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Risks Digest 27.19
From: RISKS List Owner <risko () csl sri com>
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2013 16:58:32 PDT

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest  Monday 11 March 2013  Volume 27 : Issue 19

Peter G. Neumann, moderator, chmn ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
The current issue can be found at

Boeing 787s to create half a terabyte of data per flight (Dag-Erling Smorgrav)
Shaw Internet customers up in arms over lost e-mails during 'interruption'
  (Lauren Weinstein)
Radio controlled clocks misinterpret daylight saving time warning bit
  (Joe Loughry)
Tor Exit Nodes Located and Mapped (Steve Schear via Dewayne Hendricks)
9th Circuit Appeals Court: 4th Amendment Applies At The Border; Also:
  Password Protected Files Shouldn't Arouse Suspicion (Lauren Weinstein)
"Facebook does damage control after claims of rigged News Feed" (Zach Miners
  via Gene Wirchenko)
Seattle bar bans Google Glass over privacy concerns (Mark Thorson)
"When is your data not your data? When it's in the cloud" (Bill Snyder via
  Gene Wirchenko)
"Maybe, just maybe, users can win the privacy war" (Galen Gruman via
  Gene Wirchenko)
Skype's Been Hijacked in China, and Microsoft Is O.K. With It (Businessweek
  via David J. Farber)
Harvard e-mail spying story (Lauren Weinstein)
Harvard's e-mail intrusion explanation fails the smell test
  (Lauren Weinstein)
Re: How SSD power faults scramble your data (Geoff Kuenning)
Re: Electronic health records: teething problems? (Arnold Weissberg)
Re: Yahoo Mail Hack Sending E-mails With Single Link To Rogue Websites
  (Chris Drewe, Martyn Thomas)
Re: Major crash at Yahoo Mail de-activates millions of accounts
  (Jonathan Kamens, Chris J Brady, Jonathan Kamens)
Re: Trojaned blackmails from PCs. Japanese Police arrested PC owners
  (Chiaki Ishikawa)
Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

Date: Thu, 07 Mar 2013 13:41:07 +0100
From: Dag-Erling Smorgrav <des () des no>
Subject: Boeing 787s to create half a terabyte of data per flight


  ``The latest planes we are getting, the Boeing 787s, are incredibly
  connected. Literally every piece of that plane has an internet connection,
  from the engines, to the flaps, to the landing gear.  [...]  We can get
  upwards of half a terabyte of data from a single flight from all of the
  different devices which are internet connected,'' [Virgin Atlantic IT
  director David] Bulman said.

What could *possibly* go wrong?

Dag-Erling Sm=C3=B8rgrav - des () des no


Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 22:29:01 -0700
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com>
Subject: Shaw Internet customers up in arms over lost e-mails during
  service 'interruption'

  "Shaw e-mail customers are scrambling after an interruption of Shaw's
  e-mail services Thursday led to millions of e-mails being deleted.  About
  70 per cent of Shaw's e-mail customers were affected when the company was
  troubleshooting an unrelated e-mail delay problem and an attempted solution
  caused incoming e-mails to be deleted, a spokesman told The Sunday
  Province."  http://j.mp/13OyeK8 (*The Province* via NNSquad)



Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 17:05:12 +0000
From: Joe Loughry <joe.loughry () stx ox ac uk>
Subject: Radio controlled clocks misinterpret daylight saving time warning bit

Some radio synchronised clocks in USA unexpectedly switched to Daylight
Saving Time (DST) yesterday hours ahead of schedule.  According to the Time
and Frequency Division of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), which operates radio station WWVB in Boulder, Colorado, the last two
significant bits in the time code give a warning that DST changes tomorrow
and the current state of DST (standard time or daylight saving time).  Some
clocks changed to DST when the warning bit appeared.


Joe Loughry, Doctoral Student in the Department of Computer Science
St Cross College, Oxford


Date: March 10, 2013 10:11:56 AM EDT
From: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne () warpspeed com>
Subject: Tor Exit Nodes Located and Mapped

[Note:  This item comes from friend Steve Schear.  DLH]

Tor Exit Nodes Located and Mapped, 27 Feb 2013

Tor Exit Nodes are the gateways where encrypted Tor traffic hits the
Internet.  This means an exit node can be abused to monitor Tor traffic
(after it leaves the onion network). It is in the design of the Tor network
that locating the source of that traffic through the network should be
difficult to determine. However if the exit traffic is unencrypted and
contains identifying information then an exit node can be abused.

The torproject therefore is dependent on a diverse and wide range of exit
nodes. This update to an older page is where I attempt to display the exit
nodes diversity in a Google map with Geolocation. The map was built using
Google Maps API v3, with Marker Clusterer.

The majority of exit nodes are likely not monitored and are `safe', they are
managed by good Internet citizens who believe in the aims of the Tor
project. However even a handful of bad nodes could be a threat as exit nodes
are periodically changed as you use the Tor network.  Understand the
Technology, Understand the Risks.

Use of the Tor Project by activists and Human Rights Defenders can be a
valuable tool in avoiding surveillance; however you should always have a
good understanding of the risks and keep your traffic encrypted end to end,
as any of these exit nodes could be watching your traffic flows.

At the most basic level unless you are using encrypted protocols (HTTPS /
SSH / TLS), the Tor traffic could be monitored. Here are two simple
examples: [snip]

Dewayne-Net RSS Feed: <http://www.warpspeed.com/wordpress>


Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2013 16:00:47 -0800
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com>
Subject: 9th Circuit Appeals Court: 4th Amendment Applies At The Border;
  Also: Password Protected Files Shouldn't Arouse Suspicion

9th Circuit Appeals Court: 4th Amendment Applies At The Border; Also:
Password Protected Files Shouldn't Arouse Suspicion
  http://j.mp/X55bAB  (Techdirt via NNSquad)

  "In a somewhat surprising 9th Circuit ruling (en banc, or in front of the
  entire set of judges), the court ruled that the 4th Amendment does apply
  at the border, that agents do need to recognize there's an expectation of
  privacy, and cannot do a search without reason.

  Furthermore, they noted that merely encrypting a file with a password is
  not enough to trigger suspicion. This is a huge ruling in favor of privacy


Date: Fri, 08 Mar 2013 11:47:56 -0800
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () telus net>
Subject: "Facebook does damage control after claims of rigged News Feed"
  (Zach Miners)

  [The risk being about how the rules can keep changing.]

, InfoWorld, 5 Mar 2013
One user reports a 1,000 percent increase in interaction after paying
to promote a post


Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 08:52:21 -0700
From: Mark Thorson <eee () sonic net>
Subject: Seattle bar bans Google Glass over privacy concerns

Proprietor admits its for the free publicity of being first, too.



Date: Thu, 07 Mar 2013 10:32:28 -0800
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () telus net>
Subject: "When is your data not your data? When it's in the cloud"
  (Bill Snyder)

Bill Snyder, *InfoWorld*, 07 Mar 2013
With Verizon's aid, police arrest a man for storing illegal porn in
the cloud, which raises questions about how much privacy cloud users can expect


Date: Fri, 08 Mar 2013 12:02:58 -0800
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () telus net>
Subject: "Maybe, just maybe, users can win the privacy war" (Galen Gruman)

Galen Gruman, InfoWorld, 8 Mar 2013
A 'silent Big Brother' information state is emerging -- and people
are starting to realize the danger and act


Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2013 15:09:15 -0500
From: "David J. Farber" <farber () gmail com>
Subject: Skype's Been Hijacked in China, and Microsoft Is O.K. With It -
 Businessweek (Very good article -- link to it!!! djf)


Jeffrey Knockel is an unlikely candidate to expose the inner workings of
Skype's role in China's online surveillance apparatus. The 27-year-old
computer-science graduate student at the University of New Mexico,
Albuquerque doesn't speak Chinese, let alone follow Chinese politics. ``I
don't really keep up with news in China that much,'' he says. But he loves
solving puzzles. So when a professor pulled Knockel aside after class two
years ago and suggested a long-shot project -- to figure out how the Chinese
version of Microsoft's (MSFT) Skype secretly monitors users -- he hunkered
down in his bedroom with his Dell (DELL) laptop and did it.

Since then, Knockel, a bearded, yoga-practicing son of a retired U.S. Air
Force officer, has repeatedly beaten the ever-changing encryption that
cloaks Skype's Chinese service. This has allowed him to compile for the
first time the thousands of terms -- such as Amnesty International and
Tiananmen -- that prompt Skype in China to intercept typed messages and send
copies to its computer servers in the country. Some messages are blocked
altogether. The lists -- which are the subject of a presentation Knockel
will make on Friday, March 8, at Boston University, as well as a paper he's
writing with researchers from the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab -- shed
light on the monitoring of Internet communications in China. Skype's
videophone-and-texting service there, with nearly 96 million users, is known
as TOM-Skype, a joint venture formed in 2005 with majority owner Tom Online,
a Chinese wireless Internet company. ...


Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 09:39:07 -0700
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com>
Subject: Harvard e-mail spying story

  "Harvard University central administrators secretly searched the e-mail
  accounts of 16 resident deans last fall, looking for a leak to the media
  about the school's sprawling cheating case, according to several Harvard
  officials interviewed by the Globe.  The resident deans sit on Harvard's
  Administrative Board, the committee charged with handling the cheating
  case. They were not warned that administrators planned to access their
  accounts, and only one was told of the search shortly afterward."
  http://j.mp/12Fvu2B  (Boston.com)


Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2013 11:27:01 -0700
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com>
Subject: Harvard's e-mail intrusion explanation fails the smell test

  "Harvard Offers Explanation for Search of E-Mail Accounts"

  "Harvard University on Monday offered its first public comments on its
  searching of staff members' e-mail accounts, saying that the
  administration had not notified most of those employees because it wanted
  to protect the one who inadvertently leaked confidential material to the
  news media."   (The New York Times)

OK, let's get a couple of things straight here.  First, if Harvard wants to
assert that the Terms of Service of their e-mail system permits
administrators to monitor the contents of e-mail, that's within their rights.
This is not at all an uncommon arrangement for corporate e-mail systems,
though whether or not the Harvard community would agree that it's
appropriate in their case is a different question.  But for Harvard to try
to suggest that their intrusion was less significant because only Subject
lines were inspected is mealymouthed nonsense of the sort we expect from
governments trying to excuse their own e-mail intrusions.  Subject lines
contain a great deal of information, and for some messages represent the
entire effective contents!  Trying to claim Subject lines are not content
just doesn't fly.  Also, there was of course no guarantee that the Subject
lines would indicate who had forwarded the messages of interest in this
case, since (not exactly headline news!) it's possible to forward messages
(and copy/past text) under completely different Subject lines.  So no matter
how you slice it, Harvard's overall explanation doesn't seem to really pass
the smell test very well at all.  Very disappointing from a great
educational institution.

  [1. It appears to me someone at Harvard overreacted initially,
      especially if multiple student answers happened to be identical
      because they were all copied from the same website, which seemed
      to be in scope of the exam in the first place.
   2. Subject lines are certainly content-bearing, but might be treated
      differently -- if for example the text were encrypted, but the
      subject line were not.  What was the expressed policy, and how
      was it enforced?
   3. Smell test? The whole thing smells no matter how you slice it.  PGN]


Date: Thu, 07 Mar 2013 00:31:13 -0800
From: Geoff Kuenning <geoff () cs hmc edu>
Subject: Re: How SSD power faults scramble your data

I have to confess surprise that this paper has made a number of news sites,
for several reasons--the first being that I'm still not used to the idea
that the mainstream is interested in this sort of research.

But it's worth noting a few things.  First, the researchers worked very hard
to produce the power failures in question.  Most installations that use SSDs
connect them to a reliable power supply, either because they are part of a
huge datacenter, or because they are built into a laptop that has a battery.
So the average user is VERY unlikely to see the kinds of failures reported
in the paper.

Second, the failures weren't universal.  Some SSDs apparently incorporate
enough internal power (probably via capacitors) to shut down cleanly when
power is lost.  If I recall the talk correctly, the most reliable behavior
was at both ends of the cost spectrum.

Third, the test conditions were extreme.  The researchers cut power suddenly
using a special circuit, while in the middle of writing large amounts of
data to the drive.  Most real power failures are slower, since the
line-power drop is smoothed by the DC power supply.  And since few people do
continuous large writes, statistics are on your side.

Fourth, we should remember hard drives aren't too happy under the same test
conditions.  So it may not be wise to junk all your SSDs just yet.

And finally, several years of research at the University of Wisconsin have
revealed some pretty disturbing information about the reliability of
software file systems under various failure conditions.  So it's not clear
that power faults are the first thing we should worry about anyway (though
I'm not ready to take a position one way or the other).

FWIW, I don't use an SSD but it's purely a cost/capacity decision.

    Geoff Kuenning   geoff () cs hmc edu   http://www.cs.hmc.edu/~geoff/

I have always wished for my computer to be as easy to use as my telephone;
my wish has come true because I can no longer figure out how to use my
telephone.  -- Bjarne Stroustrup


Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2013 23:07:03 -0500
From: Arnold Weissberg <aweissberg () verizon net>
Subject: Re: Electronic health records: teething problems? (RISKS-27.17)

Re: Gene Wirchenko's note (Risks-27.18) about needing an e-mail address to
"not register" to read an article on line, an excellent service to deal with
this is 10 Minute Mail (10minutemail.com). This is extremely useful for
those sites that send you a link to follow in order to access the site.  If
that's not necessary, make one up.  I'm sure no one's checking.


Date: Sat, 09 Mar 2013 23:56:57 +0000
From: "Chris Drewe" <e767pmk () yahoo co uk>
Subject: Re: Yahoo Mail Hack Sending E-mails With Single Link To Rogue Websites

RISKS-27.18 describes various woes with Yahoo! e-mail; no
idea if there's any connection, but today's 'Daily Telegraph'
(Mar 9th, 2013) includes this item:

In my case: (a) I used to work for BT (nothing to do with their internet
service) but have no connection now except as a customer and future
pensioner; and (b) when I started sending personal e-mails in the late 1990s
I used a company system, but soon needed my own address so set up web-based
e767pmk () yahoo co uk in May 2000.  The company banned personal web mail
access (due to virus concerns) in 2002 so for my modest e-mail traffic I
bought a laptop and used Yahoo! e-mail with pay-as-you-go dial-up, via POP
and SMTP with Netscape's e-mail program (don't laugh) to allow off-line mail
reading and preparation, which is what I've done ever since, but with
broadband since 2010.  I specifically chose BT as my ISP knowing that Yahoo!
provides their e-mail service (as btinternet.com addresses) so that I could
continue using my Yahoo! address, which has been pretty trouble-free, at
least so far...

Considering how e-mail is very much essential to modern life, it's a shame
how flaky the provision is, compared to other utilities, such as plain old
telephone service.  And how long before it's *ONLY* available in the


Date: Fri, 08 Mar 2013 12:55:27 +0000
From: Martyn Thomas <martyn () thomas-associates co uk>
Subject: Re: Yahoo Mail Hack Sending E-mails With Single Link To Rogue Websites

... And OK - I know you shouldn't click on links in e-mails - but folks do.

If we can all agree this, can we please stop blaming the users - and take
the functionality out of the e-mail client software?


Date: Thu, 07 Mar 2013 09:42:33 -0500
From: Jonathan Kamens <jik () kamens us>
Subject: Re: Major crash at Yahoo Mail de-activates millions of accounts

It is strange that, in the three e-mails to RISKS about this incident, no
reference was given to a news source independently corroborating it. It is
also strange that five days after the supposed incident, I cannot find a
single report about it on-line. I can't that an incident of the magnitude
described by Mr. Brady would have gone completely unreported.

I would like to hear more from Mr. Brady about where he obtained the details
he posted about the incident, and I would like to see some independent
corroboration. Absent such confirmation, it seems likely to me that
Mr. Brady and others who claim to have been affected by this "crash" are
actually victims of a more mundane sort: their accounts were broken into by
hackers to send spam / scam / phishing e-mails; such hackers often delete all
old e-mails and contacts to make it harder for the victims to regain access
to their accounts and warn their contacts that to ignore the bogus e-mails
sent from them by the hackers.

This theory would seem to be bolstered by the fact that Mr. Brady himself
sent another e-mail to RISKS, four days after his first e-mail alleging a
major crash, essentially admitting to having clicked on a link in a phishing
e-mail and thereby compromising his own Yahoo account.

It is understanding that inaccurate items would occasionally slip through
and end up in RISKS; it is nevertheless important for us to remain vigilant
against them and to correct them promptly when they do occur.


Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:11:02 -0800 (PST)
From: Chris J Brady <chrisjbrady () yahoo com>
Subject: Re: Major crash at Yahoo Mail de-activates millions of accounts
  (RISKS-Digest 27.18)

I have no intention of getting into a war of attrition over this issue. The
facts - as far as I am concerned are these:

* I DID NOT click on any of these trojan virus links - indeed when I get
 such an e-mail I always send the original sender info. on what it is.

* On Saturday - I and many others - suddenly had my Yahoo Classic e-mail
account de-activated. When I activated by entering a capcha and clicking on
Submit I found to my horror that ALL 13 year's worth of folders and e-mails
and contacts had been deleted.

* After searching the Yahoo Help pages I eventually found a pro-forma for
requesting a complete restore. I submitted this. Nothing happened for many
hours. I submitted it again. I received a response that all had been
restored as per the last snapshot. In fact NOTHING had been restored.

* Meanwhile I was monitoring Y-Mail on Yahoo Groups, Yahoo Answers, Twitter,
Facebook, and other e-mail forums. There was considerable and increasing
frustration as evidenced by numerous posts that nothing was being done by
Yahoo to restore accounts - some Plus accounts.

* I submitted my restore request again (third time). Again some hours later
I received an e-mail stating that all had been restored. Nothing had been.

* After searching the Yahoo Help pages I eventually found a Customer Service
no. - unfortunately it was 1-800 for the USA - chargeable at international
rates from the UK.  Then after making inquiries on various forums I was
given an 0870 no. (premium rate) and a 0800 no. for the UK. My phone has a
Giffgaff SIM, luckily 0800 nos. are free. I called that and was on hold for
90 minutes. Eventually someone responded whom I could barely
understand. Anyway after 30 minutes of nonsensical conversation the upshot
was that I should submit yet another restore request via the Help site.

* This was now 48 hours after the initial deletions (for me). The restore
window was well-past. Yahoo only keeps backups for 48 hours at maximum.

* Eventually on Tuesday I logged in and most folders, e-mails and contacts
had been restored as they were on the previous Friday. All my e-mails for
Saturday through to Monday had gone for good - apparently a result of the

* Additionally I compiled a list of just a few cases to send to Yahoo CS for
them to see just how concerned their members were. This was bounced back as

  [Very Long item of e-mail sent to cc-advoc () yahoo-inc com omitted here.]


Date: Thu, 07 Mar 2013 13:17:38 -0500
From: Jonathan Kamens <jik () kamens us>
Subject: Re: Major crash at Yahoo Mail de-activates millions of  accounts

On 03/07/2013 12:11 PM, Chris J Brady wrote:
I have no intention of getting into a war of attrition over this issue.

If you are going to make serious accusations of malfeasance against a major
corporation and its employees in a respected, public forum, you ought to be
prepared to support or retract them.

I've reviewed all the information you sent. None of it supports any of your
claims about the cause or scope of the problem.

There are numerous reasons why any single, active Yahoo account might be
wiped and deactivated without the consent of its owner.

There are numerous possible explanations other than the one you gave for why
there might be a sudden sharp uptick in the perceived number of such
deactivated accounts.

I understand that you are angry about what happened to your account; I would
be, too. I am sorry about what you and others have experienced.  I agree
with you that Yahoo deserves criticism for their poor handling of the
situation, regardless of whether it's their fault. It may turn out that it
*was* their fault after all. Nevertheless, there is as yet no evidence of
that, and these unfortunate events and Yahoo's poor response to them do not
justify the statement as fact of serious, unsubstantiated allegations.


Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2013 11:25:32 +0900
From: Chiaki Ishikawa <ishikawa () yk rim or jp>
Subject: re: Trojaned blackmails from PCs. Japanese Police arrested PC owners

I reported earlier about the ordeal of a few people who were arrested by the
police in Japan because the computer trojan/virus they somehow downloaded
sent threatening notes to various services.  The police thought these people
were the real perpetrators.  But the real party behind the bot/virus and the
blackmails sent a revealing e-mail to a lawyer, and demanded the wrongly
arrested people be freed. The e-mail contains information that was only
available to the person sending the original black mails. As a result of
this e-mail, and as the result of a local Police who found the trace of
suspected unknown virus-like activity on one of the computers of the
arrested men, the charges were dropped for all the falsely arrested people,
and freed.  [ Trojan sent blackmails from PCs. Japanese Police arrested PC
owners 27.10]

Sorry for the long posting, but I am not sure if this news coverage is
available in English in any detail and it is worth reporting what happens in
this corner of the world.

Now, the new twist at the end of last year.

Japanese police set up a Facebook page towards the end of the last year for
courting the information related to the wrong-doing so that they may be able
to clue in the original identity of the perpetrator.

This was the first time the Japanese police turned to SNS for this type of
investigation. Ironically, it was all too clear that the Japanese police did
not have the technical expertise to handle this type of the crime. The
arrests were made just because the IP addresses recorded in the logs matched
these people's computers despite some claimed no knowledge and even
suggested that someone may hijacked Wi-Fi, but the police would not listen
to it, etc.

I doubt how useful the Facebook page was. Some even speculated that this
Facebook was a ploy to irritate the perpetrator to commit more acts which
may leak information to the real identity. (If so, it may have worked in
either positive or negative way. See the new event described later.)

Also, after the falsely arrested people were released, police leaked words
that their investigation was blocked due to the use of TOR network through
which the virus or bot was uploaded originally.  I was afraid that TOR was
given a bad name just because of this incidence.  To my relief, some
commentators on TV did stress that TOR has a place in the society for
whistle-blowers and dissidents in dictatorial countries.

(I can not access the facebook page any more. It seems to have been closed
due to the development described below. )

Still more twists this year.

Just prior to the new year's day and a few days later, a couple of e-mails
were sent to the Police and major TV and print press stating that a certain
key piece that is pertinent to the crime is buried in a place (the first one
suggested a mountain in the western suburb of Tokyo and the second mail
suggested a cat in very small island just off the beach south west of
Tokyo).  Then the police arrested a 30 years old man with a previous record
of arrest due to a blackmail posted to a popular BBS after a copyright issue
got nasty regarding a cartoon-like cat figure (ASCII art) escalated several
years ago.

But the reason for the arrest is not quite digital if you expect some
advanced ICT evidence.

A memory media was found inside a collar that was attached to a stray cat in
the smallish island as claimed by the e-mail.  And the man arrested on Feb
5th is said to have been captured earlier by one of the newly installed
surveillance cameras on the island padding the particular cat, etc.  (But as
far as the incriminating evidence that the collar was put by the man on this
stray cat goes, it may not be on the video.  Despite press scrutiny, the
police kept mum about this key point.)

Another couple of evidences which the police seem to suggest: (I am culling
these from various media articles. Unlike USA, the discovery process for
police/prosecutor evidence to figure out how strong a case is for meriting a
public prosecution is not done in Japan despite the lawyers demanding such
procedure to take place. So frankly I don't know what the police in store
until the court business proceeds very far.)

(a) - the newly arrested man uses Hewlett Packard PC at a place where he is
   hired as temp hand, and the virus/bot written in C# carried an
   identification record which suggests it was compiled on an HP PC.

  [OK, I did not know that the virus/bot used C#. But obviously police asked
  many anti-virus makers about the origin and the nature of the
  trojan/virus, and the words were out to the general public that the
  virus/bot was written in C#.]

(b) - There is an evidence in the log that his PC connected one of the
   TOR connection gateways at least a few times in the past. (But it is
   not clear what happened through the connection, etc.)

The lawyer for the man has already spelled out that

 - the man claims no knowledge of C#, and he wonders why anyone thought he
   wrote the trojan/virus (written in C#).

 - the man denied putting the media inside the collar that was on this
   particular cat.

Also, he was caught on a camera of a TV station a day or two before the
arrest (it seems that the police leaked the on-going investigation leading
to the man) and he seemed to be utterly careless. (I would have thought a
man leaving behind such a deed would be more careful like trying to see if
someone is trailing him now and then. But I digress.)

Any readers reading RISKS worth his/her salt would see that it is so easy to
rebut claims (a) and (b).

I have a feeling that the new e-mails around the new year's and the the
memory media placed on the cat that led to the arrest is a big joke played
by the real perpetrator who knows the regular activity pattern of the newly
arrested man. It would be so simple to plant the memory media in advance if
the man is known to go such a place to pad on the popular cats in the
island, etc.

After all the mastermind behind the blackmails explained in his/her e-mail
that the intention was to reveal the ineptitude of the Japanese police
handling the cybercrime in general.

It my fear turns correct, then the Japanese police will have no authority to
regulate the cybercrime in the public eyes for some time to come. *That*
will be a sad outcome of the series of events.

We have to wait and see.


Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2012 20:20:16 -0900
From: RISKS-request () csl sri com
Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

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=> SUBMISSIONS: to risks () CSL sri com with meaningful SUBJECT: line.
 *** NOTE: Including the string "notsp" at the beginning or end of the subject
 *** line will be very helpful in separating real contributions from spam.
 *** This attention-string may change, so watch this space now and then.
=> ARCHIVES: ftp://ftp.sri.com/risks for current volume
     or ftp://ftp.sri.com/VL/risks for previous VoLume
 http://www.risks.org takes you to Lindsay Marshall's searchable archive at
 newcastle: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS.html gets you VoLume, ISsue.
   Lindsay has also added to the Newcastle catless site a palmtop version
   of the most recent RISKS issue and a WAP version that works for many but
   not all telephones: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/w/r
 <http://the.wiretapped.net/security/info/textfiles/risks-digest/> .
==> PGN's comprehensive historical Illustrative Risks summary of one liners:
    <http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.html> for browsing,
    <http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.pdf> or .ps for printing
  is no longer maintained up-to-date except for recent election problems.
 *** NOTE: If a cited URL fails, we do not try to update them.  Try
  browsing on the keywords in the subject line or cited article leads.
==> Special Offer to Join ACM for readers of the ACM RISKS Forum:


End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 27.19

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