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Risks Digest 27.41
From: RISKS List Owner <risko () csl sri com>
Date: Sun, 18 Aug 2013 5:29:27 PDT

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest  Sunday 18 August 2013  Volume 27 : Issue 41

Peter G. Neumann, moderator, chmn ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
The current issue can be found at

Computer outage meets uninspected meat with no mete-outs (Doug McIlroy)
Separate errors bring down NYTimes site and .gov TLD (Lauren Weinstein)
Civilian GPS is vulnerable to being spoofed (Suzanne Johnson)
Xerox scanners/photocopiers randomly alter numbers in scanned documents
  (Robert Schaefer, Glynn Clements)
Easter Eggs in Infrastructure Software (Paul Fenimore)
NSA to cut sys admins by 90% (Lauren Weinstein)
Remotely hacking/hijacking the camera on Samsung Smart TV (Lauren Weinstein)
DC, Maryland: Speed Camera Firms Move To Hide Evidence (Richard Forno)
The Public/Private Surveillance Partnership (Dewayne Hendricks)
ISOC: Stand Together to Support Open Internet Access, Freedom, and Privacy
  (David J. Farber)
Lavabit, email service Snowden reportedly used, abruptly shuts down
  (Dewayne Hendricks)
"Lavabit shutdown marks another costly blemish for U.S. tech companies"
  (Ted Samson via Gene Wirchenko)
"Lavabit founder says he can't legally explain why he shut down
   email service" (Ted Samson via  Gene Wirchenko)
Feds Threaten To Arrest Lavabit Founder For Shutting Down His Service
Subverting BIND's SRTT Algorithm: Derandomizing NS Selection (Roee Hay via
  Lauren Weinstein)
Re: Hackers Reveal Nasty New Car Attacks (Amos Shapir)
Digital Crossroads: Telecommunications Law and Policy ... (PGN)
Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)


Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 16:23:44 -0400
From: Doug McIlroy <doug () cs dartmouth edu>
Subject: Computer outage meets uninspected meat with no mete-outs

["Shipping Continued After Computer Inspection System Failed at Meat Plants"
*The New York Times*, 17 Aug 2013, with Doug's summarizing and commenting,
although I retitled the subject line.  Sorry.  I couldn't resist.  PGN]

A nationwide system that controlled meat inspection went down for two
days. It was recently installed, and one user is quoted as saying the
installed system was subject to the same troubles as an early demo system
that he was trained on.

Presumably the system was built on contract, as almost all government
systems are. Yet, the contractor is never mentioned in the article.

This is a slightly different twist on a well-known risk: software vendors
who avoid responsibility--in this case the NYT gave them a pass in the court
of public opinion, not a court of law, but nevertheless a pass.

  [Subsequent PS: After sending the note, I bethought myself of the stark
  comparison with the stories about airplane battery fires. There the
  emphasis was not on the owning of airlines, but on the makers of the
  airplane and the batteries.  Doug]


Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 16:03:36 -0700
From: Subject: Separate errors bring down NYTimes site and .gov TLD
Subject: Separate errors bring down NYTimes site and .gov TLD

*The New York Times* Web Site Returns After Hours Offline

http://j.mp/15G1QFl  (*The New York Times* via NNSquad)

  "The Web site ofd* The New York Times* was offline for about two hours on
  Wednesday in what company officials say was a failure during regular
  maintenance of NYTimes.com, and not the result of a cyberattack."

DNSSEC administration likely cause of .gov outage

http://j.mp/16lSbtP  (Fierce)

  A GSA official said on background the website outage was triggered by a
  now-resolved DNSSEC issue and the agency is "still working on analyzing
  the whole thing." The outage, he added, did not effect [sic] users on
  secure government networks.


Date: August 14, 2013 11:56:57 AM EDT
From: Suzanne Johnson <fuhn () pobox com>
Subject: Civilian GPS is vulnerable to being spoofed (via Dave Farber)

Civilian GPS is vulnerable to being spoofed -- and researchers are looking
for ways to ensure the signals are legit.

... The yacht's captain offered up his boat for the experiment after seeing
 Humphreys give a presentation at this year's SXSW conference. The takeover
 took place in June while the boat was traveling in the Mediterranean off
 the coast of Italy. From a perch onboard the yacht, the spoofing
 researchers shifted the ship's course three degrees to the north. They
 also convinced the yacht's GPS system that the boat was underwater.

Humphreys: ``[The captain] invited me to basically try kicking the tires of
his security system.  And yeah -- they were flat.''

Until now, the threat of spoofing existed mostly on paper. Humphreys's team
had demonstrated the device in experiments with unmanned aerial
vehicles. Those tests established that the technology can work from up to 30
kilometers away, Humphreys says.

Now the yacht experiment shows it can be used to fool a navigation system in
the real world. This has implications for any system that relies on civilian
GPS -- a list that includes commercial aviation, smartphones, and the stock

Humphreys: ``Civilian GPS is not encrypted and not authenticated, so that
means it's entirely predictable.  Predictability is the enemy of security.''



Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2013 10:29:44 -0400
From: Robert Schaefer <rps () haystack mit edu>
Subject: Xerox scanners/photocopiers randomly alter numbers in scanned documents

``In this article I present in which way scanners / copiers of the Xerox
WorkCentre Line randomly alter written numbers in pages that are scanned.
This is not an OCR problem (as we switched off OCR on purpose), it is a lot
worse -- patches of the pixel data are randomly replaced in a very subtle
and dangerous way: The scanned images look correct at first glance, even
though numbers may actually be incorrect.''


And so it goes, as Vonnegut would say.

robert schaefer, Atmospheric Sciences Group, MIT Haystack Observatory
Westford, MA 01886 http://www.haystack.mit.edu 781-981-5767


Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 23:55:58 +0100
From: Glynn Clements <glynn () gclements plus com>
Subject: Xerox scanners/photocopiers randomly alter numbers in scanned documents




Summary: JBIG2 compression looks for repeated "patches" within the image,
and replaces all occurrences with references to a single copy.  Except, that
the matching isn't exact, so e.g. a 6 may be treated as a copy of a patch
that's actually an 8.

Any scanner has limits to its accuracy, and any form of lossy compression
has some loss. But unlike e.g. JPEG, where the artifacts are often clearly
visible, there is no indication of the degree of uncertainty involved.

Possible risks:

* Changes to account numbers, debiting or crediting the wrong account.
* Changes to monetary amounts.
* Sending police, bailiffs, demolition crew, etc to the wrong address.
* Using the wrong part number in a safety-critical design.
* Using the wrong dimensions or tolerances in a safety-critical design.
* Administering the wrong dosage of a drug, or the wrong number of dosages
  (or even the wrong drug if it's referenced by catalogue number).

-- From a legal perspective, the mere fact that such scanners exist brings
into question the authenticity of any document unless its entire history is


Date: Wed, 07 Aug 2013 09:23:48 -0600
From: Paul Fenimore <fenimore () swcp com>
Subject: Easter Eggs in Infrastructure Software

The US National Weather Service's website <www.weather.gov> returns a
forecast for Manhattan when the location "evil" is searched. Finding rogue
search results for a US Government service that is critical to safety is
concerning enough, but when I tried to make an HTTPS connection to the
National Weather Service's website to verify the "validity" of the results,
I immediately received a warning that the SSL certificate is invalid. The
cert was valid, but for Akami Technologies (07:27:A4:69), and was flagged
for possible hijacking of the connection.  The risks? Farming out important,
probably even critical, parts of the Weather Service's infrastructure with
loss of control or even knowledge of what is going on, the opportunity for
faked connections to www.weather.gov, and the introduction of incorrect
behavior into critical code, probably for the sake of a very bad taste


Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2013 20:21:28 -0700
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com>
Subject: NSA to cut sys admins by 90%

  "The National Security Agency, hit by disclosures of classified data by
  former contractor Edward Snowden, said Thursday it intends to eliminate
  about 90 percent of its system administrators to reduce the number of
  people with access to secret information."
  http://j.mp/1cyL8R4  (Reuters via NNSquad)

``What could go wrong?''

  [I am reminded of a meeting with U.S. Navy Admirals in June 1999,
  representing a rather different point on the spectrum.  It was stated that
  the Navy was planning on using only Microsoft operating systems to
  minimize the training problems for system administrators, and also to
  outsource most of its system administration (because it was becoming very
  difficult to keep enough personnel with adequate sysadmin experience in
  the Navy).  PGN]


Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2013 21:27:34 -0700
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com>
Subject: Remotely hacking/hijacking the camera on Samsung Smart TV

  "Today's high-end televisions are almost all equipped with "smart" PC-like
  features, including Internet connectivity, apps, microphones and
  cameras. But a recently discovered security hole in some Samsung Smart TVs
  shows that many of those bells and whistles aren't ready for prime time.
  The flaws in Samsung Smart TVs, which have now been patched, enabled
  hackers to remotely turn on the TVs' built-in cameras without leaving any
  trace of it on the screen. While you're watching TV, a hacker anywhere
  around the world could have been watching you.  Hackers also could have
  easily rerouted an unsuspecting user to a malicious website to steal bank
  account information."
    http://j.mp/146NK3m  (WPTV / CNN via NNSquad)


Date: August 7, 2013 9:37:36 AM EDT
From: Richard Forno <rforno () infowarrior org>
Subject: DC, Maryland: Speed Camera Firms Move To Hide Evidence

  [Via Dave Farber]


Afraid of refunds, Washington, DC and Salisbury, Maryland conceal evidence
that could reveal camera inaccuracy.

The firms operating red light cameras and speed cameras in the District of
Columbia and Maryland are working to suppress evidence that could be used to
prove the innocence of a photo enforcement ticket recipient. In Washington,
the Arizona-based vendor American Traffic Solutions has repositioned cameras
and cropped photos so that it is impossible to determine whether another
object or vehicle happens to be within the radar unit's field of view.

The change is important since DC hearing adjudicators have been throwing out
citations whenever another vehicle was visible, creating the possibility of
a spurious radar reading (view ruling). The cropping also makes it extremely
difficult to use pavement lines to perform a secondary check of the speed
estimate provided by the radar. Lines painted on the road for this purpose
are visible in one photo, but not the other (view first photo, view second
photo). No video is provided to the vehicle owner.

The District has also recently been installing next-generation speed cameras
that use infrared light instead of a visible flash when photographing
vehicles. This means drivers will have no way of knowing whether they will
receive a ticket until weeks after the alleged violation.

In Salisbury, Maryland, the city and its private speed camera contractor
Brekford are working together to prevent the Maryland Drivers Alliance from
confirming whether the photo enforcement program is in compliance with state
law. There is good reason to believe it is not, as other towns that allow
Brekford to issue tickets, including Greenbelt and Hagerstown, have been
forced to refund illegally issued citations.

At issue is whether Brekford's cameras were properly certified under
Maryland Code Section 21-809, which requires testing on an annual basis by
an independent lab. The law states that the results of such testing "shall
be kept on file" along with a daily setup log. The Maryland-based motoring
rights group simply asked for a copy of the file. The city and camera
company now insist that the group must pay $535 to the speed camera
contractor for the calibration certificates and logs that the municipality
is required to keep on file. These are documents that the State Highway
Administration makes freely available on its website.

"In regards to this request, it is anticipated to take six total hours to
gather and assemble the requested documents," Brekford wrote in a July 16
letter to the Salisbury police chief. "The first two hours will be provided
without charge, however the addition four hours shall be charged at the rate
of $75.00 per hour. An additional $235.00 will be charged for the copying
and mailing services rendered in providing the requested
information. Additionally, Brekford does not release or provide technical
specifications on any of our camera systems."

The city also delayed responding to the request for thirty days, which the
motorist group says is one of many violations of the state's public records
laws. The refusal to provide basic specifications regarding the camera's
operation is also raising eyebrows.

"Basically they are saying the public is just supposed to 'trust us' when
Brekford says their equipment is of a sort which is reliable, since they are
withholding all documents which describe the technology," said Ron Ely, the
Maryland Drivers Alliance chairman.

[Source: Response to Maryland Public Information Request (Brekford, 16 Jul


Date: August 10, 2013 11:48:09 PM EDT
From: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne () warpspeed com>
Subject: The Public/Private Surveillance Partnership

  [Via Dave Farber]

The Public/Private Surveillance Partnership
Bruce Schneier, 5 Aug 2013

  [Also in Bruce's latest CRYPTOGRAM,  PGN]

Imagine the government passed a law requiring all citizens to carry a
tracking device. Such a law would immediately be found unconstitutional. Yet
we all carry mobile phones.

If the National Security Agency required us to notify it whenever we made a
new friend, the nation would rebel. Yet we notify Facebook. If the Federal
Bureau of Investigation demanded copies of all our conversations and
correspondence, it would be laughed at. Yet we provide copies of our e-mail
to Google, Microsoft or whoever our mail host is; we provide copies of our
text messages to Verizon, AT&T and Sprint; and we provide copies of other
conversations to Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, or whatever other site is
hosting them.

The primary business model of the Internet is built on mass surveillance,
and our government's intelligence-gathering agencies have become addicted to
that data. Understanding how we got here is critical to understanding how we
undo the damage.

Computers and networks inherently produce data, and our constant
interactions with them allow corporations to collect an enormous amount of
intensely personal data about us as we go about our daily lives. Sometimes
we produce this data inadvertently simply by using our phones, credit cards,
computers and other devices. Sometimes we give corporations this data
directly on Google, Facebook, Apple Inc.'s iCloud and so on in exchange for
whatever free or cheap service we receive from the Internet in return.

The NSA is also in the business of spying on everyone, and it has realized
it's far easier to collect all the data from these corporations rather than
from us directly. In some cases, the NSA asks for this data nicely. In other
cases, it makes use of subtle threats or overt pressure. If that doesn't
work, it uses tools like national security letters.

The result is a corporate-government surveillance partnership, one that
allows both the government and corporations to get away with things they
couldn't otherwise.

There are two types of laws in the U.S., each designed to constrain a
different type of power: constitutional law, which places limitations on
government, and regulatory law, which constrains corporations. Historically,
these two areas have largely remained separate, but today each group has
learned how to use the other's laws to bypass their own restrictions. The
government uses corporations to get around its limits, and corporations use
the government to get around their limits.

This partnership manifests itself in various ways. The government uses
corporations to circumvent its prohibitions against eavesdropping
domestically on its citizens. Corporations rely on the government to ensure
that they have unfettered use of the data they collect. ...

Dewayne-Net RSS Feed: <http://www.warpspeed.com/wordpress>


Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2013 17:43:04 +0200
From: "David J. Farber" <farber () gmail com>
Subject: Stand Together to Support Open Internet Access, Freedom, and Privacy

Internet Society Board of Trustees Calls on the Global Internet Community to
Stand Together to Support Open Internet Access, Freedom, and Privacy

Fundamental ideals of the Internet are under threat

[Berlin, Germany, 4 Aug 2013] The Internet Society Board of Trustees during
its meeting in Berlin, Germany today called on the global Internet community
to stand together in support of open Internet access, freedom, and
privacy. Recently exposed information about government Internet surveillance
programs is a wake-up call for Internet users everywhere: the fundamental
ideals of the Internet are under threat.  The Internet Society Board of
Trustees believes that government Internet surveillance programs create
unacceptable risks for the future of a global, interoperable, and open
Internet. Robert Hinden, Chair of the Board of Trustees, stated, ``Berlin is
a city where freedom triumphed over tyranny. Human and technological
progress are not based on building walls, and we are confident that the
human ideals of communication and creativity will always route around these
kinds of attempts to constrain them. We are especially disappointed that the
very governments that have traditionally supported a more balanced role in
Internet governance are consciously and deliberately hosting massive
Internet surveillance programs.''

In the brief period since these surveillance programs were revealed to the
general public, the Internet Society Board stated there are already chilling
effects on global trust and confidence on the Internet ecosystem. The fact
that information about surveillance programs is emerging primarily from
countries with a long history of supporting the open Internet is
particularly disturbing. As the next billion people come online, these
countries should be expected to demonstrate leadership in support of the
values that underpin the global Internet. In the wake of these
announcements, the Internet Society encourages a return to multistakeholder
cooperation to preserve the benefits of the Internet ecosystem for all.

The Internet Society Board of Trustees expects governments to fully engage
with their citizens in an open dialogue on how to reconcile national
security and the fundamental rights of individuals. Security should not be
at the cost of individual rights and, in this context, the Board welcomes
the initiative by some civil society organizations to promote "International
Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications
Surveillance." The Internet Society endorses these principles, and
emphasizes the importance of proportionality, due process, legality, and
transparent judicial oversight. The Internet Society believes that
surveillance without any such safeguards risks undermining the
sustainability of the open Internet.

Lynn St. Amour, President and CEO of the Internet Society: ``In the spirit
of the pioneers and early innovators of the Internet that were honored this
week at the 2013 Internet Hall of Fame ceremony, we urge the global Internet
community to defend against attempts by governments to fragment the Internet
either through overt regulation or hidden surveillance programs, We must
reassert the global spirit of community that is at the heart of the
Internet's growth and success, and stand firm in our belief that openness
and collaboration is the best path forward.''


Date: August 8, 2013 8:26:11 PM EDT
From: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne () warpspeed com>
Subject: Lavabit, email service Snowden reportedly used, abruptly shuts down

[Note:  This item comes from friend Mike Cheponis.  DLH]


Remember when word circulated that Edward Snowden was using Lavabit, an
email service that purports to provide better privacy and security for users
than popular web-based free services like Gmail? Lavabit's owner has shut
down the service, and posted a message on the lavabit.com home page today
about wanting to avoid "being complicit in crimes against the American
people."  According to the statement, it appears he rejected a US court
order to cooperate with the government in spying on users.

The email service offered various security features to a claimed user base
of 350,000, and is the first such firm to have publicly and transparently
closed down, rather than cooperate with state surveillance programs. The
email address Snowden (or someone sending emails on his behalf) is reported
to have used to send invites to a press conference at Moscow's Sheremetyevo
Airport in mid-July was a Lavabit account.

Below, the full message from Lavabit's founder and operator Ladar Levison:

My Fellow Users,

I have been forced to make a difficult decision: to become complicit in
crimes against the American people or walk away from nearly ten years of
hard work by shutting down Lavabit. After significant soul searching, I have
decided to suspend operations. I wish that I could legally share with you
the events that led to my decision. I cannot. I feel you deserve to know
what's going on--the first amendment is supposed to guarantee me the
freedom to speak out in situations like this. Unfortunately, Congress has
passed laws that say otherwise. As things currently stand, I cannot share my
experiences over the last six weeks, even though I have twice made the
appropriate requests.

What's going to happen now? We've already started preparing the
paperwork needed to continue to fight for the Constitution in the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals. A favorable decision would allow me resurrect
Lavabit as an American company.

This experience has taught me one very important lesson: without
congressional action or a strong judicial precedent, I would _strongly_
recommend against anyone trusting their private data to a company with
physical ties to the United States.

Ladar Levison
Owner and Operator, Lavabit LLC

Defending the constitution is expensive! Help us by donating to the Lavabit
Legal Defense Fund here.

Update: Spencer Ackerman at the Guardian has more:

Several technology companies that participate in the National Security
Agency's surveillance dragnets have filed legal requests to lift the secrecy
restrictions that prevent them from explaining to their customers precisely
what it is that they provide to the powerful intelligence service -- either
wittingly or due to a court order. Yahoo has sued for the disclosure of some
of those court orders.

The presiding judge of the secret court that issues such orders, known as
the Fisa court, has indicated to the Justice Department that he expects
declassification in the Yahoo case. The department agreed last week to a
review that will last into September about the issues surrounding the
release of that information.

There are few Internet and telecommunications companies known to have
refused compliance with the NSA for its bulk surveillance efforts, which the
NSA and the Obama administration assert are vital to protect Americans. One
of them is Qwest Communications, whose former CEO Joseph Nacchio --
convicted of insider trading -- alleged that the government rejected it for
lucrative contracts after Qwest became a rare holdout for post-9/11

"Without the companies' participation," former NSA codebreaker William
Binney recently told the Guardian, "it would reduce the collection
capability of the NSA significantly."


Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 11:50:59 -0700
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () telus net>
Subject: "Lavabit shutdown marks another costly blemish for U.S. tech
  companies" (Ted Samson)

Ted Samson | InfoWorld, 09 Aug 2013
Email provider's move will further fuel concerns that American
companies can't be trusted to keep customer data private


Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 12:55:18 -0700
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () telus net>
Subject: Lavabit founder says he can't legally explain why he shut down
  email service (Ted Samson)

Ted Samson | InfoWorld, 14 Aug 2013
Ladar Levison says pulling plug on secure email service purportedly
used by Edward Snowden was lesser of two evils


Date: Aug 17, 2013 4:54 PM
From: "Randall Webmail" <rvh40 () insightbb com>
Subject: Feds Threaten To Arrest Lavabit Founder For Shutting Down His Service

Better than ever, things just keep on getting ...

  [More via Dewayne via Dave Farber]

Feds Threaten To Arrest Lavabit Founder For Shutting Down His Service
from the *either-you-help-us-spy-on-people-or-you're-a-criminal* dept

The saga of Lavabit founder Ladar Levison is getting even more ridiculous,
as he explains that the government has threatened him with criminal charges
for his decision to shut down the business, rather than agree to some
mysterious court order. The feds are apparently arguing that the act of
shutting down the business, itself, was a violation of the order:

* ... a source familiar with the matter told NBC News that James Trump, a
senior litigation counsel in the U.S. attorney's office in Alexandria, Va.,
sent an email to Levison's lawyer last Thursday -- the day Lavabit was
shuttered -- stating that Levison may have "violated the court order," a
statement that was interpreted as a possible threat to charge Levison with
contempt of court. *



Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 09:13:16 -0700
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren () vortex com>
Subject: Subverting BIND's SRTT Algorithm: Derandomizing NS Selection

  "Today I presented at USENIX WOOT '13 a new vulnerability that we had
  found in BIND, the most popular DNS server. Exploiting this vulnerability
  allows to reduce the amount of effort required for an off-path (blind) DNS
  cache poisoning attack.  The whitepaper is now publicly available,
  together with the presentation and ISC's (the organization behind BIND)
  notification.  In this blog post I will describe the vulnerability in a
  less formal fashion."
    http://j.mp/13Zbwir  (*Security Intelligence* via NNSquad)


Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2013 16:49:02 +0300
From: Amos Shapir <amos083 () gmail com>
Subject: Re: Hackers Reveal Nasty New Car Attacks

I drive a 2012 Ford Focus.  Maybe the lower models get a lower grade
computer; the first thing I noticed when I started driving it, is that
nothing I do happens immediately, including stepping on the gas or the
brakes.  There is always some delay, sometimes up to a second.  I
almost ran over a child once while I was getting used to it.


Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2013 11:40:01 PDT
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann () csl sri com>
Subject: Digital Crossroads: Telecommunications Law and Policy ...

I have just received a copy of

  Jonathan E. Nuechterlein and Philip J. Weiser
  Digital Crossroads: Telecommunications Law and Policy in the Internet Age
  Second Edition
  MIT Press, 2013

This seems to be a really valuable compendium of many of the legal and
policy issues underlying RISKS.  The first edition of the book was published
in 2005, and it is evident from the preface to the second edition that much
has changed in the past eight years.  For example, the second edition adds
new analyses relating to mobile broadband, the seeming demise of
conventional telephony, spectrum issues, network neutrality, online video,
and lots more.  The chapter titles give you an idea of the comprehensive
scope of the book.

  1. The Big Picture
  2. Competition Policy in Wireline Communications
  3. The Spectrum
  4. Mobile Wireless Services
  5. A Primer on Internet Technology
  6. Net Neutrality and the Regulation of Broadband Access
  7. Interconnection and Intercarrier Compensation
  8. Universal Service in the Age of Broadband
  9. Competition in the Delivery of Video Programming
 10. The Future of Telecommunications Competition Policy

These chapters are followed by a copiously annotated 100 pages of end notes.

The book is highly accessible for readers with widely diverse needs and
interests, from casual curiosity about specific subjects to serious needs to
understand the details.  It also seems to benefit from a dozen people
acknowledged as proofreaders and indexers!

This topic is obviously not devoid of controversy.  However, irrespective of
any quibbles someone might have with the devils in the details, this appears
to be a huge contribution and deserves careful reading.


Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2012 20:20:16 -0900
From: RISKS-request () csl sri com
Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

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