Firewall Wizards mailing list archives
RE: Defense in Depth to the Desktop
From: "Ben Nagy" <ben () iagu net>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 10:38:29 +0100
Hi Chris, I like it. I remember floating the same idea about four or five year ago, using non-encrypted IPSec to isolate the clients instead of VLANs. (not that it was new even then ;) Adding the IPSec to the mix has some fringe benefits in terms of eliminating rogue clients, and being able to make user sensitive rule changes. It also has some massive downsides for non-homogenous networks, but if you have a W2K or later client pool I would assert that it's actually nicer. You might also want to consider (ick) MS ISA Server for networks that have a predominantly MS client pool (most). That will give you much better state tracking for the tricksy SMB/CIFS/NetBIOS stuff, as well as user sensitive rules as a side benefit. There are not many Stateful Packet Filters that can do 'proper' state for ms-rpc and other nasty windows stuff which uses a lot of UDP. Many (most?) just open up the UDP port for return traffic for a time window. Well, at least they used to. One small flaw in your model is the "lurker worm" that sits on a server and waits for a client to connect on the appropriate service. Imagine, for example, a 0day LSASS worm - if the server is infected then the client pool will be rapidly infected as well, because as soon as they talk to a domain controller (in windowsland) the DC will helpfully send them a copy of the worm for free. This doesn't invalidate the model, but it's an important clarification of limitations. This is kind of similar to download.ject and the recent IFRAME attacks which used an infected adserver. (so it's not an alien model to h4x0rs). I also have some observations - you're using a LOT of vlans. How are you going to manage that for large client pools? I think that tagging only gives you 4096 IDs, right? Besides, tagging leaves you open for "side to side" client infections for clients that are new / misconfigured / not supposed to be there. I suppose you would want to use switchport based VLANs, but that sounds like switch config hell. Overall, I kinda like the model. I think your big vulnerabilities are the configuration management and the VLANs (also insert "VLANs were not made to enforce security barriers" rant here), and also the technical details of the statefulness of your firewall with respect to lurker worms. Cheers, ben
-----Original Message----- From: firewall-wizards-admin () honor icsalabs com [mailto:firewall-wizards-admin () honor icsalabs com] On Behalf Of Chris Pugrud Sent: Thursday, December 02, 2004 8:24 PM To: firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com Subject: [fw-wiz] Defense in Depth to the Desktop Defense in Depth to the Desktop the Strong Internal Network Defense model Most organizations have expended large amounts of money and resources in strengthening their perimeter defenses, primarily through firewalls and similar network hardware mechanisms. Additionally, most organizations rely only on operating system security controls for the internal networks, not applying strong internal security controls. The lack of strong internal security controls is highlighted when the internal network and systems suffer catastrophic failure when attackers, malware, and, most destructively, worm viruses make their way into the network inside the defensive perimeter. This is the classic "eggshell" weakness of network security, hard and crunchy on the outside, soft and chewy on the inside. The Strong Internal Network Defense (SIND) model attempts to address this key vulnerability through the application of hard internal defenses through network hardware. Overview Consider the following example of a simplified network. The network is divided into two subnets; one subnet contains all of the client systems, while the second subnet contains all of the servers. The client subnet and the server subnet are separated by a session based, stateful, packet filtering firewall. The firewall is unidirectional; it only permits traffic that is initiated from a client to a server. Servers are allowed to reply to clients, but they can not initiate communication, TCP or UDP, to a client. Surprisingly, this example does not break Microsoft or most application [*1] protocols. The result is counterintuitive, but analysis and testing support this assertion. In addition to the firewall, the client systems are fully isolated from each other by layer 2 controls (private vlans). The servers may be similarly isolated, but doing so is minimally effective and damaging to server to server communications. Consider the introduction of a zero day worm virus [*2] into such a network by an infected client. The client can attack all of the servers, and all of the servers may become infected. The infected client can not attack any of the other clients because of the layer 2 isolation. The infected servers can not attack any of the clients because of the firewall. The end result is that one client and the servers, a small subset of the organization, are infected. This is much less devastating, and much easier to clean up, than if the entire network was infected. [*1] MAPI, the protocol used by MS Exchange clients (outlook) and the server has a quirk, acknowledged by Microsoft, affecting new mail notification. Despite the presence of a perfectly capable TCP connection from client to server, the server sends a small new mail notification message to the client from a random high port, UDP, to a dynamic high port on the client. Microsoft has acknowledged the issue, as highlighted by using clients through a NAT gateway, but does not give an indication that they care to fix it. [*2] The infamous zero day worm virus is invoked as a worse case analysis because it invalidates anti-virus and patch defense mechanisms. Since worms are increasingly targeting necessary network ports, personal firewalls are also equally invalidated as a defense mechanism. Marcus can gleefully dance on their graves. Analysis The primary design of the model is to focus security resources on the servers. No organization can reasonably maintain strict control over client systems, but they do have absolute control over making sure that servers are currently patched and running the latest AV signatures. The need to keep client systems on the patch and AV treadmill is greatly diminished. Client systems can not directly affect the security of other clients systems, they can only attempt to harm the servers and themselves. Application protocols that are broken are peer to peer systems and any kind of desktop file sharing. This is strongly viewed as a good thing in most organizations. If I was an attacker going after juicy data the first place I would look is the poorly secured desktops of the CEO and CFO. Since many organization appear to be IDS blind on client segments, Id probably fly under the radar as well. The model can be easily supplemented with port and protocol restrictions to further protect the servers from the clients. The model is very easily scalable, the example is for demonstration purposes. Research suggests the addition of: a tightly protected master server segment, for servers that query clients (server -> client protocols, security scanners, dhcp, backup servers?); a resources segment for things only used by the servers, like printers; the Internet (duh!); and something intuitive keeps wanting to separate out authorization servers (Domain Controllers) as well. Draw circles on the white board for each segment with arrows to model the firewall, any arrows that point at the clients have the potential to infect the entire organization, youve been warned. With good IP space management, the model should scale across a WAN. Questions? (aka, what have I missed?) Chris _______________________________________________ firewall-wizards mailing list firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
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Current thread:
- Defense in Depth to the Desktop Chris Pugrud (Dec 05)
- Re: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Magosányi Árpád (Dec 07)
- Re: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Chris Pugrud (Dec 07)
- Re: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Magosányi Árpád (Dec 11)
- protection models Chris Pugrud (Dec 11)
- Re: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Chris Pugrud (Dec 07)
- Re: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Magosányi Árpád (Dec 07)
- Re: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Rogan Dawes (Dec 07)
- Re: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Chris Pugrud (Dec 07)
- RE: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Ben Nagy (Dec 07)
- RE: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Chris Pugrud (Dec 07)
- RE: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Scott Stursa (Dec 11)
- RE: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Chris Pugrud (Dec 11)
- RE: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Chris Pugrud (Dec 07)
- Re: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Chris Pugrud (Dec 13)
- Re: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Paul D. Robertson (Dec 13)
- Re: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Frederick M Avolio (Dec 13)
- Re: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Chris Pugrud (Dec 14)
- Re: Defense in Depth to the Desktop Chris Pugrud (Dec 14)
