mailing list archives
Re: how to protect name servers against cache corruption
From: "Jay R. Ashworth" <jra () scfn thpl lib fl us>
Date: Wed, 30 Jul 1997 09:15:35 -0400
On Wed, Jul 30, 1997 at 04:38:59AM -0000, tqbf () smtp enteract com wrote:
itself, and I'm inclined to believe him when he says there are no more
trivial fixes. If you know of one, why don't you share it? I'm not
Here's a simple piece of input. If BIND 8.1.1 receives a DNS query
response with an invalid query ID, it logs it and drops the packet.
However, the invalid query ID is evidence of an attack in progress. Why
doesn't BIND parse the packet, find out what question is being answered,
and immediately re-issue the query with a different ID?
If a copy of BIND _receives_ a query, decides it's bogus, logs it, and
drops it, then a question isn't _being_ answered, it's bing _asked_.
Why _would_ BIND re-issue a query. it hadn't _issued_ that query in
the first place. Or, in simpler terms, "huh"?
In other words, it's possible for BIND to detect that it is under attack
(in a response-forged query-ID guessing situation). BIND doesn't do
anything about this. Why?
This isn't so much a security bug, but more a lack of a security-enhancing
feature. It _certainly_ doesn't merit the veiled character assination
you've been using it to justify.
Just the simplest suggestion I can come up with (without having this go
into multiple pages) to convey the idea that I am trying to be
I'm not sure this is the appropriate forum for this discussion
(*copout*Ididn'tstartthisthread*copout*), but if you want further details
as to my harebrained suggestions, I'm happy to give them!
Time to move this to bind-workers, no? Perry, Paul?
Jay R. Ashworth jra () baylink com
Member of the Technical Staff Unsolicited Commercial Emailers Sued
The Suncoast Freenet "People propose, science studies, technology
Tampa Bay, Florida conforms." -- Dr. Don Norman +1 813 790 7592