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Re: Linux kernel futex local privilege escalation (CVE-2014-3153)
From: Greg KH <greg () kroah com>
Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2014 08:54:54 -0700

On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 07:24:30PM +0400, Solar Designer wrote:
Greg, Thomas -

On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 06:45:45PM +0400, Solar Designer wrote:
This was handled via linux-distros, hence the mandatory oss-security
posting.  The issue was made public earlier today, and is included in
this Debian advisory:



    Pinkie Pie discovered an issue in the futex subsystem that allows a
    local user to gain ring 0 control via the futex syscall. An
    unprivileged user could use this flaw to crash the kernel (resulting
    in denial of service) or for privilege escalation.

I've attached patches by Thomas Gleixner (four e-mails, in mbox format),

Can you comment on how the four patches:

Subject: [patch 1/4] futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch
Subject: [patch 2/4] futex: Validate atomic acquisition in
Subject: [patch 3/4] futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi
Subject: [patch 4/4] futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust

Those have to go on top of:

relate to these two on LKML:

Subject: [PATCH 3.14 001/228] futex: Add another early deadlock detection check
Subject: [PATCH 3.14 002/228] futex: Prevent attaching to kernel threads

These, as these two patches are already in Linus's tree.

Now if these two are needed for the first 4 to work properly, that I do
not know, Thomas might.  I see no reason why a distro would not want
these two patches anyway, as they made the stable kernel criteria.


greg k-h

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