Dailydave mailing list archives

Re: Cisco and Vocera wireless LAN VoIP devices don't check certificates


From: "George Ou" <george_ou () lanarchitect net>
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2008 13:19:10 -0800

Sure, if the client does not lock down the "server name" subject field in
the certificate, and the certificate authority isn't locked down to an
internal CA, then it's as good as wide open.  The EAP clients are very hard
to properly configure unlike the typical web browser which automatically
compares the certificate subject field to the URL address.

This Vocera/Cisco case is much worse though, since no amount of care in the
deployment is going to help you.  The client makes zero effort to verify the
certificate due to CPU resource limitations in these Wireless embedded
devices.


George

-----Original Message-----
From: Joshua Wright [mailto:jwright () hasborg com] 
Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2008 6:26 AM
To: George Ou
Cc: dailydave () lists immunitysec com
Subject: Re: [Dailydave] Cisco and Vocera wireless LAN VoIP devices don't
check certificates

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| That means you can basically put up your own bogus access point with a
rogue
| RADIUS backend with your own self-signed digital certificate claiming it's
| the same as the certificate the client is use to seeing.  Since the client
| never bothers to cryptographically check the signature, it thinks it's
| talking to the right server and it will send its hashed password or pin to
| the server making it very easy to crack.

Similarly, if you have a valid certificate for RADIUS from a trusted CA
for any organization, you can impersonate other legitimate RADIUS
servers and get access to inner EAP authentication credentials (MS-CHAP,
PAP and CHAP, for example).

This was the premise for the talk I gave with Brad Antoniewicz at
Shmoocon on Sunday FreeRADIUS WPE (Wireless Pwnage Edition) simplifies
this attack by customizing FreeRADIUS behavior and configuration:

http://www.willhackforsushi.com/FreeRADIUS_WPE.html

- -Josh
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