Security Basics mailing list archives
RE: Firewall and VLAN security design
From: "David Gillett" <gillettdavid () fhda edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2004 16:20:03 -0800
Actually, if you don't offer up your management interface to the publicly accessible side of things, the VLAN separation makes things function exactly like a physically separate switch. Without the routing between those VLANs, the traffic does not magically go from one VLAN to another and the ability to exploit/crack the switch is no greater than having a separate switch in place.
Barring, of course, edge conditions and bugs in the switch itself, which we all know can't possibly happen in the Real World. Except, of course, they DO. David Gillett
Current thread:
- Firewall and VLAN security design Ahmed Ameen (Nov 01)
- RE: Firewall and VLAN security design David Gillett (Nov 01)
- RE: Firewall and VLAN security design Bryan S. Sampsel (Nov 02)
- RE: Firewall and VLAN security design David Gillett (Nov 03)
- RE: Firewall and VLAN security design Bryan S. Sampsel (Nov 02)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: Firewall and VLAN security design Ivan Coric (Nov 03)
- RE: Firewall and VLAN security design Jonathan Loh (Nov 03)
- RE: Firewall and VLAN security design Paul Benedek (Nov 03)
- RE: Firewall and VLAN security design Bryan S. Sampsel (Nov 03)
- RE: Firewall and VLAN security design Ghaith Nasrawi (Nov 12)
- RE: Firewall and VLAN security design Ivan Coric (Nov 03)
- RE: Firewall and VLAN security design David Gillett (Nov 01)
