mailing list archives
Re: Attack on badly configured Netfilter-based firewalls
From: ArkanoiD <ark () eltex net>
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2012 14:01:25 +0300
It is known "problem" for a long time (note the quotes -- as it is known, it
is not a problem anymore and is fixed in all default rulesets).
ipv6 may reintorduce it, though.
On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 11:55:30AM +0100, Sebastian Krahmer wrote:
I know that the 127.0.0.1 trick worked in past, but for loopback
addresses this isnt working anymore since quite a while.
You will get a 'martian destination', regardless of routing
or rp_filter's set. If we talk about a Linux kernel:
if (ipv4_is_lbcast(daddr) || ipv4_is_zeronet(daddr) ||
Or I am doing something seriously wrong. No idea what Solaris
or BSD's are doing.
For 'real' NIC's this trick is however still working, even if
the machine is a host (not a router). This leaves some room for
accessing internal admin interfaces from outside. :)
However, playing with source addresses to defeat firewalls should be
difficult, since most dists enable rp_filter.
On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 01:53:29AM +0400, Solar Designer wrote:
On Sun, Feb 26, 2012 at 10:05:55PM +0100, Eric Leblond wrote:
On Sun, 2012-02-26 at 12:17 -0700, Kurt Seifried wrote:
Are there any helpers that can be abused to open holes in the firewall
externally, or is it only internal clients that can cause problems and
trigger the firewall to improperly allow network traffic in/out.
No, attacker has to be on a network directly connected to the firewall.
I guess by "internal clients" Kurt was referring to machines behind the
firewall (e.g., someone clicking an URL that has a string looking like
an FTP command embedded in it, thereby triggering the FTP helper to open
a hole - stuff that was discussed in late 1990s and partially mitigated
by hardening the helpers at the time), whereas by "attacker on a network
directly connected to the firewall" Eric means that the attacker may be
_outside_ the firewall (behind its WAN interface), but on the same
network segment (e.g., the attacker might have compromised a nearby
server, such as of another customer at a colocation facility).
It is known that a machine will generally receive and process a packet
routed to one of its NICs by MAC address even if the destination IP
address is that of another NIC or even loopback (e.g., it is possible to
access services bound to 127.0.0.1 in this way - but only from directly
connected machines). Without rp_filter or equivalent, it is possible to
have these packets' source addresses match the other NIC's network
segment. My _guess_ (based solely on the info posted in here so far) is
that the gist of Eric et al.'s new attack is to apply this approach
against a protocol helper. The novelty is thus in combining these known
things together to arrive at something that to the best of my knowledge
has not yet been discussed.
I suppose Eric will tell us if this is the correct guess or not. ;-)
~ perl self.pl
~ krahmer () suse de - SuSE Security Team
SUSE LINUX Products GmbH,
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Re: Attack on badly configured Netfilter-based firewalls Kurt Seifried (Feb 26)
Re: Attack on badly configured Netfilter-based firewalls Florian Weimer (Feb 27)
- Re: Attack on badly configured Netfilter-based firewalls, (continued)