mailing list archives
Re: CVE Request -- gpsd 3.9 fixing a denial of service flaw
From: "Eric S. Raymond" <esr () thyrsus com>
Date: Thu, 2 May 2013 15:41:51 -0400
Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>:
On 05/02/2013 03:58 AM, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
@Eric - Eric, could you please help us to solve this doubt? (which
of the patches is the correct one to fix the above mentioned DoS /
There are two critical patches which solve two different DoSes (well,
one certain and one potential). Yes, it's a strange coincidence that
both bugs were characterized at almost the same time after we haven't
had a crash bug since 2007.
The crash bug was in the NMEA driver. There's particular kind of malformed
packet, sometimes emitted by SiRFStar-III receivers, that looks like this:
See the incomplete GGA without trailing \r\n at the front? Usually
that was harmless and would be silently discarded. Under rare circumstances
it could core dump (but not any more, I now have a regression test to check
That fix was commit dd9c3c2830cb8f8fd8491ce68c82698dc5538f50.
The potential crash/DoS was in the AIS driver.
The first stage of what it does is un-armor an AIVDM ASCII packet
representation into an equivalent binary packet which is then examined
for data at specific bit offsets.
The un-armoring logic was not properly bounds-checked, potentially
opening up a hole. In theory, an overlong armored packet could be
crafted to overrun the binary-packet buffer.
I'm not sure that one was exploitable; there are other properties of
the code (notably the bounds-checked maximum length of the AIVDM ASCII
packet buffer) that seem to guarantee the end of the binary packet
buffer could never be reached.
I put in a check anyway, because (a) I could be wrong about that, (b)
supposing I'm right, that invariant could get silently broken by a future
That was commit 08edc49d8f63c75bfdfb480b083b0d960310f94f, responding
to Savannah bug #38511.
Note: neither of these have privilege-escalation possibilities. gpsd
needs root to initialize, but drops it long before either of these
code defects could fire.
If you have any other questions, do not hesitate to ask.
<a href="http://www.catb.org/~esr/">Eric S. Raymond</a>
Description: Digital signature