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Re: Re: [Full-disclosure] MySQL (Linux) Stack based buffer overrun PoC Zeroday
From: Sergei Golubchik <serg () askmonty org>
Date: Sun, 2 Dec 2012 20:25:22 +0100

Hi, Huzaifa!

Here's the vendor's reply:

On Dec 02, Huzaifa Sidhpurwala wrote:

* CVE-2012-5611 MySQL (Linux) Stack based buffer overrun PoC Zeroday
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Dec/4
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=882599

A duplicate of CVE-2012-5579
Already fixed in all stable MariaDB version.

* CVE-2012-5612 MySQL (Linux) Heap Based Overrun PoC Zeroday
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Dec/5
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=882600

Acknowledged.
https://mariadb.atlassian.net/browse/MDEV-3908

* CVE-2012-5613 MySQL (Linux) Database Privilege Elevation Zeroday
Exploit
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Dec/6
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=882606

Not a bug. MySQL manual specifies many times very explicitly:

===
   * Do not grant the `FILE' privilege to nonadministrative users. Any
     user that has this privilege can write a file anywhere in the file
     system with the privileges of the *Note `mysqld': mysqld. daemon.
     To make this a bit safer, files generated with *Note `SELECT ...
     INTO OUTFILE': select. do not overwrite existing files and are
     writable by everyone.

     The `FILE' privilege may also be used to read any file that is
     world-readable or accessible to the Unix user that the server runs
     as. With this privilege, you can read any file into a database
     table. This could be abused, for example, by using *Note `LOAD
     DATA': load-data. to load `/etc/passwd' into a table, which then
     can be displayed with *Note `SELECT': select.
===
You should exercise particular caution in granting the `FILE'
and administrative privileges:

   * The `FILE' privilege can be abused to read into a database table
     any files that the MySQL server can read on the server host. This
     includes all world-readable files and files in the server's data
     directory.  The table can then be accessed using *Note `SELECT':
     select. to transfer its contents to the client host.
===

Additionally, MySQL (and MariaDB) provides a --secure-file-priv
option that allows to restrict all FILE operations to a specific
directory.

Thus, CVE-2012-5613 is not a bug, but a result of a misconfiguration,
much like an anonymous ftp upload access to the $HOME of the ftp user.

* CVE-2012-5614 MySQL Denial of Service Zeroday PoC
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Dec/7
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=882607

Acknowledged.
https://mariadb.atlassian.net/browse/MDEV-3910

* CVE-2012-5615 MySQL Remote Preauth User Enumeration Zeroday
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Dec/9
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=882608

This is hardly a "zeroday" issue, it was known for, like, ten years.
But I'll see what we can do here.
https://mariadb.atlassian.net/browse/MDEV-3909

Regards,
Sergei
MariaDB Security Coordinator


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