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CERT Advisory CA-95:05.sendmail.vulnerabilities
From: cert-advisory () cert org (CERT Advisory)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 1995 17:15:24 -0500

=============================================================================
CA-95:05                        CERT Advisory
                              February 22, 1995
                            Sendmail Vulnerabilities
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

This advisory supersedes all previous CERT advisories on sendmail.

The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of several problems with
sendmail, one of which is widely known. The problems occur in many versions of
sendmail (see below for details).

The CERT staff recommends installing the appropriate patches immediately.  If
you cannot do so, consider using one of the alternatives described in Section
III.

As we receive additional information relating to this advisory, we
will place it, along with any clarifications, in a CA-95:05.README
file. CERT advisories and their associated README files are available
by anonymous FTP from info.cert.org. We encourage you to check the
README files regularly for updates on advisories that relate to your
site.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

I.   Description

     There is a problem in versions of sendmail that support IDENT (RFC 1413)
     functionality. This problem could allow an intruder to gain unauthorized
     access to your system remotely (that is, without having access to an
     account on the system). Systems known at this time to be affected are
     named in the Solutions section below; see the column labeled "Remote
     vul?/patch status." 

     In addition, other problems have been identified in sendmail that allow
     intruders to gain unauthorized privileges. Intruders need to have access
     to an account on your system to exploit these problems. The problems
     occur in many versions of sendmail. The final column of the table in the
     Solutions section indicates systems known at this time to be affected. 

II.  Impact

     By exploiting the vulnerabilities, intruders may be able to read any file
     on the system, overwrite or destroy files, or run programs on the system.

     The problem in IDENT's subroutines enables intruders to exploit the
     vulnerability remotely. To exploit the other vulnerabilities, intruders
     need to have access to an account on the system. 

III. Solution
     
     A. Obtain the appropriate patch from your vendor and install it according
        to the instructions included with the patch.

        Below is a summary of information we have received from vendors. More 
        details, including how to obtain patches, are in the Appendix A of this
        advisory. This information is reproduced in the CA-95:05.README file,
        which we will update periodically.

        If your vendor's name is not on this list, please contact your vendor
        directly.
                  

Vendor or Source             Remote vul?/patch status Local vul?/patch status
                             (IDENT)
---------------             ------------------------  ------------------------
Eric Allman                 
  version 8.6.10             no/ --                  no/ --
  all other versions         yes/upgrade avail.      yes/upgrade avail.
                          
Apple Computer, Inc.       
  v.3.1.1, 3.1               no/ --                  yes/patch avail.
  earlier versions           yes/see appendix        yes/see appendix

Berkeley Software Design,
Inc. (BSDI)
  version 2.0                no/ --                  yes/patch avail. soon
  other versions             yes/patch avail. soon   yes/patch avail. soon

Cray Computer Corporation
(Craycos)                    no/ --                  yes/patch avail.        


Data General Corporation     no/ --                  no/ --

Digital Equipment Corp.      no/ --                  yes/patch avail. soon
              
Harris Comp.Systems Corp.    yes/patch avail.        yes/patch avail.

Hewlett-Packard Company      no/ --                  yes/patch avail.by Feb 23

IBM Corporation              no/ --                  yes/patch avail. 

Motorola                     yes/patch avail.        yes/patch avail.

Open Software Foundation     no/ --                  yes/see appendix

The Santa Cruz Operation     no/ --                  yes/patch avail. soon 

Sequent Computer Systems     no/ --                  yes/patch avail.

Silicon Graphics (SGI)       no/ --                  yes/patch avail.

Solbourne (Grumman)          no/ --                  yes/patch avail. soon

Sony Corporation             yes/patch avail.        yes/patch avail.

Sun Microsystems, Inc.       no/ --                  yes/patch avail.



     B. Install sendmail 8.6.10, which is freely available (see Appendix A
        for locations). This version fixes all the problems described in this
        advisory. Be aware that, depending upon the currently installed
        sendmail program, switching to a different sendmail may require
        significant effort (such as rewriting the sendmail.cf file.)

     C. Until you are able to install the appropriate patch or sendmail
        8.6.10, we recommend the following workarounds.
           
        1. To protect against remote attacks only:
   
           If you are running sendmail versions 8.6.6 through 8.6.9, you can
           turn off the IDENT protocol by adding the following line to the
           configuration file and then restarting sendmail:
                    
                    Orident=0

            If you have difficulty doing so, consult your documentation or
            vendor for guidance.  
            
            If you are running 8.6.5 or earlier you cannot disable IDENT in
            this way. Instead, you should upgrade to version 8.6.10.

         2. To provide limited protection against local attacks:

            Install the "sendmail wrapper" that is provided in
            Appendix B of this advisory. The wrapper is also available by
            anonymous FTP from 
            
        info.cert.org:/pub/tools/sendmail/sendmail_wrapper/sendmail_wrapper.c  
                 MD5 = 5c930d9d139dfaa1dfc9de6c40ddf8c6
       
        ftp.auscert.org.au:/pub/auscert/tools/sendmail_wrapper.c
                 MD5 = 5c930d9d139dfaa1dfc9de6c40ddf8c6

        ftp.cert.dfn.de:/pub/tools/net/sendmail-wrapper/sendmail-wrapper.c
                 MD5 = 5c930d9d139dfaa1dfc9de6c40ddf8c6 
                         
            
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CERT Coordination Center thanks Eric Allman, Wolfgang Ley, Danny Smith,
and Eric Halil for their support in responding to this problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident
Response and Security Teams (FIRST).

If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to
CERT staff by electronic mail, we strongly advise that the e-mail be
encrypted.  The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key, PGP
(public key available via anonymous FTP on info.cert.org), or PEM (contact
CERT staff for details).

Internet E-mail: cert () cert org
Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
           CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4),
           and are on call for emergencies during other hours.
Fax: +1 412-268-6989

Postal address:  CERT Coordination Center
                 Software Engineering Institute
                 Carnegie Mellon University
                 Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
                 USA

CERT advisories and bulletins are posted on the USENET newsgroup
comp.security.announce. If you would like to have future advisories and
bulletins mailed to you or to a mail exploder at your site, please send mail
to cert-advisory-request () cert org 

Past advisories, CERT bulletins, information about FIRST representatives, and
other information related to computer security are available for anonymous FTP
from info.cert.org. 


CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.


.............................................................................
Appendix A: Vendor Information

Current as of February 22, 1995
See CA-95.05.README for updated information; this file supersedes
all other sendmail README files.

Below is information we have received from vendors who have patches available
or upcoming for the vulnerabilities described in this advisory.


--------------------
Eric Allman

Sendmail version 8.6.10 is not vulnerable.  

This version is available by anonymous FTP from

 ftp.cs.berkeley.edu:/ucb/sendmail
 ftp.uu.net:/networking/mail/sendmail/UCB
 info.cert.org:/pub/tools/sendmail/sendmail.8.6.10
 ftp.cert.dfn.de:/pub/tools/net/sendmail
 ftp.auscert.org.au:/pub/coast/mirrors/ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/sendmail

In all of the above locations, the MD5 checksums are the same,

MD5 (sendmail.8.6.10.base.tar.Z) = 4ab8ac267b1eaf8d1725c14cf4b2e885
MD5 (sendmail.8.6.10.cf.tar.Z) = c70c576697bbbf047ed379a7b98633f6
MD5 (sendmail.8.6.10.misc.tar.Z) = 6212390ca0bb4b353e29521f1aab492f
MD5 (sendmail.8.6.10.patch) = 08d6f977c171ea858f1e940163212c3a
MD5 (sendmail.8.6.10.xdoc.tar.Z) = 8b2252943f365f303b6302b71ef9a841


--------------------
Apple Computer, Inc.

An upgrade to A/UX version 3.1 (and 3.1.1) for these vulnerabilities is
available. The upgrade is a replacement of the sendmail binary. It is
available via anonymous FTP from ftp.support.apple.com:

        pub/apple_sw_updates/US/Unix/A_UX/supported/3.x/sendmail/

It is also available via anonymous FTP from abs.apple.com:

        pub/abs/aws95/patches/sendmail/

In both cases the compressed binary has the following signature:

        MD5 (sendmail.Z) = 31bb15604517630f46d7444a6cfab3f1

Uncompress(1) this file and replace the existing version in /usr/lib;
be sure to preserve the hard links to /usr/ucb/newaliases and
/usr/ucb/mailq, kill the running sendmail and restart.

Earlier versions of A/UX are not supported by this patch.  Users of
previous versions are encouraged to update their system or compile 
the latest version of sendmail available from ftp.cs.berkeley.edu.

Customers should contact their reseller for any additional information.

--------------------
Berkeley Software Design. Inc. (BSDI)

BSD/OS V2.0 is vulnerable to the local user problems,
but not the remote user (IDENT) problem.

All earlier releases of BSD/OS are vulnerable to both
problems.  Patches are being developed and will be
made available via anonymous FTP on ftp.bsdi.com
in the directory "bsdi/support".

BSDI Contact Information:
        BSDI Customer Support
        Berkeley Software Design, Inc.
        7759 Delmonico Drive
        Colorado Springs, CO 80919
        Toll Free: +1 800 ITS BSD8 (+1 800 486 2738)
        Phone: +1 719 260 8114
        Fax: +1 719 598 4238
        Email: support () bsdi com

--------------------
Cray Computer Corporation (Craycos)

        A new version of sendmail, one that does not have the
        problem, is available from CCC.  Please contact your site
        analyst for more information. You may also contact CCC Field
        Support using the address below.

                e-mail: support () craycos com

--------------------
Digital Equipment Corporation

Digital will announce the availability of a kit as soon as it becomes
available.

--------------------
Harris Computer Systems Corporation

Request the appropriate patch for Harris NightHawk Systems, as follows:

                System                          Patch

                cx/ux 7.1                       cx7.1-030
                cx/ux 6.2                       cx6.2-114
                cx/sx 6.2                       cx6.2-114


If you need further information, contact
the Harris Support Hotline 1-800-245-6453.

--------------------
Hewlett-Packard Company

Hewlett-Packard HP-UX           Patches available by 2/23/95 
                                Vulnerable to:   -d DEBUG option
                                                 Latest queue problem
                                Not Vulnerable to: IDENT problem

Apply patch PHNE_5264 (series 700/800, HP-UX 9.x), or
            PHNE_5263 (series 700/800, HP-UX 8.x), or
            PHNE_5260 (series 300/400, HP-UX 9.0), or
            PHNE_5259 (series 300/400, HP-UX 8.x)

You can get patches via:
1. Ftp / email / kermit to HP SupportLine
   To obtain a copy of the HP SupportLine email service user's guide,
   send the following in the TEXT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE to
   support () support mayfield hp com (no Subject is required):
                      send guide
2. World Wide Web: http://support.mayfield.hp.com

If you need further information, contact

HP SupportLine: 1-415-691-3888
phone: 1-415-691-3680
telnet/ftp: support.mayfield.hp.com (192.6.148.19)

--------------------
IBM Corporation

        A possible security exposure exists in the bos.obj 
        sendmail subsystem in all AIX releases.
 
        The user can cause arbitrary data to
        be written into the sendmail queue file.
        Non-privileged users can affect the delivery of mail, as well as
        run programs as other users.
        
        Workaround
 
        A. Apply the patch for this problem. The patch is available
           from software.watson.ibm.com. The files will be located in
           the /pub/aix/sendmail in compressed tar format.

           The MD5 checksum for the binary file is listed
           below, ordinary "sum" checksums follow as well.

           File            sum             MD5 Checksum
           ----            ---             ------------
           sendmail.tar.Z 35990           e172fac410a1b31f3a8c0188f5fd3edb

 
         B. The official fix for this problem can be ordered as
            Authorized Program Analysis Report (APAR) IX49257
 
            To order an APAR from IBM in the U.S. call 1-800-237-5511
            and ask for shipment as soon as it is available (in
            approximately two weeks).  APARs may be obtained outside the
            U.S. by contacting a local IBM representative.
 
--------------------
Motorola Computer Group (MCG)

The following MCG platforms are vulnerable:
        R40
        R32 running CNEP add-on product
        R3 running CNEP add-on product

The following MCG platforms are not vulnerable:
        R32     not including CNEP add-on product
        R3      not including CNEP add-on product
        R2
        VMEEXEC
        VERSADOS

The patch is available and is identified as "patch_43004 p001" or
"SCML#5552".  It is applicable to OS revisions from R40V3 to R40V4.3.
For availability of patches for other versions of the product contact
your regional MCG office at the numbers listed below.

Obtain and install the appropriate patch according to the instructions
included with the patch.

The patch can be obtained through anonymous ftp from ftp.mcd.mot.com
[144.191.210.3] in the pub/patches/r4 directory.  The patch can also
be obtained via sales and support channels.  Questions regarding the
patch should be forwarded to sales or support channels.

For verification of the patch file:
        Results of      sum -r  == 27479 661
                        sum     == 32917 661
                        md5     == 8210c9ef9441da4c9a81c527b44defa6

Contact numbers for Sales and Support for MCG:

                United States (Tempe, Arizona)
                Tel:    +1-800-624-0077
                Fax:    +1-602-438-3865

        Europe (Brussels, Belgium)
                Tel:    +32-2-718-5411
                Fax:    +32-2-718-5566

        Asia Pacific / Japan (Hong Kong)
                Tel:    +852-966-3210
                Fax:    +852-966-3202

        Latin America / Australia / New Zealand (U.S.)
                Tel:   +1 602-438-5633
                Fax:   +1 602-438-3592

--------------------
Open Software Foundation

The local vulnerability described in the advisory can be exploited
in OSF's OSF/1 R1.3 (this is different from DEC's OSF/1).
Customers should apply the relevant portions of cert's fix to 
their source base.  For more information please contact OSF's
support organization at osf1-defect () osf org 

--------------------
The Santa Cruz Operation

SCO systems are not vulnerable to the IDENT problem.
Systems running the MMDF mail system are not vulnerable to the remote or
local problems.

The following releases of SCO products are vulnerable to the local problems.
============================================================================
SCO TCP/IP 1.1.x for SCO Unix System V/386 Operating System Release 3.2 
Versions 1.0 and 2.0
SCO TCP/IP 1.2.x for SCO Unix System V/386 Operating System Release 3.2
Versions 4.x
SCO TCP/IP 1.2.0 for SCO Xenix System V/386 Operating System Release 2.3.4

SCO Open Desktop Lite Release 3.0
SCO Open Desktop Release 1.x, 2.0, and 3.0
SCO Open Server Network System, Release 3.0
SCO Open Server Enterprise System, Release 3.0

Patches are currently being developed for the release 3.0 and 1.2.1
based products. The latest sendmail available from SCO, on Support Level
Supplement (SLS) net382d, is also vulnerable. 

Contacts for further information:

e-mail: support () sco COM

USA, Canada, Pacific Rim, Asia, Latin America 
6am-5pm Pacific Daylight Time (PDT)
----------------------------------------------
1-408-425-4726  (voice)
1-408-427-5443  (fax)

Europe, Middle East, Africa: 9am-5:30pm British Standard Time (BST)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
+44 (0)923 816344 (voice)
+44 (0)923 817781 (fax)


--------------------
Sequent Computer Systems

Sequent customers should contact Sequent Customer Service and request the
Fastpatch for sendmail.

phone: 1-800-854-9969.
e-mail: service-question () sequent com


--------------------
Silicon Graphics, Inc.

At the time of writing of this document, patches/binaries are planned for 
IRIX versions 4.x, 5.2, 5.3, 6.0, and 6.0.1 and will be available to all 
SGI customers.

The patches/binaries may be obtained via anonymous ftp (ftp.sgi.com) or
from your support/service provider.

On the anonymous ftp server, the binaries/patches can be found in 
either ~ftp/patches or ~ftp/security directories along with more 
current pertinent information.

For any issues regarding this patch, please, contact your support/service
provider or send email to cse-security-alert () csd sgi com .


--------------------
Sony Corporation

        NEWS-OS 6.0.3   vulnerable; Patch SONYP6022 [sendmail] is available.
        NEWS-OS 6.1     vulnerable; Patch SONYP6101 [sendmail] is available.
        NEWS-OS 4.2.1   vulnerable; Patch 0101 [sendmail-3] is available.
                        Note that this patch is not included in 4.2.1a+.

        Patches are available via anonymous FTP in the
        /pub/patch/news-os/un-official directory on
        ftp1.sony.co.jp [202.24.32.18]:

        4.2.1a+/0101.doc        describes about patch 0101 [sendmail-3]
        4.2.1a+/0101_C.pch      patch for NEWS-OS 4.2.1C/a+C
        4.2.1a+/0101_R.pch      patch for NEWS-OS 4.2.1R/RN/RD/aRD/aRS/a+R

        6.0.3/SONYP6022.doc     describes about patch SONYP6022 [sendmail]
        6.0.3/SONYP6022.pch     patch for NEWS-OS 6.0.3

        6.1/SONYP6101.doc       describes about patch SONYP6101 [sendmail]
        6.1/SONYP6101.pch       patch for NEWS-OS 6.1

        Filename                BSD             SVR4
                                Checksum        Checksum
        --------------          ---------       ---------
        4.2.1a+/0101.doc        55361 2         19699 4
        4.2.1a+/0101_C.pch      60185 307       25993 614
        4.2.1a+/0101_R.pch      35612 502       31139 1004
        6.0.3/SONYP6022.doc     03698 2         36652 4
        6.0.3/SONYP6022.pch     41319 436       20298 871
        6.1/SONYP6101.doc       40725 2         3257 3
        6.1/SONYP6101.pch       37762 434       4624 868

        MD5 checksums are:
        MD5 (4.2.1a+/0101.doc) = c696c28abb65fffa5f2cb447d4253902
        MD5 (4.2.1a+/0101_C.pch) = 20c2d4939cd6ad6db0901d6e6d5ee832
        MD5 (4.2.1a+/0101_R.pch) = 840c20f909cf7a9ac188b9696d690b92
        MD5 (6.0.3/SONYP6022.doc) = b5b61aa85684c19e3104dd3c4f88c5c5
        MD5 (6.0.3/SONYP6022.pch) = 1e4d577f380ef509fd5241d97a6bcbea
        MD5 (6.1/SONYP6101.doc) = 62601c61aef99535acb325cf443b1b25
        MD5 (6.1/SONYP6101.pch) = 87c0d58f82b6c6f7811750251bace98c

If you need further information, contact your vendor.

--------------------
Solbourne

Grumman System Support Corporation now performs all Solbourne
software and hardware support. Please contact them for further
information.

        e-mail: support () nts gssc com       
        phone: 1-800-447-2861

--------------------
Sun Microsystems, Inc.

Sun has developed patches for all supported platforms and architectures,
including Trusted Solaris, Solaris x86, and Interactive Unix. Note that Sun no
longer supports the sun3 architecture and versions of the operating system
that precede 4.1.3.

Current patches are listed below.

         OS version      Patch ID    Patch File Name
         ----------      ---------   --------------- 
         4.1.3           100377-19   100377-19.tar.Z
         4.1.3_U1        101665-04   101665-04.tar.Z
         5.3             101739-07   101739-07.tar.Z
         5.4             102066-04   102066-04.tar.Z
         5.4_x86         102064-04   102064-04.tar.Z


The patches can be obtained from local Sun Answer Centers and through
anonymous FTP from ftp.uu.net in the /systems/sun/sun-dist directory. In
Europe, the patches are available from mcsun.eu.net in the /sun/fixes
directory.

The patches are also available through the usual URL on World Wide Web.

Sun is issuing Security Bulletin #129 with details on February 22;
the patches will become available worldwide during the 24 hours to
follow.



..............................................................................
Apppendix B: Sendmail Wrapper

This wrapper can be used to improve security until you can install a vendor
patch or sendmail version 8.6.10. Note that it does not address all known
sendmail vulnerabilities.

/*
**  sendmail_wrapper.c - wrap sendmail to prevent newlines in command line
**                       and clean up the environment.
**
**  Authors:    Eric Halil, Danny Smith
**              AUSCERT
**              c/o Prentice Centre
**              The University of Queensland
**              Qld.  4072.
**              Australia
**              22-Feb-1995
**
**  Disclaimer:  The use of this program is at your own risk.  It is 
**               designed to combat a particular vulnerability, and may
**               not combat other vulnerabilities, either past or future.
**               The decision to use this program is yours, as are the
**               consequences of its use.
**
**               This program is designed to be an interim relief measure
**               until appropriate patches can be obtained from your vendor.
**
**  Installation instructions
**  =========================
**
**  1.  su to root.
**
**  2.  Determine the location of sendmail.  On SunOS and Ultrix
**      systems, it is located in the /usr/lib directory.  On BSDI
**      systems, it is located in the /usr/sbin directory.  For example
**      purposes only, /usr/lib will be used in the following instructions
**      steps.
**
**  3.  Copy the sendmail program to sendmail.real.  Change the permissions
**      on the copy of sendmail.
**
**              # cd /usr/lib
**              # cp sendmail sendmail.real
**              # chmod 0700 sendmail.real
**
**  4.  Determine the permissions, owner, and group of sendmail.  This
**      information will be used later.
**
**      For BSD users:
**              # ls -lg sendmail
**      For System V users:
**              # ls -l sendmail
**
**  5.  Edit this wrapper program and define REAL_SENDMAIL.  By default,
**      REAL_SENDMAIL is defined as "/usr/lib/sendmail.real".
**
**  6.  Compile this program in a directory other than /usr/lib.  For
**      example to use /tmp, first copy this file into /tmp.
**
**              # cd /tmp
**              # cc -O -o sendmail sendmail_wrapper.c
**
**  7.  Copy this new wrapper program into the directory containing sendmail.
**      Make sure this directory and its parent directories are protected so
**      only root is able to make changes to files in the directory.  This
**      will replace the existing sendmail.  The following steps should be
**      executed quickly.
**
**      Users will not be able to send e-mail during the time when the
**      wrapper is copied into place until the chmod command has been
**      executed.  Use the information from step #4 and set the permissions
**      owner, and group of the new sendmail.
**
**              # cp sendmail /usr/lib/sendmail
**              # cd /usr/lib
**              # chown root sendmail
**              # chmod 4511 sendmail
**
**  8.  Kill the running sendmail process and start the new sendmail.
**
**      For SunOS and Ultrix:
**              # kill -9 `head -1 /etc/sendmail.pid`
**              # /usr/lib/sendmail -bd -q1h
**
**      For BSDI:
**              # kill -9 `head -1 /var/run/sendmail.pid`
**              # /usr/sbin/sendmail -bd -q1h
**
**      For other systems, follow your vendors guidelines or use the
**      following command.  Kill the processes and start the new sendmail.
**              # ps -auxw | grep sendmail | grep -v grep
**              # kill -9 (process id numbers)
**              # ./sendmail -bd -q1h
**
**  9.  Test that mail still works.

** Version 1.1  22-Feb-1995.
*/

#include <stdio.h>

/*
**      REAL_SENDMAIL needs to be defined using the full pathname
**      of the real sendmail.  A few known locations have been defined.
*/

#ifdef sun
#define REAL_SENDMAIL   "/usr/lib/sendmail.real"
#endif

#ifdef ultrix
#define REAL_SENDMAIL   "/usr/lib/sendmail.real"
#endif

#if defined (__bsdi__) || defined(__386BSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)

#define REAL_SENDMAIL   "/usr/sbin/sendmail.real"
#endif

int main( argc, argv, envp)
int     argc;
char    *argv[];
char    *envp[];
{
    char        *cp;
    int         i;
    int         j;
    int         status;

/*
**  Ensure that there are no newlines in the arguments
*/
    for ( i = 1; i < argc; i++)
    {
        for ( cp = argv[ i]; *cp != '\0'; cp++)
        {
            if ( ( *cp == '\r') || ( *cp == '\n'))
            {
                *cp = ' ';
            }
        }
    }

/*
**  While we are at it, let's clean up the environment
**  Remove LD_*, IFS, and PATH enviroment variables before execing
*/
    i = 0;
    while( envp[ i] != NULL)
    {
        if ( strncmp( envp[ i], "LD_", 3) == 0)
        {
            j = i;
            while ( envp[ j] != NULL)
            {
                envp[ j] = envp[ j + 1];
                j++;
            }
            continue;
        }
        if ( strncmp( envp[ i], "IFS=", 4) == 0)
        {
            j = i;
            while ( envp[ j] != NULL)
            {
                envp[ j] = envp[ j + 1];
                j++;
            }
            continue;
        }
        if ( strncmp( envp[ i], "PATH=", 5) == 0)
        {
            j = i;
            while ( envp[ j] != NULL)
            {
                envp[ j] = envp[ j + 1];
                j++;
            }
            continue;
        }
/*
**  Now check for newlines in environment variables
*/
        for ( cp = envp[ i]; *cp != '\0'; cp++)
        {
            if ( ( *cp == '\r') || ( *cp == '\n'))
            {
                *cp = ' ';
            }
        }
/*
**  next environment variable
*/
        i++;
    }

/*
** exec the real sendmail now
*/
    status = execve( REAL_SENDMAIL, argv, envp);
    perror( "execve sendmail");
    return( status);
}





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