Re: [Full-disclosure] Apache suEXEC privilege elevation / information disclosure

[Reindl Harald <h.reindl () thelounge net>]

Am 11.08.2013 22:15, schrieb Stefan Kanthak:
> "Reindl Harald" <h.reindl () thelounge net> wrote:
> > Am 10.08.2013 16:52, schrieb Tobias Kreidl:
> > > It is for this specific reason that utilities like suPHP can be used as a powerful tool to at least keep the
> > > account user from shooting anyone but him/herself in the foot because of any configuration or broken security
> > > issues. Allowing suexec to anyone but a seasoned, responsible admin is IMO a recipe for disaster.
> >
> > and what makes you believe that a developer can not be a "seasoned, responsible admin"?
>
> Because developers write functions like "system", "symlink" and "suexec"
> which can create havoc (and are WELL-KNOWN for creating havoc since
> years) and allow everybody to call them in the default configuration of
> their software.

a so because some stupid developers all are faulty?

> > bullshit, many of the "seasoned, responsible admins" which are only
> > admins are unable to really understand the implications of whatever
> > config they rollout
>
> It was the developer who created and published this vulnerable software
> or the vulnerable default configuration in the first place.

it was the admin who did not RTFM and rolled out default
settings in environents with untrustable code

> If a user/administrator who installs software has to turn insecure
> features OFF its the developer who is to blame, and of course the
> testers, the QA and the management too

not entirely untrue, but anybody who thinks he can install
whatever server-software with defaults, not RTFM and call
hiself a serious admin is a fool

again:
symlinks are to not poision always and everywhere
they become where untrusted customer code is running
blame the admin which doe snot know his job and not
the language offering a lot of functions where some
can be misused

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