Re: "I hunt Sys-Admins"

[Dave Aitel <dave.aitel () gmail com>]

I wrote a slightly longer piece on this today here:
http://cybersecpolitics.blogspot.com/2016/07/when-is-cyber-attack-act-of-war.html

But to address the CERT question directly, I will pose a few distinct
arguments as to how Cyber is a special snowflake and CERTS are clearly
legitimate targets.

First, the things I've read coming out of the UN/Tallinn have made few
inroads into defining the difference between CNE and CNA. From an espionage
standpoint, CERTS are clear high priority targets because they collect
information on your attacks, but also on other nation states who have been
caught, which can be fed directly into your national intrusion response.

Likewise, while it is annoying to have your CERT non-functional, a CNA
attack on a CERT is not life-ending or otherwise special in any way - I'm
not privy to whatever discussion at the UN/Tallinn drove them to the
conclusion that a CERT was something special in the response fabric - one
could as well label "Amazon AWS" as off limits. As much as I love the
people on our CERTs, we have duplicate response effort in many different
agencies (in particular, DHS/NSA/FBI/CIA/DOD). No sane country is going to
take CNE against CERTs off the plate.

If what you're saying is: There are some places you should not attack, I
would point out that the translation into cyber world is "There are some
effects on systems you should try not to have". For example: "Trojan
anything you want, but don't actually damage the dam system near NY because
we will respond to that as it could cause massive loss of life and clean
water".

The thing that makes Cyber special here is that there is no end to the
thread when you pull on it - there is no red line you can draw around a
hospital or dam system.

-dave

On Tue, Jul 12, 2016 at 3:04 PM Alex Grigsby <AGrigsby () cfr org> wrote:

> I agree with most of the points you raise (esp. with respect to the
> vagueness of "critical infrastructure") but I'll push back a bit on your
> CERT point.
>
> You're right that a CERT would likely be a prime target during a conflict,
> but just because a country would want to pwn a CERT doesn't necessarily
> mean that it should. Over the last 100+ years, countries have agreed to not
> deliberately target certain installations in wartime even if it's in their
> strategic interest to do so. For example, the laws of war prohibit the
> targeting hospitals or anything with a red cross/red crescent (
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protective_sign) even if it would be
> militarily advantageous for a country to do so (i.e. less enemies on the
> battlefield). Same thing goes for restrictions on certain weapons (e.g.
> chemical weapons in the case of the Geneva protocol or booby traps in the
> case of the Conventional Weapons convention).
>
> Countries have agreed to these restrictions largely on the basis of
> reciprocity--we won't do it to you if you don't do it to us. It doesn't
> necessarily mean that all states will comply, but they create a strong norm
> in favor of their adherence.
>
> Based on the history of the laws of war, it doesn't seem completely
> ridiculous that countries could eventually come to some sort of
> understanding that CERTs are off limits.
>
> Alex
>
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>    1. "I hunt Sys-Admins" (dave aitel)
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> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2016 15:15:12 -0400
> From: dave aitel <dave () immunityinc com>
> To: "dailydave () lists immunityinc com"
>         <dailydave () lists immunityinc com>
> Subject: [Dailydave] "I hunt Sys-Admins"
> Message-ID: <5fc94935-e035-6b70-5d55-7f16d7f25992 () immunityinc com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Occasionally I like to reflect, as you all do, on the various things that
> have mis-shaped our understanding of cyber war.
>
> For example, take this Intercept article based on the Snowden leaks:
>
> https://theintercept.com/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
>
> Viewed in hindsight, this article points very closely at something I'm
> going to support in depth in an article coming out shortly, which is that
> *the term "Critical Infrastructure" does not apply in cyber the way defense
> strategists think it does*. I mention this, which may seem obvious to the
> readership of this list, because if you read policy papers they go on an on
> about how nations should avoid "attacking" each others "critical
> infrastructure" as a "norm". They don't, of course, consider defining a lot
> of terms in any specificity, but they do mention that under no
> circumstances should CERTs be attacked. Which clearly is ridiculous because
> in cyberwar the CERT is something you will have penetrated first so you
> know when you've been caught everywhere else.
> Likewise, CERTs are usually very easy to attack. Likewise, top on your
> list is secure () microsoft com, and every other security contact. And in
> order to claim those things as "off limits" we have to declare huge swaths
> of infrastructure (often unknown ahead of time) as off limits.
>
> Also visible in retrospect is that people love to focus on the catchy
> phrases. "I hunt sys-admins". Sure you do! But that means your strategic
> offensive efforts have already failed at least twice. In order to get to
> the point where "I hunt sys-admins" team is involved, you have to get
> through "I hunt developers", "I hunt other hackers", and "I hunt system
> integrators". And even above them is "I hunt standards developers and
> cryptographers" (aka, NIST :) ).
>
> -dave
>
>
>
>
>
>
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