BindView Security Advisory: Local Promotion Vulnerability in Windows NT 4

[advisory+imposter () BOS BINDVIEW COM (BindView Security Advisory)]

BindView Security Advisory
--------

Local Promotion Vulnerability in Windows NT 4
Issue Date: January 13, 2000
Contact:  Todd Sabin <tsabin () bos bindview com>

Topic:
Problem in NtImpersonateClientOfPort system call on NT 4

Overview:
Due to a flaw in the NtImpersonateClientOfPort Windows NT 4 system
call, any local user on a machine is able to impersonate any other
user on the machine, including LocalSystem.  We have written a
demonstration exploit which allows any user to spawn a cmd.exe window
as LocalSystem.

Affected Systems:
All Windows NT 4.0 systems up to and including SP6a.  We tested our
exploit on W2K RC2, and it was not vulnerable.

Impact:
All Windows NT 4.0 machines are subject to compromise by any user who
can log in locally and run arbitrary programs.  This may lead to
Domain Admin access, if Domain Admin credentials are on the machine.
In the case of Terminal Server, it should also be possible to use the
credentials of other users on the compromised machine to take actions
across the network as those other users.  This has not been tested,
however.

Details:
Windows NT includes a mostly undocumented feature called Lpc ports,
which are used for making Local Procedure Calls on a machine.  One of
the system apis used with Lpc ports is NtImpersonateClientOfPort,
which allows a server to act in the security context of the client who
is calling it.  However, the interface to the call lets the server
specify which client to impersonate based on process and thread IDs.

The kernel does do some sanity checking of the parameters to verify
that the call is legitimate, but it's possible to fake it.  First it
verifies that the port you're trying to impersonate on actually has an
outstanding request.  This is easy to satify by making a request to it
ourselves.  Next, it checks that the message ID in the request matches
the outstanding message ID in the thread you're asking to impersonate.
This is also easy to satisfy, because if a thread is _not_ making a
request, it's outstanding message ID will be zero.  So, as the server,
when the request comes in, we just change the pid and tid to the ones
we want, and change the Message ID to 0.  Once we're impersonating we
can do whatever we want as that user.

The pseudo-code for our exploit works like this.  There are two
threads.

        Server thread            Client thread

          NtCreatePort
          NtReplyWaitReceivePort...

                                   NtConnectPort...

          (returns)
          NtAcceptConnectPort
          NtCompleteConnectPort
          NtReplyWaitReceivePort...

                                   (returns)
                                   NtRequestWaitReplyPort...

          (returns)
          modify the LpcMessage received in the request
            so that the process and thread ids point to the
            thread we want, and change the message id to 0.
          NtImpersonateClientOfPort

At this point, we're running under the token of the thread we
specified above.  For our exploit, we choose to impersonate a thread
of lsass.  The reason has to do with the privileges that lsass has
enabled.

When impersonating, it seems that the impersonation token only gets
those privileges that are _enabled_ in the client at the time of
impersonation.  Privileges that are disabled in the client, are not
put into the impersonation token, even in a disabled state.  Now,
lsass happens to have the CREATE_TOKEN privilege enabled, so we can
impersonate lsass, and use that privilege to create a new token for
ourselves based on the lsass impersonation token, but with _all_
privileges enabled.  We can then launch another process under that
token.  So to continue:

          // get the information about the current token.
          // TOKEN_USER, TOKEN_GROUP, etc.  (esp.  TOKEN_PRIVILEGES)
          NtOpenThreadToken
          GetTokenInformation   // (several times)

          // Add _all_ privileges to our TOKEN_PRIVILEGES struct
          // all user space, preparing for NtCreateToken

          NtCreateToken  // with info from the lsass token, except that
                         // all privileges are enabled

Finally.  We have our token.  Now, we can CreateProcessAsUser with
that, except that there are a couple more hoops to jump through.
CreateProcessAsUser requires more privileges than lsass had enabled,
so we don't currently have them, however, our new token does!  So, we
can just impersonate the new token.  But again, that's not enough.
CreateProcessAsUser checks for the privileges in the _process_ token,
ignoring any impersonation token.  So as a final step, we change the
new token to be our primary process token.

          ImpersonateLoggedOnUser

          NtSetInformationProcess (... ProcessAccessToken ...)

          CreateProcessAsUser

and we're finally there.

Recommendations:

Install the hotfix from Microsoft.

Limit local logon privileges, if possible.

References:

Microsoft's security bulletin:
http://www.microsoft.com/Security/Bulletins/ms00-003.asp

Microsoft's Hotfix:
Intel: http://www.microsoft.com/Downloads/Release.asp?ReleaseID=17382
Alpha: http://www.microsoft.com/Downloads/Release.asp?ReleaseID=17383

Microsoft's Knowledge Base article:
http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q247/8/69.asp
(may take a couple days to appear)

For more information on the LPC ports APIs, see Undocumented Windows
NT, ISBN# 0-7645-4569-8, Chapter 8.  The rest of the book isn't bad
either.