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Re: do not filter your customers
From: Danny McPherson <danny () tcb net>
Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2012 14:26:14 -0500


On Feb 24, 2012, at 1:10 PM, Steven Bellovin wrote:

But just because we can't solve the whole problem, does that
mean we shouldn't solve any of it?

Nope, we most certainly should decompose the problem into 
addressable elements, that's core to engineering and operations.

However, simply because the currently envisaged solution 
doesn't solve this problem doesn't mean we shouldn't 
acknowledge it exists.

The IETF's BGP security threats document [1]  "describes a threat 
model for BGP path security", which constrains itself to the 
carefully worded SIDR WG charter, which addresses route origin 
authorization and AS_PATH "semantics" -- i.e., this "leak" 
problem is expressly out of scope of a threats document
discussing BGP path security - eh? 

How the heck we can talk about BGP path security and not 
consider this incident a threat is beyond me, particularly when it 
happens by accident all the time.  How we can justify putting all 
that BGPSEC and RPKI machinery in place and not address this 
"leak" issue somewhere in the mix is, err.., telling.

Alas, I suspect we can all agree that experiments are good and 
the market will ultimately decide.

-danny

[1] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02


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