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Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise
From: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks () VT EDU>
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2001 11:34:02 -0500
On Tue, 13 Feb 2001 22:27:14 -0200, "Rodrigo Barbosa (aka morcego)" <rodrigob () CONECTIVA COM BR> said:
#include <wtmpx.h>
main () {
      printf("%d\n",__UT_NAMESIZE);
}
Of course, what's important isn't what wtmpx.h defines it as, but what pwd.h has to say about it. If getpwent() won't handle it, your wtmp format doesn't matter... Note also that some systems have utmpx.h not wtmpx.h
If anyone can find any system that reports less then 32, it will be an exce= ption of the rule. Of course I mean current systems. libc5 systems, AIX 3.2 and o= ld systems like that will probably return 16 or even 8.
AIX 4.3.3 and AIX 5.0 both limit it to 8 in utmpx.h
Solaris 5.7 has a 32-char limit in wtmp, but has this in 'man useradd':
     The login field  (login ) is a string  no  more  than  eight
     bytes  consisting  of  characters from the set of alphabetic
     characters,  numeric  characters,  period   (.),  underscore
     (_),  and  hypen   (-). The first character should be alpha-
     betic and the field should contain at least one  lower  case
     alphabetic  character.  A warning message will be written if
     these restrictions are not met. A future Solaris release may
     refuse  to  accept  login  fields  that  do  not  meet these
     requirements. The login field  must  contain  at  least  one
     character  and  must  not  contain a colon  (:) or a newline
     (\n).
SGI 6.5.10f has a 32-char limit in utmpx.h, but 'man 4 passwd' says this:
     name      User's login name -- consists of alphanumeric characters and
               must not be greater than eight characters long.  It is
               recommended that the login name consist of a leading lower case
               letter followed by a combination of digits and lower case
               letters for greatest portability across multiple versions of
               the UNIX operating system.  This recommendation can be safely
               ignored for users local to IRIX systems.  The pwck(1M) command
               checks for the greatest possible portability on names, and
               complains about user names that do not cause problems on IRIX.
I'll let somebody else check Tru64 and HP/UX, I don't have access to them
at the moment.
Moral of the story:  Not all the world is Linux, and some vendors care
more about backward and cross compatability than being the latest-and-greatest.
--
                                Valdis Kletnieks
                                Operating Systems Analyst
                                Virginia Tech
Attachment:
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Description: 
Current thread:
- Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise, (continued)
- Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise Robert Varga (Feb 14)
- Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise Arthur Clune (Feb 15)
- Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise Peter W (Feb 15)
- Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise Flavio Veloso (Feb 16)
 
 
- Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise Robert Varga (Feb 14)
- Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise Mate Wierdl (Feb 15)
 
- Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise Rodrigo Barbosa (aka morcego) (Feb 13)
- (CORRECTION) Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise Rodrigo Barbosa (aka morcego) (Feb 14)
- Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise Valdis Kletnieks (Feb 14)
- Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise Juergen P. Meier (Feb 15)
 
- Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise Nelson Brito (Feb 15)
- Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise gabriel rosenkoetter (Feb 13)
- Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise Robert Bihlmeyer (Feb 15)
- Re: vixie cron possible local root compromise Alfred Perlstein (Feb 13)


