Vulnerability Development: Re: Beating memory address randomization (secuirty) features in Unix/Linux

[Don Bailey <don.bailey () gmail com>]

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> I believe they're talking about distros WITH RANDOMIZATION IE PAX 
> enabled.
Obviously. My point is that the original poster didn't
seem to be concerned with more advanced issues,
like PaX. Rather, they just wanted to learn how to
evade the basic stack base randomization code
employed on many popular Linux distros.

Let them worry about things like PaX later.

Also, tell me how often is PaX/grsec employed?
Clearly, not often. Distros aren't even interested in
deploying it as much as they are interested in
the new vanilla kernel way of integrating security
into the core code. That code still has a long way
to go.

Don "north" Bailey

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