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Re: The Backhoe: A Real Cyberthreat?
From: Frank Coluccio <frank () dticonsulting com>
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2006 12:53:28 -0600

My argument simply is if this kind of awareness 
can be made more broadly available you end up with 
a more resilient infrastructure overall.

Sean, would you care to list the route, facility, ownership and customer
attributes of the data base that you'd make public, and briefly explain the
access controls you would impose on same? 

If this is not what you originally intended, then please show me the way ... thanks.


On Fri Jan 20 9:19 , sgorman1 () gmu edu sent:

    As you mentioned before this is largely because the customer (SIAC) was savvy
enough to set the reuirements and had the money to do it. A lot of that saviness
came from lessons learned from 9/11 and fund transfer. Similar measures were
taken with DoD's GIG-BE, again because the customer was knowlegable and had the
financial clout to enforce the requirements and demand the information.  An
anonymous data pool is just one suggestion of a market based mechanism to do it.

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: Michael.Dillon () btradianz com
    Date: Friday, January 20, 2006 5:37 am

    > > Imagine if 60 Hudson and 111 8th
    > > were to go down at the same time? Finding means to mitigate this
    > > threat is not frivolously spending the taxpayer's money, IMO;
    > > although perhaps removing fiber maps is not the best way to
    > > address this.
    > No, removing fiber maps will not address this problem
    > now that you have pinpointed the addresses that they
    > should attack.
    > Separacy is the key to addressing this problem. Separate
    > circuits along separate routes connecting separate routers
    > in separate PoPs. Separacy should be the mantra, not
    > obscurity.
    > End-to-end separation of circuits is how SFTI and other
    > financial industry networks deal with the issue of continuity
    > in the face of terrorism and other disasters. In fact, now
    > that trading is mediated by networked computers, the physical
    > location of the exchange is less vulnerable to terrorists because
    > the real action takes place in redundant data centers connected
    > by diverse separate networks. Since 9-11 was a direct attack on
    > the financial services industry, people within the industry
    > worldwide, have been applying the lessons learned in New York.
    > Another 9-11 is simply not possible today.
    > --Michael Dillon

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