Firewall Wizards mailing list archives
RE: Link level security with static arp tables
From: "Ben Nagy" <ben () iagu net>
Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2003 11:55:22 +0200
-----Original Message----- From: firewall-wizards-admin () honor icsalabs com [mailto:firewall-wizards-admin () honor icsalabs com] On Behalf Of Debian User Sent: Sunday, October 12, 2003 2:32 PM To: firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com Hello, Problem: [ INET ] ---- <eth1> [ NAT GATEWAY ] <eth0> --- [ LOCAL NET, 50 clients ] I need to limit access to the gateway according to allowed MACs, ie Ethernet frames from allowed MAC addresses are forwarded to and fro in the gateway, but others will be dropped (and logged if possible).
What security problem are you actually solving? "I need to limit access according to MAC address" is a techical requirement, but where did it come from? I'm just curious because if it's something like "Only known and authorised machines shall be able to pass traffic through the gateway" then you have issues, given how easy it is to spoof MAC addresses. If I wanted to attack your setup I would connect, get a list of all the PC MAC addresses (by listening to broadcasts, or by ettercapping your gateway) and then just pick one that was quiet...it gets much worse if you happen to be using any wireless behind the gateway.
I could disable arp on eht0 and use static arp tables in the gw, but that would mean that the gateway won't answer any arp queries, hence the clients will not be able to find it's MAC. Setting up static arp tables in clients is not an option.
I don't think either of those options is going to work...
I could use netfilter MAC matching support in the kernel, but that would mean I have to add 50 rules to the ruleset adding considerable overhead.
You said you only had 50 clients - I don't know netfilter very well but I'll bet you lunch that adding 50 kernel-level MAC permit statements won't make any appreciable performance difference unless you have a 386 as a gateway.
Moreover, it is a link level problem that sould be solved in the same level, so netfilter is not an attractive option. Please comment if I'm wrong.
I completely agree with you here. I would be much more inclined to look at switch-level security (layer 2!), which gives you the option to filter on MAC address, physical switch port or a combination of both (which defeats my attack as outlined above). In addition, you could disable any ports that are not currently in use.
Any solutions?
You could also look at 802.1x - that's kind of designed to solve the problem I think you're asking about, but it's infrastructure-heavy. 'luck! ben _______________________________________________ firewall-wizards mailing list firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
Current thread:
- Link level security with static arp tables Debian User (Oct 13)
- Re: Link level security with static arp tables Luke Butcher (Oct 14)
- Re: Link level security with static arp tables Magosányi Árpád (Oct 15)
- Re: Link level security with static arp tables Paul Robertson (Oct 15)
- RE: Link level security with static arp tables Ben Nagy (Oct 15)
- RE: Link level security with static arp tables R. DuFresne (Oct 15)
- Re: Link level security with static arp tables Bennett Todd (Oct 15)
- Re: Link level security with static arp tables Magosányi Árpád (Oct 15)
- Re: Link level security with static arp tables Luke Butcher (Oct 14)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: Link level security with static arp tables Sloane, David (Oct 14)
