nanog mailing list archives

Re: Possible New Zero Day Microsoft Windows 3389 vulnerability - outbound traffic 3389


From: Jerry Dixon <jerry () jdixon com>
Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2012 12:07:20 -0500

Another possibility is  the use of this tool as well:
http://www.sensepost.com/labs/tools/pentest/reduh  (Reduh)

Jerry
jerry () jdixon com

On Fri, Jan 13, 2012 at 12:02 PM, Mark Keymer <mark () viviotech net> wrote:

Hi,

We have had 2 of the below hit us this week. First time was apx 11:20am
1/10/2012 (PST). The 2nd was 1/12/2012 (Yesterday) 4:45pm. We had done some
research and had already planed to switch to Network Level Authentication
(NLA) as it looks like that would help with the screen not getting dumped.
Unfortunately we had not done the change to that yet as we were getting
looking for and found a new RDP client on linux that would support it.
However last night we did start doing the changes to NLA.

I am not saying NLA is a fix or that it is the best option. Just one of
the things we are trying. When we can, locking down access to the RDP port
I think would be best.

Ohh, as for the destination. The first day was to 221.251.194.42.
Yesterday was for 115.236.185.167.

Sincerely,

Mark Keymer


On 1/13/2012 4:36 AM, James Braunegg wrote:

Hey All,

Just posting to see if anyone has seen any strange outbound traffic on
port 3389 from Microsoft Windows Server over the last few hours.

We witnessed an alarming amount of completely independent Microsoft
Windows Servers,  each on separate vlan and subnets (ie all /30 and /29
allocations) with separate gateways on and completely separate customers,
but all services were within the same 1.x.x.x/16 allocation all
simultaneously send around 2mbit or so data to a specific target IP address.

The only common link was / is terminal services port 3389 is open to the
public. Obviously someone (Mr 133t dude) scanned an allocation within our
network, and like a worm was able to simultaneously control every Microsoft
Windows Server to send outbound traffic.

Microsoft Windows Servers within the 1.x.x.x/16 allocation which were
behind a firewall or VPN and did not have public 3389 access did not send
the unknown traffic

Would be very interested if anyone else has seen this behavior before !
Or is this the start of a lovely new Zero Day Vulnerability with Windows
RDP, if so I name it "ohDeer-RDP"

A sample of the traffic is as per below, collected from netflow

Source                  Destination         Application         Src
   Port       Dst
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       51534
   TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       52699
   TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       60824
   TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       51669
   TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       49215
   TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       62099
   TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       65429
   TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       51965
   TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       50381
   TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       59379
   TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       58103
   TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       59514
   TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       58298
   TCP

This occurred around 10:30pm AEST Friday the 13th of January 2012

We had many other Microsoft Windows Servers in other 2.x.x.x/16 IP ranges
which were totally unaffected.

Kindest Regards

James Braunegg
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Jerry
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