Firewall Wizards mailing list archives
RE: VPN endpoints
From: anyluser <anyluser () yahoo com>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 2004 08:55:07 -0700 (PDT)
Generally speaking since you have no control over the clients they should be treated as trusted but hostile. Sounds like an oxymoron doesnt it? It is! On the one hand you have a service to provide. On the other, when (not if) one client gets infected the VPN connection will be an ingress for propogation within your LAN. The name of the game becomes mitigation, aka acceptable risk. Your best bet (IMHO) would be to put the VPN endpoint within your DMZ and then set up some rules that will only allow the type of traffic that the clients need to go from DMZ-LAN or DMZ-DMZ. As a simplified example, if the users only need HTTP access to an intranet, the port 80 would be the only thing that traverses the DMZ to the server. Everything else, NBT especially, would be denied. In the same example you could even limit HTTP from the VPN server to the Intranet server only, to secure things even further. The best thing you could do is to audit -exactly- what the VPN users and give them exactly that and nothing more. Every port you open between your LAN and DMZ is another ingress point for stuff that will make you have to come in on weekends. -----Original Message----- From: firewall-wizards-admin () honor icsalabs com [mailto:firewall-wizards-admin () honor icsalabs com] On Behalf Of hermit921 Sent: Tuesday, August 24, 2004 12:37 PM To: firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com Subject: [fw-wiz] VPN endpoints We are planning to put a VPN endpoint at our site for remote access. We know nothing about the remote client computers, we just provide an authentication mechanism for the users. The question concerns where we put the VPN endpoint on our network. I figure it this way: 2 VPN device interfaces, either of which can go outside the firewall, on a DMZ, or inside the firewall. That gives us 9 possible arrangements, some of which are ridiculous, but fun to consider. We came down to two configurations. One approach is putting the internal interface on a DMZ. The other approach is to have the VPN bypass the firewall entirely. I am looking for advice on which approach is better, and reasons why. hermit921 _______________________________________________ firewall-wizards mailing list firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? New and Improved Yahoo! Mail - Send 10MB messages! http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail _______________________________________________ firewall-wizards mailing list firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
Current thread:
- RE: VPN endpoints anyluser (Aug 26)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- VPN endpoints Adam Graham (Aug 26)
- RE: VPN endpoints Fetch, Brandon (Aug 26)
- RE: VPN endpoints Smith, Aaron (Aug 26)
- RE: VPN endpoints Melson, Paul (Aug 26)
- Re: VPN endpoints Rodel Collado Urani (Aug 30)
- Re: VPN endpoints Paul D. Robertson (Aug 30)
- Re: VPN endpoints Kevin Sheldrake (Aug 30)
- Re: VPN endpoints Devdas Bhagat (Aug 30)
- Re: VPN endpoints Paul D. Robertson (Aug 30)
- Re: VPN endpoints Devdas Bhagat (Aug 30)
