On 5/14/06, Dinis Cruz <dinis_at_ddplus.net> wrote:
>
> Kevin is correct, a type confusion attack will allow the bypass of the
> security manager simply because via a type confusion attack you will be able
> to change what the security manager is 'seeing'
>
> In both .Net and Java, the sandboxes logic (CAS and Security manager) are
> external to the the JVM/CLR, that is the security checks ("can I access this
> file?", "do I have permissions to call this method?", etc...) are performed
> in the middle of the core Framework libraries. Basically what the core
> Framework developers do, is to analyze all public entry points, and make
> sure that all are protected with a Security Demand (using .Net terminology).
>
> These public methods will then call private methods, who will be the ones
> that actually access the resources being protected (note that in these
> private methods there are no security checks).
>
> So in an environment where you have a solid Security Policy (enforced by a
> Security Manager) but the verifier is NOT enabled, then to jump out of the
> sandbox all that you need to do is to create a Type Confusion exploit that
> allows you to access a private member that either: calls the protected
> resource directly or disables the Security Manager (which based on the
> description provided is the demo that I think Ed Felten did).
>
> Of course that there will be other ways to exploit a non-verify world.
> Without verification it should be possible to create Buffer Overflows and
> other types of direct manipulation of memory objects which all occur before
> the security manager has a change to do anything.
Please read the java documentation.
http://java.sun.com/docs/books/vmspec/2nd-edition/html/ConstantPool.doc.html
http://java.sun.com/docs/books/vmspec/2nd-edition/html/ClassFile.doc.html#40222
Maybe you are also interested in BCEL by apache.
> Using a 'Matrix' Analogy, the Security Manager is the Police Department
> that operates inside the virtual world, where the verifier is the one that
> make sure that all characters (including the Police) behaves accordingly to
> the rules defined for that virtual world. In this analogy Neo (the hero) was
> able to perform several Type Safety or Verifier attacks which gave him those
> extra powers :)
>
> I will stick to my guns and say that in a Virtual Machine environment like
> the JVM or CLR it doesn't make sense to have the overhead of a security
> system (like CAS or Security Manager) if the verifier is disabled.
>
> Basically code executed with no verification is as 'secure' and contained
> as unmanaged code.
What do you mean by verification?
> And remember that this code will be able to access ALL resources that the
> account used to execute that code has (from emails to VPNs to documents to
> online financial services, etc...)
>
> But probably the best way forward (since the guys from SUN and other Java
> Application server can't be bothered (or don't have permission) to
> participate in this discussion) will be to do a proof of concept example.
>
> Why don't we do a 'break from a non verified Sandbox' challenge?
"We" ? Why don't _YOU_ do it. This is your crusade.
Your code must break out of a "-noverify" sandbox, but fail to break a
-verifiy sandbox.
> Dinis Cruz
> Owasp .Net Project
> www.owasp.net
-- Michael
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Received on May 14 2006
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