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Penetration Testing
mailing list archives
Re: RE: RE: PIX and ttl
From: "Fernando Cardoso" <fernando.cardoso () whatevernet com>
Date: Mon, 28 May 2001 22:58:37 +0100
[...]
The work around is break in and NMAP from the internal network ;)
Another option is to do some research on the possibility of
doing fingerprinting on the other TCP states (ESTABILISHED, FIN_WAIT,
...).
A method I use to discover windows machines behind a statefull
aware firewall with syndefender is to create ESTABILISHED connections
and analyze the ip.id increments. This analysis can be expanded to
otherfields of the packets and other states by doing some research.
That's my approach too. DF field and window sizes (if stuff like
Packeteer is not messing with it) can be also used. If pinging is
enabled Ofir Arkin's papers would be valuable too (the last version of
sing implements some nice fingerprinting based on them).
Perhaps a fingerprinting system that uses traces from a
tcpdumpsession? anyone?
That would be a nice tool. Anyway, siphon already does some part of the
job, maybe with some code grabbed from idlescan (ever heard of it? ;-)
and sing something could be done.
Um abraco
Fernando
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