On Tuesday I forwarded a copy of Secrecy News that highlighted what
Amy Smithson of the Stimson Center told Congress should be done about
government chemical data mirrored on private-sector websites:
Stimson Center demands gvt censorship of chemical-data websites
http://www.politechbot.com/p-02788.html
Amy's testimony is part of a years-long debate over chemical plant
data. Here's an article I wrote in Feb. 1999:
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,17841,00.html
Now Amy is trying (see below) to back away from her testimony, which
you can find here:
http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/11-08-01/smithson.html
>Taking matters into their own hands, certain private interest groups
>have begun presenting on their own websites data gleaned from Risk
>Management Plans and their Off-site Consequence Analyses
>sections... Immediately, these interest groups must cease and desist
>activities that make data on hazardous materials facilities available
>to widespread public view, removing this data from their websites.
>Failing their voluntary cooperation, the US government should take
>swift steps to close down the pertinent segments of these
>organizations' websites and take legal steps to prohibit them from
>distributing this data in the future on the Internet or by other
>means.
-Declan
---
http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/smithson.html
FAS Note: The following commentary by Amy E. Smithson, Director,
Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project at the
Stimson Center responds to an account of her testimony published in
the FAS newsletter Secrecy News.
_________________________________________________________________
In the November 13th issue of Secrecy News, Steven Aftergood quoted
my testimony before the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee's Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment on
November 8th. The direct quotes I certainly recognized, but the
accompanying interpretation of my policy recommendations was way
off course.
In August 2000, the government issued a new regulation governing
the public availability of the Risk Management Plans of over 15,000
facilities that deal with amounts of hazardous and extremely
hazardous chemicals over certain thresholds. One section of this
document describes scenarios about releases of these dangerous
chemicals, including information about how such releases could
happen and how many people would potentially be hurt or killed.
Some data from the Risk Management Plans, including the executive
summaries of these scenarios, were subsequently published in
searchable form on the Environmental Protection Agency's Internet
site. While the detailed scenarios themselves were not posted on
the Internet, they remain viewable at reading rooms in each state
and several US territories. My testimony addressed this specific
regulatory decision. Mr. Aftergood's editorial neglects this fact,
painting my comments as a general attack on environmental websites
that deal with chemical hazard information and their first
amendment rights.
Without embellishment, Risk Management Plan data could provide a
veritable roadmap for terrorists or other saboteurs who might wish
to unleash a chemical disaster without surmounting the considerable
obstacles of making chemical weapons from scratch. The FBI contends
that seven of the nine pieces of information needed to target a
chemical plant are contained in the Offsite Consequence Analysis
section of these plans. Yet, several environmental and
right-to-know interest groups have analyzed the Risk Management
Plan data and broken it down into even more terrorist-helpful
chunks, conveniently posted on their websites. Defenders of easy
access to the information in question say they would not knowingly
assist terrorists. Perhaps then these groups should reconsider
posting items such as a list of the top 50 facilities nationwide
from which a chemical release could potentially kill the most
people. If that isn't a handy terrorist chemical disaster roadmap,
what is?
As a closer reading of my testimony reveals, I thoroughly respect
and advocate the public's right to know of the industrial dangers
in their communities. However, there are better ways in which to
release information about US chemical plants and enable citizen
monitoring of their activities. Before the August 2000 regulation
was implemented, citizens could ask any number of questions about
local chemical sites and their community's disaster response plans
and capabilities in meetings of their Local Emergency Planning
Committees. Not only could they learn more from knowledgeable local
officials and industry representatives than they could from a sheet
of paper, citizens could voice concerns and recommendations
directly to local authorities. This approach is far preferable to
the current regulatory approach that makes it more convenient to
access this data but also hands terrorists the information they
need for their malevolent plots on a silver platter.
Since one can hardly dispute that some terrorist groups are
determined to harm as many Americans as possible, does convenience
really outweigh the possible catastrophes that could result from
Internet and reading room availability of this data? Just as the
price of better airline security is going to be longer lines at
airports, so will some reasonable sacrifices have to be made to
make it more difficult to enable terrorists to use the chemical
facilities in our midst against us.
Yes, my testimony urged that the EPA's website and reading rooms be
permanently closed and that the environmental and right-to-know
groups pull this information from their websites. If not, I believe
they are placing at risk the very lives that they desire to
protect. Should these groups refuse to do so voluntarily, I think
government has a duty to step in and pursue the removal of JUST the
Risk Management Plan associated data from the sites concerned. Key
parts of some scenario information have been scanned and posted on
the Internet. Only a "covered person"-a government official in most
cases, or a researcher who has applied for access-is supposed to be
able to have this type of data outside of the reading rooms. Abuse
of this special status by disseminating this data constitutes a
criminal act. People and organizations obviously aren't abiding by
the law and should be held accountable.
In sum, the issue is not IF this information should be accessible,
but HOW easily people should be able to access it. My testimony
never advocated general censorship or the blanket withholding of
this information, only a more careful and considered approach to
its distribution. Accordingly, Mr. Aftergood's characterization of
my remarks was simplistic, belittling in places, and most
importantly, incorrect. While I have no doubt that some may
continue to disagree with my point of view, an accurate
understanding of my perspective should be a prerequisite for doing
so.
_________________________________________________________________
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Received on Nov 17 2001
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