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Re: what if...?
From: bmanning () vacation karoshi com
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2011 17:16:06 +0000

On Tue, Dec 20, 2011 at 11:53:12AM -0500, Valdis.Kletnieks () vt edu wrote:
On Tue, 20 Dec 2011 13:37:23 -0300, "Eduardo A. =?iso-8859-1?b?U3XhcmV6?=" said:
what if evil guys hack my mom ISP DNS servers and use RPZ to redirect
traffic from mom_bank.com to evil.com?

How can she detect this?

The snarky answer is "If your mom has to ask how she can detect this, she's
probably going to be unable to do so".

The more technically correct answer is that you can check the IP and TTL as
returned by your local caching nameserver, and compare them to the values
reported from the authoritative NS for the zone.  Of course, this means you
have to hit the authoritative server, which sort of defeats the purpose of DNS

Or you can deploy DNSSEC.

Or you can deploy SSL (not perfect, but it raises the bar considerably).

Or you can google for "DNS RPZ" and start reading - the top hit seems to be
Paul Vixie's announcement: https://www.isc.org/community/blog/201007/taking-back-dns-0
and start reading - as about the 4th or 5th commenter points out, the threat
model is *no* different than a DNS server that forces in its own zones. The
commenter is talking in the context of a provider replacing a zone, but it's the
same issue if a black hat hacks in a zone.

        the one difference is that ISC will be shipping RPZ enabled code v.
        the blackhat having to hack the machine and modify the configuration.

        in the new BIND w/ RPZ,  it will be much harder to determine when
        RPZ has been tweeked...   Lowers the bar considerably.   RPZ sucks


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