mailing list archives
Re: CVE request - Linux kernel: VFAT slab-based buffer overflow
From: Benji <me () b3nji com>
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2013 14:59:17 +0000
Ah the logic. Open source software, hidden secret hush hush no public reporting patches.
Sent from my iPhone
On 27 Feb 2013, at 14:48, Greg KH <greg () kroah com> wrote:
On Wed, Feb 27, 2013 at 07:31:30AM +0100, Petr Matousek wrote:
On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 09:03:46PM -0800, Greg KH wrote:
On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 11:41:53PM -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:
Anyway, on a more serious note, at some point, acceptance will look
something like a real kernel-sec team that does essentially what you
just did, but on a continual basis: reviewing most/all commits for
potential security concerns and forwarding them to oss-sec to increase
identification and awareness to be applied downstream.
I will say flat out that this is an impossible task to accomplish.
As proof of that, I suggest you do this for just one major kernel
release cycle (2-3 months long).
You do know the number of patches applied to the Linux kernel every
Would you have caught the patch that started this thread? I sure
didn't, and I was the one who originally applied it to the kernel tree
in the first place. Doing "root-cause" research for every patch is
non-trivial, as I know you realize.
For starters, security () kernel org submissions should be posted to
oss-security or any other security related public mailing list when the
patch is being committed.
That's not going to happen, and you know that, to do so would be totally
irresponsible of us and directly harm your users. That's what
vendor-sec (or whatever it is called now) is for. Hasn't that been
happening for a while now, or has no one been notifying that list of