Firewall Wizards mailing list archives

RE: Defense in Depth to the Desktop


From: "Ben Nagy" <ben () iagu net>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 10:38:29 +0100

Hi Chris,

I like it. I remember floating the same idea about four or five year ago,
using non-encrypted IPSec to isolate the clients instead of VLANs. (not that
it was new even then ;)

Adding the IPSec to the mix has some fringe benefits in terms of eliminating
rogue clients, and being able to make user sensitive rule changes. It also
has some massive downsides for non-homogenous networks, but if you have a
W2K or later client pool I would assert that it's actually nicer.

You might also want to consider (ick) MS ISA Server for networks that have a
predominantly MS client pool (most). That will give you much better state
tracking for the tricksy SMB/CIFS/NetBIOS stuff, as well as user sensitive
rules as a side benefit. There are not many Stateful Packet Filters that can
do 'proper' state for ms-rpc and other nasty windows stuff which uses a lot
of UDP. Many (most?) just open up the UDP port for return traffic for a time
window. Well, at least they used to.

One small flaw in your model is the "lurker worm" that sits on a server and
waits for a client to connect on the appropriate service. Imagine, for
example, a 0day LSASS worm - if the server is infected then the client pool
will be rapidly infected as well, because as soon as they talk to a domain
controller (in windowsland) the DC will helpfully send them a copy of the
worm for free. This doesn't invalidate the model, but it's an important
clarification of limitations. This is kind of similar to download.ject and
the recent IFRAME attacks which used an infected adserver. (so it's not an
alien model to h4x0rs).

I also have some observations - you're using a LOT of vlans. How are you
going to manage that for large client pools? I think that tagging only gives
you 4096 IDs, right? Besides, tagging leaves you open for "side to side"
client infections for clients that are new / misconfigured / not supposed to
be there. I suppose you would want to use switchport based VLANs, but that
sounds like switch config hell.

Overall, I kinda like the model. I think your big vulnerabilities are the
configuration management and the VLANs (also insert "VLANs were not made to
enforce security barriers" rant here), and also the technical details of the
statefulness of your firewall with respect to lurker worms.

Cheers,

ben

-----Original Message-----
From: firewall-wizards-admin () honor icsalabs com 
[mailto:firewall-wizards-admin () honor icsalabs com] On Behalf 
Of Chris Pugrud
Sent: Thursday, December 02, 2004 8:24 PM
To: firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com
Subject: [fw-wiz] Defense in Depth to the Desktop


Defense in Depth to the Desktop
the Strong Internal Network Defense model

Most organizations have expended large amounts of money and 
resources in
strengthening their perimeter defenses, primarily through 
firewalls and similar
network hardware mechanisms.  Additionally, most 
organizations rely only on
operating system security controls for the internal networks, 
not applying
strong internal security controls.  The lack of strong 
internal security
controls is highlighted when the internal network and systems suffer
catastrophic failure when attackers, malware, and, most 
destructively, worm
viruses make their way into the network inside the defensive 
perimeter.  This
is the classic "eggshell" weakness of network security, hard 
and crunchy on the
outside, soft and chewy on the inside.  The Strong Internal 
Network Defense
(SIND) model attempts to address this key vulnerability 
through the application
of hard internal defenses through network hardware.

Overview

Consider the following example of a simplified network.  The 
network is divided
into two subnets; one subnet contains all of the client 
systems, while the
second subnet contains all of the servers.  The client subnet 
and the server
subnet are separated by a session based, stateful, packet 
filtering firewall. 
The firewall is unidirectional; it only permits traffic that 
is initiated from
a client to a server.  Servers are allowed to reply to 
clients, but they can
not initiate communication, TCP or UDP, to a client.

Surprisingly, this example does not break Microsoft or most 
application [*1]
protocols.  The result is counterintuitive, but analysis and 
testing support
this assertion.

In addition to the firewall, the client systems are fully 
isolated from each
other by layer 2 controls (private vlans).  The servers may 
be similarly
isolated, but doing so is minimally effective and damaging to 
server to server
communications.

Consider the introduction of a zero day worm virus [*2] into 
such a network by
an infected client.  The client can attack all of the 
servers, and all of the
servers may become infected.  The infected client can not 
attack any of the
other clients because of the layer 2 isolation.  The infected 
servers can not
attack any of the clients because of the firewall.  The end 
result is that one
client and the servers, a small subset of the organization, 
are infected.  This
is much less devastating, and much easier to clean up, than 
if the entire
network was infected.

[*1]  MAPI, the protocol used by MS Exchange clients 
(outlook) and the server
has a quirk, acknowledged by Microsoft, affecting new mail 
notification. 
Despite the presence of a perfectly capable TCP connection 
from client to
server, the server sends a small new mail notification 
message to the client
from a random high port, UDP, to a dynamic high port on the 
client.  Microsoft
has acknowledged the issue, as highlighted by using clients 
through a NAT
gateway, but does not give an indication that they care to fix it.

[*2] The infamous zero day worm virus is invoked as a worse 
case analysis
because it invalidates anti-virus and patch defense 
mechanisms.  Since worms
are increasingly targeting necessary network ports, personal 
firewalls are also
equally invalidated as a defense mechanism.  Marcus can 
gleefully dance on
their graves.

Analysis

The primary design of the model is to focus security 
resources on the servers. 
No organization can reasonably maintain strict control over 
client systems, but
they do have absolute control over making sure that servers 
are currently
patched and running the latest AV signatures.  The need to 
keep client systems
on the patch and AV treadmill is greatly diminished.  Client 
systems can not
directly affect the security of other clients systems, they 
can only attempt to
harm the servers and themselves.

Application protocols that are broken are peer to peer 
systems and any kind of
desktop file sharing.  This is strongly viewed as a good thing in most
organizations.  If I was an attacker going after juicy data 
the first place I
would look is the poorly secured desktops of the CEO and CFO. 
 Since many
organization appear to be IDS blind on client segments, Id 
probably fly under
the radar as well.

The model can be easily supplemented with port and protocol 
restrictions to
further protect the servers from the clients.

The model is very easily scalable, the example is for 
demonstration purposes. 
Research suggests the addition of: a tightly protected 
master server segment,
for servers that query clients (server -> client protocols, 
security scanners,
dhcp, backup servers?); a resources segment for things only 
used by the
servers, like printers; the Internet (duh!); and something 
intuitive keeps
wanting to separate out authorization servers (Domain 
Controllers) as well. 
Draw circles on the white board for each segment with arrows 
to model the
firewall, any arrows that point at the clients have the 
potential to infect the
entire organization, youve been warned.

With good IP space management, the model should scale across a WAN.

Questions? (aka, what have I missed?)

Chris


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