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Re: DOS attack against DNS?
From: Daniel Senie <dts () senie com>
Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2006 16:22:18 -0500

At 12:52 PM 1/16/2006, Joel Jaeggli wrote:

On Mon, 16 Jan 2006, Paul Vixie wrote:

Mark_Andrews () isc org (Mark Andrews) writes:

        For repeat offenders create a list of networks that won't
        implement BCP 38 and collectively de-peer with them telling
        them why you are de-peering and what is required to
        re-establish connectivity.  It is in everyones interests
        to do the right thing here.

people inside one of the largest networks have told me that they have
customers who require the ability to bypass BCP38 restrictions, and that
they will therefore never be fully BCP38 compliant.  i've asked for BCP38
to become the default on all their other present and future customers but
then there was whining about bankruptcy, old outdated equipment, and so on.
sadly, there's no way to de-peer this network, or any other multinational,
and so there will be no "peer pressure" on them to implement BCP38.

Consider people in the rest of the world who may purchase simplex satellite links. By definition they inject traffic in places they aren't announcing their route from.

Sounds like the landing sites would not be able to use Unicast RPF. However, they could still use BCP38. Nothing says the filters have to be magically generated from routing data (not that uRPF really does that either, since it works off the FIB on most routers).

Mobile IP had the same set of issues when we were first working on the ingress filtering drafts. In their case, a bit of tunneling solved the issue. While tunneling could easily solve the satellite case too, there may be resistance to that.

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