Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: Solaris 2.x utmp hole
From: cjc () summit novell com (cjc () summit novell com)
Date: Thu, 18 May 1995 09:25 EDT
Subject: Solaris 2.x utmp hole The following is somewhat of a security hole in Solaris 2.x which allows any non-root user to remove themselves from /var/adm/utmp[x] files (who, w, finger, etc). Now the trick here is also to exploit this enough so that you can change your ttyname (which can easily be done) and manipulate a system utility into writing to that new ttyname (which could be a system file). This example only takes you out of the utmp files.
1. On line 95, the call to gettimeofday should be
"gettimeofday (&(ut->ut_tv), 0);" (yes, my compiler complained
about mis-matched prototypes).
2. This bug is not in evidence on UnixWare 2.01.
--
Christopher J. Calabrese
Network Security Architect
Novell Information Services & Technology, Summit, NJ
cjc () summit novell com
Current thread:
- Solaris 2.x utmp hole Scott Chasin (May 17)
- Re: Solaris 2.x utmp hole Jas (May 17)
- Re: Solaris 2.x utmp hole Scott Barman (May 18)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: Solaris 2.x utmp hole cjc () summit novell com (May 18)
- Re: Solaris 2.x utmp hole Claudio Telmon (May 18)
- Re: Solaris 2.x utmp hole Claudio Telmon (May 19)
- Re: Solaris 2.x utmp hole System Admin (May 18)
- Another translation Patrick Horgan (May 18)
- Re: Solaris 2.x utmp hole gio () DI UniPi IT (May 19)
- From the moderator: READ Please Scott Chasin (May 19)
- Re: From the moderator: READ Please Claudio Telmon (May 22)
- Re: From the moderator: READ Please Greg Woods (May 22)
- Re: From the moderator: READ Please Michael Shields (May 22)
- Re: From the moderator: READ Please Greg Woods (May 22)
