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Re: [Openvas-devel] [oss-security] CVE Request -- openvas-scanner -- Insecure temporary file use by generation of an OVAL system characteristics document, when ovaldi support enabled
From: Tim Brown <timb () openvas org>
Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2011 23:05:24 +0100
On Friday 09 Sep 2011 22:07:34 Jan-Oliver Wagner wrote:
What frightens me is that a security advisory about OpenVAS 2 (a already
deprecated version) made it even into official advisories of CERTs.
The review process seems to not work as it should, no one ever checked
back wether this version is deprecated. So it should be easy to get faked
security alerts about some tools you don't like into official CERT
advisories. Or am I getting something wrong here?
Whilst it's not a default compile time configuration option and whilst the
conditions to exploit it are uncommon, the fact remains that there are two
time of check, time of use (TOCTOU) vulnerabilities present in the code.
Calling it fake is disingenous and does OpenVAS no credit. Whilst a CVE might
be bad, a security project disputing the assignment looks even worse;
especially since one (and the more serious) case was picked up internally.
FWIW, the code concerned was present in trunk so it's not even true to say it
only affects deprecated versions (never mind the fact that just because we no
longer support something doesn't stop someone using it).
<mailto:timb () openvas org>
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