Firewall Wizards mailing list archives

RE: Security Policy


From: "McKenna, Joe" <a206527 () fmr com>
Date: Thu, 23 Oct 1997 08:35:58 -0400

Todd,

For the most part, I agree that the security policy should be the same
for the firewall and the rest of the organization.  It make sense that
you would want to control access to critical systems, limit the number
of users on the system, etc...  But, there are policies that are
mandatory in a firewall might be a hard sell for the rest of the
organization.  Such as strong authentication.  Smart card, SNK token,
one time passwords make very good sense for the firewall and the
organization, but implementing this on an HR system with hundreds of
users can be a management nightmare.  So people take the easy way out by
using login name and password and hope others won't probe and snoop.
The policy can be stated, but enforcing it is another matter.  I think
we need to send Adam Shostack after the CEO/CIO and have him give them a
good scare...

Thanks,
Joe
(617) 563-8569
joe.mckenna () fidelity com

The above comments have been formed by me for me and has nothing to do
with Fidelity Investments and rightly so...

There are times to panic and times not to panic...
... but off hand, I can't see what good panicking would do...

-----Original Message-----
From:  Bennett Todd [SMTP:bet () rahul net]
Sent:  Wednesday, October 22, 1997 7:50 AM
To:    firewall-wizards () nfr net
Subject:       Re: Security Policy

On Mon, Oct 20, 1997 at 03:20:59PM +0200, Wolfgang 'Robyn' Braun wrote:
[...] I get the feeling that something very basic is missing, and
last night i found out what it is: A Security Policy! [...] I
know what should be allowed across the firewall and i know how to
implement it (actually i already did it on my private subnet) -
but i really don't know how to write a security policy.

The content of a security policy need be no more than what you
say you know --- what should be allowed across the firewall. The
security policy serves two purposes: first, and critical for
firewall implementation, it documents what the firewall is supposed
to accomplish. Second, and critical for firewall _maintenance_,
it documents, either explicity in its text, or else implicitly by
the negotiation process that created it, the rationale behind the
spec --- the justifications in terms of organizational needs and
risk exposures and implementation costs. This in turn is the source
of authority you must have when people come and ask for services
that aren't approved by the protocol, and it further implies the
appropriate steps to take to revise the policy.

But the security policy really should specify more than just the
firewall. Unless you have guards searching everyone who enters
and leaves every entrance and exit to your center; unless you
have mechanically-tamper-resistant-and-alarmed wiring systems for
all in-house telecomms; unless your in-house systems and networks
are awesomely tightly secured; unless you are a really hideously
paranoid shop --- the firewall is only there to enforce the same
rules you want to have everywhere; they are basics like ``don't
release company proprietary data to the outside world; don't corrupt
or destroy business-critical data; don't import destructive or
illegal data from the outside''. The firewall is there mostly
because without it, it's usually easy for someone _outside_ the
organization to violate your security policy unassisted. You still
really want to document the organization's security goals, and make
sure people understand them, and make sure your firewall config is
consistent with them. If you try to enforce a level of security with
the firewall, and that level is seriously inconsistent --- stricter
or more relaxed --- than the rest of the organization's security
posture, then you are doing something wrong.

Is there some sort of guideline on how to write a security policy?

There are many. The key rfc would be 1244, the Site Security
Handbook, by the Site Security Policy Handbook Working Group.

-Bennett




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