a program enough authority to break out of the
> AppArmor profile?
>
No, cap_setuid is not sufficient. In fact, being full root is not
sufficient to break out of AppArmor confinement. Rood daemons being one
of the greatest threats to the system, AppArmor would not be very useful
if it could not confine root.

Crispin 

-- 
Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.                      http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/
Director of Software Engineering, Novell  http://novell.com
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Received on Apr 10 2006
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