mailing list archives
Re: Spoofing ASNs (Re: SNMP DDoS: the vulnerability you might not know you have)
From: Jimmy Hess <mysidia () gmail com>
Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2013 08:23:22 -0500
A strange thought occurs....
Regarding, devices that unintentionally have SNMP open to the public.
They might also have write access open, which could enable reconfiguring
the device to facilitate full TCP spoofing, or opening up a tunnel;
enabling 3 way handshake and everything, permitting the possible DDoS
conditions to go well beyond simple UDP reflection.
Those devices that just have SNMP read access; might reveal enough
information in the exposed MIBs about the device, timestamps, connection
table status..... for an attacker to successfully inject false data into
a TCP stream.
For example... spoofing a TCP message containing a false BGP route
advertisement; if enough about the state of the router's TCP connection
table and synchronization numbers, timestamp, and other hints about the
state of the random number generator, can be discovered directly or
indirectly through some piece of data in the SNMP MIB....
On Sun, Aug 11, 2013 at 7:45 AM, Florian Weimer <fw () deneb enyo de> wrote:
* Jared Mauch:
Number of unique IPs that spoofed a packet to me. (eg: I sent a
packet to 188.8.131.52 and 184.108.40.206 responded).
That's not necessarily proof of spoofing, isn't it? The system in
question might legitimately own IP addresses from very different
networks. If the system is a router and the service you're pinging is
not correctly implemented and it picks up the IP address of the
outgoing interface instead of the source address of the request,
that's totally expected.
I'm not saying that BCP 38 is widely implement (it's not, unless
operators have configured exceptions for ICMP traffic from private
address, which I very much doubt). I just think you aren't actually
measuring spoofing capabilities.