Firewall Wizards mailing list archives
Re: Security of HTTPS
From: Kevin <kkadow () gmail com>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 18:18:12 -0600
On Tue, 23 Nov 2004 09:24:45 +0100, Ben Nagy <ben () iagu net> wrote: . . .
or total mis-use of the protocol to ignore server authentication (nobody does that although it is supported in theory).
Are you referring to checking for a trusted signature on the certificate presented by the server, or some other server authentication? I am not aware of any current web browser which fails to check whether the server certificate is signed by a trusted CA. This was once a "feature" of lynx-ssl, since resolved. However, there are quite a few applications which tout SSL/TLS encryption as a security measure, yet make no attempt to validate the server certificate. It's perhaps reasonable for the application to present a "certificate warning" dialog giving the user the option to ignore the problem and proceed, but much more difficult to stomach an application which doesn't even check validity at all. Getting back on the topic of firewalls, I wonder if it would be possible for a firewall not doing MITM for SSL to validate the certificate presented by the remote server, and terminate the attempted SSL session if the certificate does not match the remote host, is not signed by an acceptable CA or has been revoked? This would not entirely eliminate the threat of applications tunneling other protocols inside SSL, but would provide enhanced protection against clients which do not perform adequate certificate validation, with relatively low overhead. Kevin Kadow _______________________________________________ firewall-wizards mailing list firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
Current thread:
- RE: Security of HTTPS Ben Nagy (Dec 02)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: Security of HTTPS Dave Piscitello (Dec 02)
- Re: Security of HTTPS Kevin (Dec 05)
- RE: Security of HTTPS Ben Nagy (Dec 07)
- Re: Security of HTTPS David Lang (Dec 26)
