mailing list archives
Risks Digest 26.80
From: RISKS List Owner <risko () csl sri com>
Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2012 16:25:06 PDT
RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Wednesday 25 April 2012 Volume 26 : Issue 80
ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, moderator, chmn ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy
***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
The current issue can be found at
Airline pilot distracted by new text messages botches landing attempt
Backdoor in mission-critical systems (Dan Goodin via C Y Cripps)
The Power of Individual Voters to Transform Their Government (William Cox)
Risks from computers in elections? (Brad Friedman via Mark E. Smith)
Thieves steal fiber (Joel Garry)
Berkeley High students hack into attendance system (Jill Tucker)
TapLogger (Jim Reisert)
Solar panel production page reveals name, address, real-time info
Re: Insider attack on smart meters (Paul Wallich)
Compromised ATMs of no Consequence to Banks or Customers (Chris J Brady)
Google Street View face blurring side effects (Ed Ravin)
Occupy Wall Street protester doesn't own his tweets, judge rules
Harvard Library open access? (Dan Geer)
White House pushes back on CISPA "cybersecurity" legislation (The Hill and LW)
11 percent of all sexts sent to the wrong recipient (Natt Garun via
"The Flight from Conversation" (Sherry Turkle)
Review: CERT Guide to Insider Threats, Capelli/Moore/Trzeciak (Ben Rothke)
Henry Petroski does it again! (PGN)
Gmail outage much broader than originally reported (Juan Carlos Perez via
Re: "Did first DDOS attack sink the Titanic?" (Jeremy Ardley)
Re: Hospital generator failure following earthquake (Dick Mills)
The hidden danger of Windows 8 Microsoft Accounts (Woody Leonhard via
Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)
Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2012 17:14:02 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty () roscom com>
Subject: Airline pilot distracted by new text messages botches landing attempt
Mike Flacy, *Digital Trends*, 19 Apr 2012
While U.S. residents that fly commercially have to turn off their cell
phones prior to take-off, a airline pilot in Australia left his phone on
during a flight and found new text messages more interesting than landing
As detailed by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, an investigation into
a Jetstar flight JQ57 between Darwin to Singapore discovered that the
airline captain failed to lower the landing gear during the first attempt at
a landing as he was too busy with his mobile phone. While the incident
occurred nearly two years ago, the details of the investigation were
released this week. According to the report, the captain neglected to turn
off his mobile phone prior to the 220-seat Airbus 320 taking off in Darwin,
Australia. When the plane began an initial descent into Changi Airport
within Singapore, the captain's phone started beeping with new text message
alerts when the plane was in between 2,500 to 2,000 feet off the ground.
The captain turned his attention to the phone during the descent and the
co-pilot attempted to get the captain's attention. After trying to alert the
captain twice, the co-pilot switched off the auto-pilot during landing, but
started to notice that something was wrong when the plane was just 1,000
feet off the ground. ...
Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2012 15:44:49 -0400 (EDT)
From: C Y Cripps <cycmn () nyct net>
Subject: Backdoor in mission-critical systems (Dan Goodin)
Backdoor in mission-critical hardware threatens power, traffic-control systems
Dan Goodin, *ArsTechnica", 25 Apr 2012
Backdoor in mission-critical hardware threatens power, traffic-control
Like a key under a door matt, the MAC address exposed here allows hackers
to tamper with this Internet-connected RuggedCom device, used to control
power substations and other critical infrastructure.
In the world of computer systems used to flip switches, open valves, and
control other equipment inside giant electrical substations and railroad
communications systems, you'd think the networking gear would be locked
down tightly to prevent tampering by vandals. But for customers of
Ontario, Canada-based RuggedCom, there's a good chance those
Internet-connected devices have backdoors that make unauthorized access a
That's because equipment running RuggedCom's Rugged Operating System has
an undocumented account that can't be modified and a password that's
trivial to crack. What's more, researchers say, for years the company
hasn't bothered to warn the power utilities, military facilities, and
municipal traffic departments using the industrial-strength gear that the
account can give attackers the means to sabotage operations that affect
the safety of huge populations of people.
"You treat these embedded appliances as a device that you don't have a
window to see into," says researcher K. Reid Wightman of industrial
machinery, which is often designed to withstand extreme heat and cold,
dust, and other brutal conditions where they're housed. "You can't really
patch it. You have to rely on the vendor to do the right thing when they
set the device up and when they install the OS. And the vendor really fell
down on this one."
The backdoor uses the login ID of "factory" and a password that's
recovered by plugging the MAC, or media access control, address of the
targeted device into a simple Perl script, according to this post
published on Monday to the Full Disclosure security list. To make
unauthorized access easy, paying customers of the Shodan computer search
engine can find the IP numbers of more than 60 networks that use the
vulnerable equipment. The first thing users who telnet into them see, as
the picture above demonstrates, is its MAC address.
Like a router plugged into a utility's power grid
Equipment running the Rugged Operating System act as the switches and hubs
that connect programmable logic controllers to the computer networks used
to send them commands. They may sit between the computer of a electric
utility employee and the compact disk-sized controller that breaks a
circuit when the employee clicks a button on her screen. To give the
equipment added power, Rugged Operating System is fluent in the Modbus and
DNP3 communications protocols used to natively administer industrial
control and SCADA, or supervisory control and data acquisition,
systems. The US Navy, the Wisconsin Department of Transportation, and
Chevron are just three of the customers who rely on the gear, according to
this page on RuggedCom's website.
"As a citizen and based on the customer list on their website, I know for
a fact that I personally depend on this equipment every day in some way,"
said Justin W. Clarke, the author of the full-disclosure advisory who said
he notified company officials of the backdoor 12 months ago. "The
equipment is so widely installed that it would be logical to assume that
something I'm doing--whether it's riding a train, using power, or walking
across a cross walk--depends on this."
RuggedCom representatives didn't respond to a request for comment. This
article will be updated if a response is received after its initial
According to a timeline included in Clarke's advisory, RuggedCom officials
earlier this month stated "they need another three weeks to alert their
customers, but not fix the vulnerability." Working with the US Computer
Emergency Response Team, Clarke said he sought additional information, but
RuggedCom never responded.
Forever day bugs bite again
In acknowledging but not fixing a security vulnerability in software
that's widely used to control critical infrastructure, RuggedCom joins a
growing roster of companies marketing wares bitten by so-called
forever-day bugs. The term, which is a play on the phrase zero-day
vulnerability, refer to documented flaws in industrial systems that will
never be fixed. Other members of this group include ABB, Schneider
Electric, and Siemens. Indeed, RuggedCom was acquired by a Canada-based
subsidiary of Siemens in March.
The hardcoded backdoor can be opened when users access affected devices
using telnet, remote shell, or a serial console. The best defense against
attacks that exploit the vulnerability is a layered approach that includes
isolating devices from the Internet altogether as well as disabling or
blocking telnet and remote shell access through network filters or
firewalls, Clarke said.
An independent security researcher in San Francisco, Clarke told Ars he
has grown so concerned about the lack of security in industrial control
systems that he's taken to ordering used gear hawked on eBay to see what
kinds of vulnerabilities he can find in it. He said he spotted the Rugged
OS backdoor with little trouble by analyzing an image of the RuggedCom
"It is esoteric, it is obscure, but this equipment is everywhere," he
said. "I was walking down the street and they had one of the traffic
control cabinets that controls stop lights open and there was a RuggedCom
switch, so while you and I may not see it, this is what's used in electric
substations, in train control systems, in power plants and in the
military. That's why I personally care about it so much." This article
was updated to remove identifying information included in the image.
[See also a WiReD item (noted by Lauren Weinstein):
Rugged switches and servers are used in "mission-critical" communication
networks used in power grids, railway control systems, and traffic control
systems as well as in manufacturing facilities. RuggedCom asserts on its
web site that its products are "the product of choice for
high-reliability, high-availability, mission-critical communications
networks deployed in harsh environments around the world." Clarke says he
notified RuggedCom about his discovery in Apr. 2011 and says the
representative he spoke with acknowledged the existence of the backdoor.
"They knew it was there," he told Threat Level. "They stopped
communicating with me after that." http://j.mp/Jqr8hm ]
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2012 15:27:37 PDT
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann () csl sri com>
Subject: The Power of Individual Voters to Transform Their Government
William John Cox, Dandelion Salad: "U.S. voters appear to be increasingly
powerless to fight the plutocracy which runs their government. As a result,
Americans are living in an ever more repressive police state that is
illegally committing acts of violent aggression around the world. The only
thing that can possibly transform the U.S. government to one that cares for
the voters who elect it, rather than for the plutocracy that controls it, is
a unified opposition by all of the People, irrespective of their social
class or political beliefs."
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2012 19:58:10 -0700
From: "Mark E. Smith" <mymark () gmail com>
Subject: Risks from computers in elections? (Brad Friedman)
A recent article by Brad Friedman: Baked Again in Alaska: Yet Another
Election Crashes and Burns in The Last Frontier, states that, "...the
electronic voting systems we use in this nation --- every single one of them
--- are complete garbage." http://www.bradblog.com/?p=9259
One of the risks enumerated is that the central tabulators that count more
than 90% of US votes (whether cast on electronic voting machines or on paper
ballots read by optical scanners) can be remotely accessed without public
awareness, and that data entered into them, particularly when all data comes
from "admin" using the password "password," cannot be traced. Merely to
learn that the data is not verifiable can take years of litigation, and the
information sought can be "manipulated" before being released, if it is
released at all.
Ultimately, computer systems are only as reliable as the people who program
and administer them. In the case of programmers working for voting machine
corporations, and of politically appointed elections officials, the public
usually has no way to assess their reliability.
Most voters would not trust their lives and the lives of their children to
the brakes on a car if they had no way to verify that the brakes were in
good working condition. Yet they continue to trust their future and the
future of their children and their country to an election system that is,
indeed, "complete garbage," and, except in rare cases of hand counts,
The real risk to the public isn't in the computer systems used in elections,
which could easily be both accurate and verifiable, it is in voters placing
their trust in systems that in more than 90% of cases cannot be verified as
accurate, and in the people who program and administer those systems, whose
reliability can rarely be assessed. Although Brad and many other voters
continue to insist that nonvoters like myself are "apathetic," I think it is
obvious that people who vote in systems they know to be unreliable,
unverifiable garbage, are the ones who really don't care.
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2012 17:31:33 -0700
From: joel garry <joel-garry () cox net>
Subject: Thieves steal fiber
Thieves stole 75 feet of fiber and 6 feet of copper cable. 600 strand cable
served 10,000 Internet customers, including military bases, and some
I'm not sure if the risk is that copper thieves are too stupid to know the
difference between fiber and copper lines, or if criminal gangs now need
fiber - they have been known to steal cellphone repeaters off of towers.
An additional risk may be media magnification - TV reporting in the early
morning said 17 million customers were affected.
Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2012 9:31:40 PDT
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann () csl sri com>
Subject: Berkeley High students hack into attendance system (Jill Tucker)
[Source: Jill Tucker, Berkeley High students hack into attendance system,
*San Francisco Chronicle*, 20 Apr 2012; PGN-ed]
Some of Berkeley High's best students are among nearly three dozen students
suspended for hacking into the school's attendance system. At least four
students used an administrator's stolen password to clear tardies and
unexcused absences from the permanent records of 50 students, offering the
service or the password for a price. The scam allowed the students to
circumvent the school's rigid attendance policy, which had been in effect
until March 2012 and required teachers to dock student grades if they had
three or more unexcused absences. The hackers erased from the system
hundreds of cut classes and tardies from October through December 2011, and
charged classmates $2 to $20 for the illicit assistance.
Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2012 15:59:33 -0600
From: Jim Reisert AD1C <jjreisert () alum mit edu>
TapLogger: Inferring User Inputs On Smartphone Touchscreens Using
On-board Motion Sensors
Similar to looking at fingerprint patterns on the screen to try to
determine an unlock password.
Jim Reisert AD1C, <jjreisert () alum mit edu>, http://www.ad1c.us
Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2012 00:50:26 -0400
From: Jonathan Kamens <jik () kamens us>
Subject: Solar panel production page reveals name, address, real-time info
The recent articles in RISKS about "smart meters" brought the following
story to mind which might be of interest here...
My wife and I had a solar photovoltaic electricity generation system,
a.k.a. "solar panels," installed on our roof late last year by a Boston-area
company called SunBug. Overall, we were very pleased with SunBug and with
the quality of our installation, and we're looking forward to several
decades of much, much lower electric bills (our last monthly bill was
Many solar installers offer a web page their customers can use to monitor
the performance of their systems. SunBug, however, goes one step further:
their web page monitors not only solar electricity production, but also home
electricity consumption. This allows customers to monitor how much of their
electricity needs are being satisfied by solar, and it incentivizes them to
find ways to conserve energy to make the line on the graph go down. It's a
great idea in theory, but there are serious problems with SunBug's
implementation of it.
After our system went live, SunBug set up the monitoring page for us, sent
us a link to it, and posted that link on a publicly accessible page on their
web site. I.e., it was at that point possible for anyone in the world to
access our monitoring page and view our production and consumption in
But that's not all that was visible on the page; it also contained our name
I'm not going to post a link to our page because I don't know you all well
enough to do that :-), but suffice it to say that any moderately intelligent
person can tell from the consumption graph, with a high degree of accuracy,
when we are home or away and awake or asleep.
If someone wanted to rob us, they would be able easily to tell the best time
to do that. Worse, if someone wanted to harm us or our children, they would
be able easily to tell when we'd be available at home to be harmed. This is
Their exposure of their customers' names and addresses on a publicly
accessible web site without their prior knowledge or consent is clearly a
violation of the Massachusetts Data Privacy Law, 201 CMR 17.
There's another interesting twist in the story... As soon as I realized that
our address was visible to the world on our monitoring page, I updated our
settings to tell the site not to make our address visible. They do provide
that as an option, although they don't enable it by default. However, after
doing that, I was digging a little deeper into how the monitoring page
works, and I discovered that the bit controlling whether to display the
address is enforced on the client side via AJAX, not on the server. In other
words, our address was being sent down to the web browser regardless of
whether the bit was set; all the setting did was tell the browser whether to
display the address to the user. Therefore, anyone could use a network
sniffer like wireshark or even just a browser tool like Firebug to find out
Needless to say, I raised a big stink to SunBug. They fixed it for us by
making back-end changes in their database to completely remove all of our
PII from the site. They also said they understood my concerns and were
looking into how to address them for all of their customers, although I
don't know what in particular they've done in the several months since I
brought the issue to their attention.
The box that SunBug installed to monitor our electricity production and
consumption is a "smart meter" of sorts, so this story illustrates that the
concerns people have with smart meters are legitimate and already
manifesting in the real world.
In closing, I want to emphasize that although I was rather disappointed with
this particular aspect of SunBug's work, I was pleased overall, and I still
think we chose the correct installer out of the five or so we interviewed
seriously before hiring SunBug.
[And of course the OpSec solution is decidedly anti-ecological: make
consumption appear exactly the same all the time!
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2012 21:07:59 -0400
From: Paul Wallich <pw () panix com>
Subject: Re: Insider attack on smart meters (RISKS-26.79)
FBI Concerned About Smart Meter Hacking, 9 Apr 2012
I am a little suspicious of the numbers here (and, in the original report
they appear to be hedged with subjunctives). A few searches show that Puerto
Rico consumes about 22 billion kWh annually, with a typical retail cost of
roughly 10 cents/kWh. So to get into the hundreds of millions (the linked
piece cites an estimate of "up to" $400M/yr) you would need to steal 10-20%
of total electricity consumption on the island. Even assuming that basic
software checks would ignore a drop of as much as 75% in consumption
year-over-year, that would require about 15-25% (and possibly more) of total
consumption to be through hacked meters. You would need a large industrial
enterprise to do that kind of work. Anyone want to bet that the "hundreds of
millions" is an estimate of what might be the losses if all the smart meters
Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2012 03:23:06 -0700 (PDT)
From: Chris J Brady <chrisjbrady () yahoo com>
Subject: Compromised ATMs of no Consequence to Banks or Customers
In London many ATMs have been targeted by criminal gangs for years. And it
appears that no-one cares -- many ATMs are visibly compromised -- yet the
banks allow them to remain damaged. I know of three; 1/ one in Charing Cross
Station with wires hanging out of the fascia, 2/ one in Paddington Station
where the whole machine can be pulled out of the cabinet, 3/ one at the top
end of Charing Cross Road with glue all round from where a skimming device
had been installed. But the situation is worse. At Paddington I was using
another -- undamaged -- ATM. Afterwards I saw someone using the damaged ATM
(she had the obligatory earbuds in both ears), so after she had finished I
pointed out that the ATM was damaged and its security compromised. She
didn't care. She walked off. Ditto with some users of the ATM at Charing
Cross. No-one could be bothered to listen or take notice. Late last year I
reported the one at Charing Cross to Barclays Bank - it remains compromised
5 months later. And this will get worse as the tourists arrive for the
Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2012 18:44:54 -0400
From: Ed Ravin <eravin () panix com>
Subject: Google Street View face blurring side effects
The Israeli daily HaAretz reports that Google Street View is now
live for several major Israeli cities. The Justice Ministry
demanded that Google blur out faces and license plates, but there's
still a few bugs in the system - faces on some posters and advertisements
were blurred, but some faces on actual people were not:
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2012 22:02:30 -0700
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com>
Subject: Occupy Wall Street protester doesn't own his tweets, judge rules
In a candid ruling, a New York judge said a protester can't stop
prosecutors from searching his Twitter account because he doesn't own the
tweets in the first place. Judge Matthew Sciarrino Jr. cited a
"widely-believed" but "mistaken" notion about online privacy rights and
said that search and seizure protections don't apply because we "do not
have a 'physical' home on the Internet."
http://j.mp/ID36Rk (Paid Content)
[T'weet or not T'weet, That is di-gestion. PGN]
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2012 10:03:59 -0400
From: Dan Geer <dan () GEER ORG>
Subject: Harvard Library open access?
Harvard Library to faculty: we're going broke unless you go open access
Cory Doctorow, Monday, Apr 23
"Harvard Library's Faculty Advisory Council is telling faculty that it's
financially 'untenable' for the university to keep on paying extortionate
access fees for academic journals. It's suggesting that faculty make their
research publicly available, switch to publishing in open access journals
and consider resigning from the boards of journals that don't allow open
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2012 18:42:01 -0700
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com>
Subject: White House pushes back on CISPA "cybersecurity" legislation
"In a statement, National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden said
any cybersecurity legislation should include strong privacy protections
and should set mandatory security standards for critical infrastructure
systems, such as electrical grids and water supplies." http://j.mp/IWlFmS
(The Hill via NNSquad)
My current blog posting re CISPA is: "
"CISPA, Cybersecurity, and the Devil in the Dark":
http://j.mp/HIO8ud (Lauren's Blog)
Lauren Weinstein (lauren () vortex com): http://www.vortex.com/lauren
Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2012 17:18:28 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty () roscom com>
Subject: 11 percent of all sexts sent to the wrong recipient (Natt Garun)
Natt Garun, *Digital Trends*, 19 Apr 2012
Sexters beware: A new poll finds that your sexy messages may end up in the
wrong hands if you're not careful enough.
If you're into mobile, virtual sexy time, we have no judgment with what you
want to do in your private life. But according to a poll conducted by United
Kingdom-based mobile news site Recombu, 11 percent of sexts are sent to
unintended recipients. Looks like too many of you are getting too caught up
in the moment!
The poll, which surveyed approximately 2,000 adults, showed that 47 percent
of responders sext on a regular basis. About 48 percent of sexters are
female, and 45 percent are male (we're guessing the rest means undisclosed
gender or transgendered). However, the numbers show that males seem to get
more heated and eager than their female counterparts.
About one in 10 sexts from male senders get accidentally shipped to someone
it wasn't meant for, while females stats stand at one in 20. What's worse:
16 percent of men have had their sexy messages end up in a family member's
inbox while just 8 percent of females suffer the same embarrassment. ...
Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2012 9:49:23 PDT
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann () csl sri com>
Subject: "The Flight from Conversation" (Sherry Turkle in The NYT)
[Source: Sherry Turkle, The Flight From Conversation, *The New York
Times*, The Sunday Review, 22 Apr 2012; excellent long article, PGN-ed]
We live in a technological universe in which we are always communicating.
And yet we have sacrificed conversation for mere connection. At home,
families sit together, texting and reading e-mail. At work executives text
during board meetings. We text (and shop and go on Facebook) during classes
and when we're on dates. My students tell me about an important new skill:
it involves maintaining eye contact with someone while you text someone
else; it's hard, but it can be done. ...
I spend the summers at a cottage on Cape Cod, and for decades I walked the
same dunes that Thoreau once walked. Not too long ago, people walked with
their heads up, looking at the water, the sky, the sand and at one another,
talking. Now they often walk with their heads down, typing. Even when they
are with friends, partners, children, everyone is on their own devices.
So I say, look up, look at one another, and let's start the conversation.
Sherry Turkle is a psychologist and professor at M.I.T. and the author, most
recently, of ``Alone Together: Why We Expect More From Technology and Less
From Each Other.''
[This really gives new meaning to being left to your own devices. PGN]
Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2012 23:20:27 -0400
From: Ben Rothke <brothke () hotmail com>
Subject: Book review: CERT Guide to Insider Threats
Dawn Cappelli, Andrew Moore and Randall Trzeciak
CERT Guide to Insider Threats: How to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to
Information Technology Crimes
CERT Insider Threat Center
While Julius Caesar likely never said ``Et tu, Brute?'', the saying
associated with his final minutes has come to symbolize the ultimate insider
betrayal. In The CERT Guide to Insider Threats: How to Prevent, Detect, and
Respond to Information Technology Crimes, authors Dawn Cappelli, Andrew
Moore and Randall Trzeciak of the CERT Insider Threat Center provide
incontrovertible data and an abundance of empirical evidence, which creates
an important resource on the topic of insider threats. There are thousands
of companies that have uttered modern day versions of Et tu, Brute due to
insidious insider attacks and the book documents many of them. The book is
based on work done at the CERT Insider Threat Center, which has been
researching this topic for the last decade. The data the threat center has
access to is unparalleled, which in turn makes this the definitive book on
the topic. The threat center has investigated nearly 1,000 incidents and
their data sets on the topic are unrivaled. With that, the book truly needs
to be on the desktop of everyone tasked with data security and intellectual
Full review at:
Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2012 15:22:07 PDT
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann () csl sri com>
Subject: Henry Petroski does it again!
Henry Petroski is a long-time friend of RISKS, and his name has appeared in
at least two dozen RISKS items over the years. As I write this, I have just
noticed that his latest regular column (this one is called Backseat
Designers) in the May-June issue of *American Scientist* is adapted from
Chapter 11 of his latest book, To Forgive Design: Understanding Failure,
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2012.
Many years ago, when I managed to induce Henry to give keynote talks for an
early COMPASS conference on safety and for the ACM SIGSOFT conference in
1991, he modestly insisted he did not know enough about computers. However,
much of what he has written and said is always highly relevant to RISKS, and
therefore his new book deserves mention here.
Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2012 19:35:22 -0700
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () ocis net>
Subject: Gmail outage much broader than originally reported (Juan Carlos Perez)
Juan Carlos Perez, *InfoWorld*, 18 Apr 2012
Google initially underestimated the number of affected users,
which likely topped 30 million
Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2012 14:21:26 +0800
From: Jeremy Ardley <jeremy.ardley () gmail com>
Subject: Re: "Did first DDOS attack sink the Titanic?"
This may perhaps have been the first DDOS, but remember the telephone was
around before then.
Today we have the massive problem of emergency services numbers being
overwhelmed by calls about a single incident. A lot of this is due to mobile
phones but some exists because of the size of the incident.
A typical scenario is a grass-fire besides a freeway. In the space of a few
minutes hundreds of people will call in to report it. This massive volume of
calls effectively prevents any response to other calls like a house fire.
In the event of 9/11 People all over the city reported in. I literally have
no idea how the call-centres coped with this massive amount of incoming
calls and effectively a fixed number of operators.
Back in 1900 I don't know if they had emergency numbers or just operators,
but I'm sure any significant event would have overwhelmed whatever systems
they had in place.
The industry has yet to design a resilient call response system that can
handle peak overloads while still attending to routine but life critical
Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2012 13:52:38 -0400
From: Dick Mills <dickandlibbymills () gmail com>
Subject: Re: Hospital generator failure following earthquake
RISKS-26.79 described how an earthquake stirred up sediments in diesel fuel
tanks, causing the emergency diesel engines to stop.
This problem is well known to boaters. The classical scenario is trying to
escape from an enclosed harbor to the open sea. The pounding of the boat in
the surf at the harbor entrance stirs sediments, predictably causing engine
failure at the worst possible time. The known remedy is to have multiple
fuel filters plus a rapid way to switch from one to the backup.
Knowledgeable skippers in that classic scenario will even station a man to
stand by with his hand on the fuel filter throw-over valve.
Even in less classic scenarios, it is completely foreseeable that fuel
filters are most likely to clog at the time of maximum agitation. Since
that is precisely the time when dependence on engine power is most critical,
it must be addressed at the design and planning stages.
In an unmanned installation, the switching filters remedy is problematic
(even if automatic). Still, the nature of the problem is identical.
So the risk here involves mechanisms to transfer risk knowledge from one
domain to another. Surely engine manufacturers must be familiar with it. I
wonder what their installation and operating instructions say on the
Dick Mills, Sailing Vessel Tarwathie
Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2012 14:22:43 -0700
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () ocis net>
Subject: The hidden danger of Windows 8 Microsoft Accounts (Woody Leonhard)
Woody Leonhard, *InfoWorld*, 18 Apr 2012
Microsoft goes to great lengths to convince Windows 8 users to log on with
an email address, but if your account gets hijacked you could find yourself
Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2011 20:01:16 -0900
From: RISKS-request () csl sri com
Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)
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End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 26.80
- Risks Digest 26.80 RISKS List Owner (Apr 25)