Dailydave mailing list archives
Re: SSL MITM fun.
From: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf () coredump cx>
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2009 21:16:38 +0100
have HTTPS://www.paypal.com/?domain.cn?<some args> validateUnless I'm missing something, this is essentially what Eric Johanson said in 2005 about IDN: http://www.shmoo.com/idn/homograph.txt
Yes, and unless I am mistaken, most browsers should take a number of countermeasures, including banning many homographs not consistent with user's current script, or the script of the target domain; in particular, I think /-lookalikes are banned in most implementations, making this vector much less plausible. The screenshots in that presentation seem to be of Firefox 1.5, judging from UI icons.
If you can sit between endpoints, modify traffic, and you control one of the eventual endpoints anyway, and only you're jumping through all these hoops to maintain the illusion for the unsuspecting user, why not just take control of DNS and *actually* MITM SSL?
To avoid scary security warnings. /mz _______________________________________________ Dailydave mailing list Dailydave () lists immunitysec com http://lists.immunitysec.com/mailman/listinfo/dailydave
Current thread:
- SSL MITM fun. Dave Aitel (Feb 19)
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- SSL MITM fun. Dan Moniz (Feb 19)
- Re: SSL MITM fun. Alexander Sotirov (Feb 19)
- Re: SSL MITM fun. Dan Moniz (Feb 19)
- Re: SSL MITM fun. Chris Weber (Feb 20)
- Re: SSL MITM fun. Michal Zalewski (Feb 20)
- Re: SSL MITM fun. Alexander Sotirov (Feb 20)
- Re: SSL MITM fun. Michal Zalewski (Feb 20)
- Re: SSL MITM fun. Robert Święcki (Feb 20)
- Message not available
- Re: SSL MITM fun. Michal Zalewski (Feb 20)
- SSL MITM fun. Dan Moniz (Feb 19)
- Message not available
- Re: SSL MITM fun. Michal Zalewski (Feb 19)
- Re: SSL MITM fun. Berend-Jan Wever (Feb 19)
- Re: SSL MITM fun. Fyodor (Feb 19)
- Re: SSL MITM fun. Richard Bejtlich (Feb 20)
- Re: SSL MITM fun. jmoss (Feb 24)
- Re: SSL MITM fun. Dragos Ruiu (Feb 19)
