Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: ncurses 4.1 security bug
From: astor () GUARDIAN NO (Alexander Kjeldaas)
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 1998 11:33:32 +0200
On Fri, Jul 10, 1998 at 02:07:54PM -0600, Warner Losh wrote:
And you have no way of knowing if they get called in such a ways as to
put libc at risk.
I see two solutions to this problem:
1) set?id programs need to be modified. They need to come up
with their privs disabled and explicitly enable them for
the work they need to do. This is definitely a change in
the traditional behavior of how set?id works. It would buy
a few things at the cost of a few other things. I'm
surprised that I've need seen references to this in the
literature.
The POSIX.6 features implemented in Linux 2.1 supports this [the filesystem support for this will not be integrated into 2.2 so you can't use this "out-of-the-box"]. What basically happens is that each executable has an allowed set which states which capabilities(*) the program is allowed to obtain, a set of forced capabilities which it will obtain regardless of whether the executing process has them in its inheritable set, and an effective bit which indicates whether the executable is capability "smart" or "dumb". An executable that is capability smart will start with capabilities only in its allowed set, not in its effective set. It will therefore explicitly have to raise the individual capabilities when it wants to use them. A capability dumb program will start with effective=permitted capabilities. * These are POSIX.6-style capabilities which is similar to VMS or Trusted Solaris privileges, not KeyOS or _real_ capabilities. It is a bitmask [or, actually 3: inheritable, permitted and effective]. In Linux 2.1 all privilege checks in the kernel use these capabilities instead of checking for whether the euid==0 or not. uid==0 is simply emulated in the set*id calls by setting the appropriate capability bits. astor -- Alexander Kjeldaas, Guardian Networks AS, Trondheim, Norway http://www.guardian.no/
Current thread:
- Re: Forwared to me, (continued)
- Re: Forwared to me Toomas Soome (Jul 13)
- Re: Forwared to me Michael H. Warfield (Jul 13)
- Re: Forwared to me Jason Downs (Jul 13)
- Re: Forwared to me Illuminatus Primus (Jul 13)
- Netware 4.x Attack Tool Announcement Simple Nomad (Jul 13)
- Re: ncurses 4.1 security bug Casper Dik (Jul 09)
- Re: ncurses 4.1 security bug Pavel Kankovsky (Jul 09)
- Re: ncurses 4.1 security bug Matt Evans (Jul 09)
- Re: ncurses 4.1 security bug Warner Losh (Jul 10)
- inetd can leak file descriptors +FIX Jeff Forys (Jul 14)
- Re: ncurses 4.1 security bug Alexander Kjeldaas (Jul 15)
- Re: ncurses 4.1 security bug Warner Losh (Jul 10)
- Re: ncurses 4.1 security bug Ben Laurie (Jul 11)
- Re: ncurses 4.1 security bug David Schwartz (Jul 11)
- Re: ncurses 4.1 security bug Geoffrey KEATING (Jul 14)
- Re: ncurses 4.1 security bug Ben Laurie (Jul 11)
- Re: ncurses 4.1 security bug David Schwartz (Jul 11)
- Re: ncurses 4.1 security bug Ben Laurie (Jul 12)
