On 1 Mar 2011, at 09:11, Pierre Joye wrote:
2011/2/28 Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg () gmail com>:
I'm not familiar with this code or any of the context surrounding this
fix, but it appears to be an incomplete fix. Checking for existence
of a symlink and then opening the resource leaves open a window during
which a legitimate file can be replaced with a symlink.
Not sure it is fixable, or maybe using a lock on the symbolic link
while fetching its target (to be tested to be sure that such locks
cannot be overridden from shell).
I assume you are referring to the parts for REST.php in the patch in question?
At a second look, that part could do with improvements; I wrote up a function which takes TOCTOU into consideration.
I'll have that patch done by the end of the day.
For other situations I am using tempnam() (via the System class) as those files are only temporary and were being
extracted from compressed archives; The predictability of their end destination where the centre part of the reported