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FW: Worm probes
From: "Braun, Mike" <MBraun () firstam com>
Date: Tue, 18 Sep 2001 08:33:36 -0700


I received this warning from TruSecure regarding the latest worm attack.

Mike Braun 
First American CREDCO

-----Original Message-----
TruSecure ALERT- TSA 01-023 - W32.nimda.a.mm 

Date: September 18, 2001
Time:  1000 EDT

RISK INDICES:

Initial Assessment: RED HOT

Threat: VERY HIGH, (rapidly increasing)

Vulnerability Prevalence: VERY HIGH, effects IIS servers version 4.0,
5.0, and internal networks.

Cost: High, command execution is possible 

Vulnerable Systems:  IIS 4.0 and 5.0

SUMMARY:
A new IIS worm is spreading rapidly.  Its working name is Nimda: 
W32.nimda.a.mm

It started about 9am eastern time today, Tuesday,September 18, 2001,
Mulitple sensors world-wide run by TruSecure corporation are getting
multiple hundred hits per hour. And began at 9:08am am.  

The worm seems to be targeting IIS 4 and 5 boxes and tests boxes for
multiple vulnerabilities including:

Almost all are get scripts, and a get msadc (cmd.exe) 
get_mem_bin
vti_bin  owssvr.dll
Root.exe
CMD.EXE
../  (Unicode)
Getadmin.dll
Default.IDA
/Msoffice/  cltreq.asp

This is not code red or a code red variant.  

The worm, like code red attempts to infect its local sub net first,
then spreads beyond the local address space.

It is spreading very rapidly. 

TruSecure  believes that this worm will infect any IIS 4 and IIS 5
box with well known vulnerabilities.  We believe that there are
nearly 1Million such machines currently exposed to the Internet.  

Risks Indices:
Vulnerability   VULNERABILITY  PREVALANCE is very high - Milllions of
Internet Web server hosts:   TruSecure process and essential
configurations should generally be protective.  The vulnerability
prevalence world-wide is very high

Threat - VERY HIGH and Growing The rate of growth and spread is
exceedingly rapid - significantly faster than any worm to date and
significantly faster than any variant of Code red.

Cost --  Unknown, probably moderate per infected system.


The worm itself is a file called 
README.EXE, or ADMIN.DLL
a 56K file which is advertised as an audio xwave mime type file.  

Other RISKS: 
There is risk of DOS of network segments by traffic volume alone
There is large risk of successful attack to both Internet exposed IIS
boxes and to developer and Intranet boxes inside of corporations. 

Judging by the Code Red II experience, we expect many subtle routes
of infection leading to inside corporate infections.  

We cannot discount the coincidence of the date and time of release,
exactly one week to (probably to the minute) as the World Trade
Center attack . 


REPLICATION:
There are at least three mechanisms of spread:  
The worm seems to spread both by a direct IIS across Internet (IP
spread)
It probably also spreads by local shares.  (this is not known for
sure at this time)
There is also an email vector where README.EXE is sent via email to
numerous accounts.  

Mitigations
TruSecure essential practices should work.
Block all email with EXE attachments
Filter for README.EXE 
Make sure IIS boxes are well patched and hardened, or removed from
both the Internet and Intranets.
Make sure any developer computing platforms are not running IIS of
any version (many do so by default if either. 
Disconnect mail from the Internet 
Advise users not to double click on any unexpected attachments.  
Update anti-virus when your vendor has the signature. 


-----Original Message-----
From: Bryan Heitman [mailto:bryanh () communitech net]
Sent: Tuesday, September 18, 2001 8:22 AM
To: nanog () merit edu
Subject: Re: Worm probes



We're also seeing a large increase in this activity.  This seems to be more
severe than the first time.  Have an additional 30 to 40 meg inbound from
this.

Best regards,


Bryan Heitman
CommuniTech.Net, Inc.
----- Original Message -----
From: <up () 3 am>
To: <nanog () merit edu>
Sent: Tuesday, September 18, 2001 10:05 AM
Subject: Re: Worm probes




ugh...this is way more impact...a 128k ISDN customer running an NT/Win2k
box is at 100% BW, and my 2x T1's are at about 2x normal traffic for this
time of day, although still well short of capacity...apache server
processor load is WAY up just from the requests, and the logs are growing
like mad.

On Tue, 18 Sep 2001, deeann mikula wrote:


On Tue, 18 Sep 2001, ravi pina wrote:


On Tue, Sep 18, 2001 at 09:54:31AM -0400, sigma () pair com said at one
point in time:


Has anyone else been seeing a dramatic increase in /scripts/.. NT
worm
probes this morning?  We're seeing about 8000/second, starting
around 9:15
Eastern time, to and from a wide variety of addresses.

affirmative.  i just looked at my logs, and it looks like
each probe tries a bunch of things.  i haven't seen much
on the lists, but i'm looking right now.

i'm pretty sure that the worm's attack phase starts on the 20th (which
of course, depends upon a correctly set system clock) and also that
attempting to execute something like /scripts/root.ext/c++ something
is involved.

i think that cert's website would be a good place to look.  i'm *not*
a security/virus chick, but i did host a talk by marty linder of cert
where he discected code red's activity and presented a summary.

cert is of course, http://www.cert.org.


deeann m.m. mikula

director of operations
telerama public access internet
http://www.telerama.com
1.877.688.3200





James Smallacombe       PlantageNet, Inc. CEO and Janitor
up () 3 am     http://3.am
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