Bugtraq mailing list archives

Re: Solaris patchadd(1) (3) symlink vulnerabilty


From: "Juergen P. Meier" <jpm () class de>
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2000 10:30:22 +0100

Solaris /usr/sbin/patchadd is a /bin/ksh script.
The problem lies in the vulnerability of ksh.

However: Sun Microsystems does recommend to only install
patches at single-user mode (runlevel S). So no other
possibly malicious user can exploit this ksh behaviour.

at least after the ebay desaster we should have all learned
this lesson... ;)

Always do init S before applying solaris patches. (especially
if you do kernel or devicedriver patches, check your readme's).

Again: if you follow the Vendors recommendations, you are
not vulnerable.

cheers,

Juergen

On Tue, Dec 19, 2000 at 07:00:20PM +1100, Paul Szabo wrote:
Jonathan Fortin <jfortin () REVELEX COM> wrote:

When patchadd is executed, It creates a temporary file called
"/tmp/sh<pidofpatchadd>.1" , "/tmp/sh<pidofpatchadd>.2 ,
"/tmp/sh<pidofpatchadd>.3  and assigns them mode 666 ...

I guess that patchadd is a "sh" script using the "<<" construct, this
being an instance of the bug I reported recently:

  http://www.securityfocus.com/templates/archive.pike?list=1&msg=200011230225.NAA19716 () milan maths usyd edu au

This is essentially the same as the tcsh bug fixed recently in other OSs.

Paul Szabo - psz () maths usyd edu au  http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/psz/
School of Mathematics and Statistics  University of Sydney   2006  Australia

--
Juergen P. Meier                        email: jpm () class de


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