Firewall Wizards mailing list archives
RE: Allowing DNS servers to operate behind NetScreen 500
From: "Reckhard, Tobias" <tobias.reckhard () secunet com>
Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2003 10:18:24 +0100
Back from the weekend, I find my post has stirred up a bit of a debate.. Replying to both of Rob's mails in one: On Saturday, February 15, 2003 4:11 AM, Rob Payne wrote:
On Fri, Feb 14, 2003 at 08:58:41AM +0100, Reckhard, Tobias wrote:On Thursday, February 13, 2003 3:39 AM, Rob Payne[mailto:rnspayne () the-paynes com] wrote:Nothing personal to anyone, but a lot of firewalls reallyneed to getthese kinds of things right. If they do not, firewallsare going toget in the way of (DNS) security when zones start getting signed. (Rhetorical: Has anyone attempted to fit current DNS data plus RSA/SHA1 keys and signatures in packets 512 datagrams long?)The question is when will DNS RRs ever get signed, if atall. The sheeramount of queries and number of records being requested, aswell as thetremendous increase in payload due to signatures appears tocreate veryreal, practical problems. Seehttp://cr.yp.to/djbdns/forgery.html andhttp://cr.yp.to/talks/2003dnssec.pdf.Tobias, is that some type of bait?
No, it is not. The reason for my response was that I don't know of any currently relevant reason for DNS responses to be over 512 bytes in size. You said that firewalls should be made to cope with such traffic, referring to a 'proposed standard' RFC and mentioned only DNSSEC as an example, one that is candidate for validity, since public/private key cryptography keylengths are indeed too long to fit such keys into single UDP packets. So I brought up the question if the example is actually valid, seeing that there is at least some disagreement in the DNS community on DNSSEC or, rather, the topic of securing DNS traffic, which in this context means guaranteeing the authenticity of DNS information to resolving clients.
DJB's ideas on the issue are quite well known,
This is where we disagree. djbdns is gaining in popularity, yes. However, there is a lot of disinformation and wrong quoting. I'm not able to say anything about which parties are responsible for how much and how harmful of the FUD that there is, but DJB is certainly among its victims. From what I've seen, his ideas are quite often not understood correctly. Therefore, I can't agree with your assertion that his "ideas on the issue are quite well known", unless "quite" can be replaced with "somewhat" or similar.
he thinks we should all go back to a hosts file and copying it from machine to machine.
What are you referring to here? I haven't seen any evidence of this myself.
Are you using ``nym-based security'', currently? When are you going to start?
No, I'm not. Need I in order to be able to discuss the topic? Have you tried it yourself? Actually, unless we implemented it ourselves, neither of us can currently use nym-based security, since there isn't any software that supports it.
Well, to get an answer on that, you might have to talk to some other than DJB, who has no practical experience if he thinks you can rename your machines every time you change keys. From the forgery.html page you referenced, ``The idea is simply to give each computer a name that includes the computer's nym, a fingerprint of the computer's public key.''
I am fully prepared to admit that I can't take a stance of my own on the issue yet, since I myself haven't yet delved into the topic(s) deeply enough. From my experience, though, I believe that DJB very much takes practical considerations into account, so I'm somewhat astonished at your words.
Keys need to expire, be revoked, replaced, etc. in a real world crypto setting.
Yes, this can turn into a real problem in some situations.
Computer names cannot change every time a key expires.
Why not? Note that I don't mean the opposite, but you don't supply any reason. The only reason I can come up is that URLs shouldn't change as often as typical key expiration times necessitate. However, if I understand DJB correctly, his 'security information' is never inserted into URLs at all, it is present only on the content server. The client request is modified by the intermediate proxy to include the security info.
If anyone goes with his nym-based security scheme, they will begin to keep the same keys forever, thus defeating the advantage of the key in the first place.
Only if your claim that "computer names cannot change every time a key expires" holds true.
Assuming your question was not meant to be inflammatory, but that you really wanted an answer, here goes. There are operational zones currently being signed. In fact, there was a proposal at IETF 56, (11/2002 in Atlanta,) to begin signing of the root zone (http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ihren-dnsop-interim -signed-root-00.txt).
I'll check that out, thanks for the pointer (and the other one as well). [snip]
If that does not sufficiently answer your question, I would be happy to provide you with any additional information that I can.
Thanks for the offer. I may even come back to you on it. On Saturday, February 15, 2003 9:31 PM, Rob Payne wrote: [snip]
Are you, or more importantly is your employer, going to name systems using the a public key fingerprint? If you do, what happens to the credibility of the system when the name changes because a public key expired and needs to be changed? How about when a system is broken into and the key is compromised?
Doesn't this danger (i.e. compromise of the private key) exist in all public key cryptography implementations? Surely, DNSSEC can't protect against that. Unfortunately I can't be sure I understand your first sentence, but I'll assume that you meant to say "..name systems using public key fingerprints?". You go on to ask what happens to a system's 'credibility' when its name changes due to expiration of the public key. I don't get your meaning entirely. What do you mean with credibility? The way I understood DJBs talk at Stanford, or rather the slides at http://cr.yp.to/talks/2003dnssec.pdf, he doesn't want to change systems' names as they appear to the clients of DNS proxies. He wants magic numbers, keys and cookies to be inserted into specific places of systems' names by the servers. The proxies verify the response's validity with these values. I'm avoiding the question of why the client should trust its proxy.. I don't see that question answered (nor expressed) in DJB's slides.
This is a security list, everyone here should be willing to acknowledge that no systems are "perfectly secure." Given that, why would you use security that is based upon the false assumption that a key is never compromised?
This is all based on your assumption that systems' names never change. I don't think it's impossible to generate new values for k, mX and r (or perhaps merely a subset of them) on a regular basis based on key expiration time. It's a process that can be fully automated and it doesn't bother the clients at all. Granted, you need adequate computing resources and sufficient entropy, which could very well be a problem with big zones. However, I don't see why this isn't the same with DNSSEC. [snip]
regarding DJB. Your reference to Paul Vixie is a nearly direct quote from the same web pages and has absolutely no relevance. "Vixie," as you call him, made that statement in reference to 2535.
The PDF I refer to above quotes Paul Vixie from Nov. 2002, which I assume means the IETF meeting. FYI: "We are still doing basic research on what kind of data model will work for DNS security. After three or four times of saying ''NOW we've got this, THIS TIME for sure'' there's finally some humility in the picture ... ''Wonder if THIS'll work?''... It's impossible to know how many more flag days we'll have before it's safe to burn ROMs ... It sure isn't plain old SIG+KEY, and it sure isn't DS as currently specified. When will it be? We don't know. ... 2535 is already dead and buried. There is no installed base. We're starting from scratch."
The references I listed in my previous messages are aimed at replacing 2535 in a way that fixes the problems that were found when implementing 2535.
I'll check them out.
Let's take this a step farther, so no one feels this has anything to do with any DNS implementors. My point was that firewalls that block fragmented UDP packets used by EDNS are getting in the way of security.
Others argue that EDNS is still fiction and that its future is undecided, especially when its only apparent reason for existence seems to be DNSSEC.
Let's ignore everything currently being done regarding DNSSEC by the IETF since anything regarding DNSSEC not said by Professor B. seems to be such a sensitive topic.
Oh, I am rather unemotional about it. However, the past developments in DNS haven't always been optimal, to say the least, and I feel that, as long as we're still on square one we can and should consider all reasonable possibilities and choose the best. I know DJB isn't always the most pleasant of conversation partners, but I am of the impression that personal matters are influencing the IETF more than they should. Note that I am not making any one party responsible for this.
Instead let's focus on any transaction that simply requires large DNS packets.
We could, but why should we? Would that be of any more than academic value? I'll gladly join you, I don't mind academic discussions at all. However, people implementing security-critical code, such as that used to build firewalls, strive to reduce complexity. In doing so, they sometimes very intentionally implement only those parts of a protocol that they deem necessary. Widespread adoption is a good argument in favour of a feature being considered. An academic nature probably isn't.
For instance, a well-distributed set of name servers whose names have been created using nyms. If you take 13 hosts with names based upon SHA1 fingerprints, and use them as the name servers for a zone, you cannot transmit that DNS message in 512 datagrams. My original point still holds if the firewall blocks fragmented DNS.
I need to investigate how secured lookups using DJB's scheme work in detail before I can answer this.
DNSSEC was an example. It is not the only reason why firewalls need to do the right thing with DNS.
Understood. I agree that DNS (and any other protocol) needs to be handled correctly by firewalls. However, there is not always a consensus as to what that means. And DNSSEC is one very prominent reason for large DNS messages and one that many people have misconceptions about (i.e. many people think it's practically there already and a purely good thing (TM), just like many people think BIND defines DNS). I'd be interested in other, real-world reasons why DNS responses should be allowed to be over 512 bytes in size. Not out of opposition, but out of interest. Cheers, Tobias _______________________________________________ firewall-wizards mailing list firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
Current thread:
- Re: Allowing DNS servers to operate behind NetScreen 500, (continued)
- Re: Allowing DNS servers to operate behind NetScreen 500 Ben Nagy (Feb 04)
- RE: Allowing DNS servers to operate behind NetScreen 500 Reckhard, Tobias (Feb 14)
- Re: Allowing DNS servers to operate behind NetScreen 500 Rob Payne (Feb 14)
- Re: Allowing DNS servers to operate behind NetScreen 500 tqbf (Feb 15)
- Re: Allowing DNS servers to operate behind NetScreen 500 Paul D. Robertson (Feb 15)
- Re: Allowing DNS servers to operate behind NetScreen 500 Rob Payne (Feb 15)
- Re: DNS vs. Bernstein tqbf (Feb 15)
- Re: DNS and Firewalls Rob Payne (Feb 20)
- Re: DNS Extensions and Firewalls Thomas H. Ptacek (Feb 21)
- Re: DNS Extensions and Firewalls Frank Knobbe (Feb 22)
- Re: Allowing DNS servers to operate behind NetScreen 500 Rob Payne (Feb 14)
- Re: Allowing DNS servers to operate behind NetScreen 500 Volker Tanger (Feb 17)
- Re: Allowing DNS servers to operate behind NetScreen 500 Mike Scher (Feb 17)
- Re: Allowing DNS servers to operate behind NetScreen 500 Chuck Swiger (Feb 17)
- Re: Allowing DNS servers to operate behind NetScreen 500 David Lang (Feb 18)
