Security Basics mailing list archives
RE: VALN hopping
From: "Payton, Zack" <Zack.Payton () MWAA com>
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2005 12:19:15 -0400
Use separate devices, not VLANs to segregate your DMZ from your internal network. What if I was able to establish a trunk link with the switch from the dmz and just hop past your firewall (DTP makes this trivial). What if I was able to flood your cam table with bogus addresses to the point where it gives up and starts acting as a hub (an older attack doesn't really work against newer devicess). What if I was able to find a buffer overflow in ciscos CDP parser (I'd have to be good but it's possible). What if I could shut down your internal network by DOS attacking the DMZ switch (DOS attacks against cisco devices are the most common exploit found for them). The advent of newer switches that have things like dhcp rogue server detection and arp inspection merely serve to add more points where your Ethernet frames get run against more code in the switches... Meaning more opportunity for exploitation and fun and profit. No seriously though if I see a client using one switch for their internal and external networks I ask for more money as I know it's going to be a rough job. See Cisco's SAFE implementation diagrams and propaganda. Zack Payton
Current thread:
- VALN hopping josh (Sep 28)
- RE: VALN hopping David Gillett (Sep 30)
- Re: VALN hopping Kenton Smith (Sep 30)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: VALN hopping Hayes, Ian (Sep 30)
- Re: VALN hopping David Barroso (Sep 30)
- Re: VALN hopping Micheal Espinola Jr (Sep 30)
- RE: VALN hopping Payton, Zack (Sep 30)
- RE: VALN hopping Payton, Zack (Sep 30)
- RE: VALN hopping Scott Fuhriman (Sep 30)
- Re: VALN hopping nidude (Sep 30)
