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Re: Apache symlink issue: can documented behavior be a security problem and hence get a CVE?
From: Josh Bressers <bressers () redhat com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2011 14:01:01 -0400 (EDT)

I'm going to leave this one for MITRE.

Thanks.

-- 
    JB

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Hello List,

Is it possible to assign a CVE for documented behavior? Communication
with apache security showed, that following symlinks to arbitrary
locations is a documented feature, even when "-FollowSymLink" option
is
in place. This allows any user with, that can modify some content
served
by apache to access any content accessible by the apache process, also
content not visible to the user (e.g. outside the ftp-upload directory
or forbidden like /proc/http-pid/maps). Due to the small window of
opportunity, this might be relevant mostly when user can already
execute
code on the machine, so it is not a big issue. /proc/<pid>/mem is
protected, when apache is running with setuid, so key material cannot
be
extracted using range headers. PUT was not tested so far.

See also

http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2011/ApacheNoFollowSymlinkTimerace/

- --
http://www.halfdog.net/
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