mailing list archives
Re: Isearch insecure temporary files
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>
Date: Sat, 29 Dec 2012 20:53:42 -0700
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
On 12/21/2012 12:50 PM, David Holland wrote:
Looking at that thread (which I didn't see at the time because I
no longer have time to follow this list much) I think I'd agree
that the CVE system itself is the wrong scheme, not only for its
own reasons but also because it doesn't reach the right targets.
All of these problems also apply to any new scheme someone sets
up; what I'm suggesting is that the existing CVE infrastructure is
not necessarily that much of an advantage.
One random thought, might it be worth adding structured data to CVE
that basically says when the issue was made public/reported to the
upstream and when upstream 1) acknowledged it (if ever) and then they
patched it (if ever) and when they shipped a fixed version (if ever).
Obviously then you could simply parse for the time between date
reported and date acknowledged/patched/fixed and see how
healthy/responsive the upstream is.
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux)
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----